Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Firefighter Jamie Rodriguez was called into a meeting with Fire Chief Larry Hodge for an interview of Rodriguez regarding a personnel complaint Hodge had filed against him. Rodriguez requested to have a representative from the Fire Fighters Association present during the interview. Hodge denied the request and interviewed Rodriguez without Association representation. Rodriguez was subsequently suspended for five days. Rodriguez and the Association later filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that Hodge and the City violated Rodriguez's right to union representation and asserting that such a right was conferred by Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 101.001. The trial court granted summary judgment for Rodriguez and the Association, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 101.001 does not confer on Texas public-sector employees the right to union representation at an investigatory interview that the employee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action. View "City of Round Rock v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff hired Defendant to repair foundation problems on her home. The foundation repair contract specified that Defendant would perform the foundation repair in a good and workmanlike manner and adjust the foundation for the life of the home due to settling. In 2006, Plaintiff sued Defendant for, inter alia, breach of an express warranty, breach of the common-law warranty of good and workmanlike repairs, and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims. The trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff on her breach of implied warranty of good and workmanlike repairs and DTPA claims. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Plaintiff take nothing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) parties cannot disclaim but can supersede the implied warranty for good and workmanlike repair of tangible goods or property if the parties' agreement specifically describes the manner, performance, or quality of the services; (2) the express warranty in this case sufficiently described the manner, performance, or quality of the services so as to supersede the implied warranty; and (3) Plaintiff's remaining DTPA claims were time barred. View "Gonzales v. Sw. Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC" on Justia Law

El Dorado Land Company sold property to the City of McKinney for use as a park. El Dorado's special warranty deed provided that the conveyance was subject to the restriction that the community only be used for that purpose. If the City decided not to use the property as a community park, the deed granted El Dorado the right to purchase the property. Ten years after acquiring the property, the City built a public library on part of the land. El Dorado notified the City it intended to exercise its option to purchase, but after the City failed to acknowledge El Dorado's rights under the deed, El Dorado sued for inverse condemnation. The trial court sustained the City's plea to the jurisdiction, finding that El Dorado's claim did not involve a compensable taking of property but, rather, a breach of contract for which the City's governmental immunity had not been waived. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in its deed to the City, El Dorado retained a reversionary interest in the property that was a property interest capable of being taken by condemnation. Remanded. View "El Dorado Land Co., LP v. City of McKinney" on Justia Law

Landowner purchased property for the purpose of developing the land, obtained permits, and filled a portion of the property to the 100-year flood level. The municipality subsequently constructed a facility partly on the property that would detain storm water on the property in a significant flood, thus causing the property again to be below the 100-year flood level and undevelopable without additional fill. Landowner sought damages under statutory and inverse condemnation theories. The trial court ruled in favor of Landowner and awarded damages of $694,600. The court of appeals reversed as to the inverse condemnation claim, holding the claim was premature because the property had not yet flooded. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claim was not premature because Landowner's claim was for the present inability to develop the property as previously approved unless the property was filled. Remanded. View "Kopplow Dev., Inc. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

Father was ordered to pay child support each month to Mother. Father failed to make payments for several months, resulting in an arrearage of thousands of dollars. The Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office filed a motion to enforce the support order, asserting six counts of contempt. Before a hearing was held, Father paid the entire arrearage but then accumulated a new arrearage of an even greater amount. The trial court held Father in contempt for the failures to make timely child support payments and sentenced him to serve 174 days in jail. The court of appeals ordered the trial court to vacate its contempt order, holding that Defendant could invoke Tex. Fam. Code 157.162(d) at the hearing, despite the outstanding arrearage, because he had become "current" on the missed payments that were pled in the motion. The Supreme Court instructed the appellate court to vacate its judgment, thus reinstating the trial court's order, holding that, pursuant to section 157.162(d), an obligor must be current on court-ordered child support payments due at the time of the enforcement hearing, regardless of whether those payments have been pled in the motion for enforcement, in order to avoid a finding of contempt. View "In re Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

After a trial, the trial court ordered the termination of Mother's parental rights to her two children. Before the trial court signed the termination order, Mother's trial counsel filed a "motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, notice of appeal." Two days later, Mother's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Approximately a month later, the trial court signed the termination order, granted the motion to withdraw, and appointed appellate counsel. The court of appeals dismissed the motion for a new trial or notice of appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that Mother's combined filing was not a bona fide attempt to invoke its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the present filing expressed an intent to appeal to the court of appeals and was partially entitled a notice of appeal, which constituted a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction upon its filing with the trial court clerk. Remanded. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

Roark Amusement & Vending owned and leased coin-operated amusement crane machines found in supermarkets, restaurants, and shopping malls. Roark sought a refund of the sales taxes it paid on the plush toys it purchased to stock its machines for a three-and-a-half year period, arguing that the toys were exempt under the Tax Code's sale-for-resale exemption. The Comptroller of Public Accounts disputed that the exemption applied. The trial court granted the Comptroller's motion for summary judgment and denied Roark's refund request. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the toys were exempt, and remanded the case for a determination of the refund amount due Roark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the toys were "tangible personal property" acquired by Roark "fore the purpose of transferring" the toys "as an integral part of a taxable service", and therefore, Roark qualified for a sales-tax exemption on the toys that filled its crane machines. View "Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, LP" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an employee's report to a supervisor about an employer's or co-worker's "violation of law" is a report to an "appropriate law enforcement authority" under the Texas Whistleblower Act where the employee knows his supervisor's power extends only to ensuring internal compliance with the law purportedly violated. Here the supervisor, while overseeing internal adherence to the law, was empowered only to refer suspected violations elsewhere and lacked free-standing enforcement or crime-fighting authority. Plaintiff filed a whistleblower suit charging that his demotion was in retaliation for reporting the university's violations of unspecified federal patient-care and resident-supervision rules. The lower courts denied the university's plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for a plaintiff to satisfy the Act's good-faith provision, the plaintiff must reasonably believe the reported-to authority possess the power to enforce the laws purportedly violated or prosecute suspected criminal wrongdoing; and (2) as no jurisdictionally sufficient evidence existed in this case of any objectively reasonable belief in such power, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Gentilello" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued University, her employer, for a violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act, claiming that her supervisor fired her for reporting to University that the supervisor's daughter had received in-state tuition in violation of state law. Plaintiff contended she satisfied the Act by reporting a violation of law to University's president. The trial court granted the university's plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the Act's restrictive definition of "appropriate law enforcement authority" requires that the reported-to entity be charged with more than mere internal adherence to the law allegedly violated; and (2) the evidence did not support a good-faith belief by Plaintiff that the president had authority to "regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated" or to "investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law." View "Tex. A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Moreno" on Justia Law

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds. View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law