Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As tasked by the Legislature, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) identified potential reservoir sites. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. purchased some of the wetlands on one of the sites identified by the TWDB as a potential reservoir location. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied its application for a mitigation banking permit because the State had identified the site as a potential reservoir, Hearts Bluff sued the State and the Corps for a taking for interfering with its asserted right to commercially develop the land as a mitigation bank. At issue was whether a takings claim against the State may be predicated on the denial of a permit by the federal government when the State had no authority to grant or deny the permit. The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, which alleged that Hearts Bluff failed to plead a valid takings claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent demonstrating bad faith, Hearts Bluff did not establish the existence of jurisdiction in this case because it did not establish a viable takings claim. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the City of Austin's condemnation of property to build a parking garage for a nearby convention center and a facility to chill water to cool nearby buildings. A jury found the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was fraudulent, in bad faith, and arbitrary and capricious, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, invalidating the taking. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was not fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious. Remanded. View "City of Austin v. Whittington" on Justia Law

The Texas Tort Claims Act imposes a lesser duty of care on the government when a premises liability claim does not involve a special defect. Plaintiff sued City, claiming that its negligence in creating and failing to repair, or warn of, a street's dangerous condition caused her to have an accident while bicycling. City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the street's condition was not a special defect but rather an ordinary premises defect of which Plaintiff was aware and the City was not. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the condition was a special defect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the condition in this case was not a special defect; and (2) City was not liable for an ordinary premises defect because Plaintiff had no evidence that City knew about this hazard before her accident. View "City of Denton v. Paper" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal, holding (1) the judgment was not final because it did not contain finality language or otherwise state that it was a final judgment and necessarily contemplated resolution of the remaining issues by way of a rehearing, and therefore, the appeal was interlocutory; and (2) no statute permitted an appeal in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed and, for different reasons, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the appeal was interlocutory; (2) the Texas Arbitration Act did not provide jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal; and (3) there is no jurisdiction over arbitration awards that are incomplete unless, under certain circumstances, the parties file a writ of mandamus, which neither party here filed. View "Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was whether the claims of an employee against his employer, both of whom were health care providers, alleging injuries arising out of inadequate training, supervision, risk-mitigation, and safety in a mental health facility, constituted health care liability claims (HCLCs) under the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act). Employer filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Employee's claims constituted HCLCs under the Act and that Employee had not served an expert report on Employer as required under the Act. The trial court denied Employer's motion. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employee here was properly characterized as a "claimant" under the Act and his allegations against his nonsubscribing Employer were health care and safety claims under the Act's definition of HCLCs, requiring an expert report to maintain his lawsuit; and (2) the Act does not conflict with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Remanded. View "Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams " on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Deceptive Trade Practices Act suit against Company and its co-operators for violating the terms of a contract. Through a process server, Plaintiff served all three Defendants with citations, but one citation contained an error in a co-operator's name. Defendants failed to file a timely answer, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that service on the co-operator was improper and that Defendants established the necessary Craddock elements to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants asserted facts that, if true, established the first Craddock element, i.e., that the failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was the result of a mistake or an accident. Remanded for consideration of the second and third elements of the Craddock test. View "Sutherland v. Spencer" on Justia Law

After Employer fired her, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her race, national origin, age, and gender. Employer filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff's pleadings failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because Plaintiff was replaced by another Mexican-American woman who was three years older than Plaintiff. The trial court denied Employer's plea. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the plea should have been granted on the age-discrimination, as replacement by an older worker was not fatal to Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the suit, holding (1) to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), a plaintiff in a true replacement case must show she was (i) a member of the protected class, (ii) qualified for her employment position, (iii) terminated by the employer, and (iv) replaced by someone younger; and (2) because Plaintiff here was replaced by an older worker, she failed to allege a prima facie case, and the trial court should have granted Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction. View "Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

An injured employee (Employee) sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. A claims adjuster with Employer's workers' compensation insurer's (Insurer) third party administrator denied the claim. The Division of Workers' compensation determined that Employee was entitled to medical and temporary income benefits. Employee subsequently brought a bad faith action against Insurer, its third party administrator, and the claims adjuster (Defendants). During discovery, Employee sought communications made between Insurer's lawyer and Employer during the administrative proceedings. Defendants argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The trial court held that the privilege did not apply. The court of appeals subsequently denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between Insurer and its insured. View "In re XL Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This suit was filed by a daughter against an organ donation charity when she discovered that the charity - contrary to an earlier representation to her - would allegedly profit from harvesting her deceased mother's tissues. The charity requested a defense from its insurer, and the insurer denied a defense. The insurer's subsequent suit against the charity resulted in two certified questions from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held (1) the insurance policy provision for coverage of "personal injury" does not include coverage for mental anguish, unrelated to physical damage to or disease of the daughter's body; and (2) the insurance policy provision for coverage of "property damages," does not include coverage for the underlying plaintiff's loss of use of her deceased mother's tissues, organs, bones, and body parts. View "Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc." on Justia Law

Sarah Friend collapsed at a city-owned water park in North Richland Hills. City employees responded with oxygen masks and other airway equipment but did not retrieve an Automatic External Defibrillator device (AED) from a storage closet elsewhere on the park grounds. Sarah died later that day. Friend's estate sued several defendants, including the City and some of its employees, claiming their gross negligence in failing to retrieve and use the AED caused Sarah's untimely death. Pursuant to section 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the trial court dismissed the employees. The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction on three alternative grounds. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the Friends' claims against the City, holding that the City's immunity was not waived by section 101.021 of the Tort Claims Act, which permits a plaintiff to rely on the "condition or use of tangible personal property" waiver provision if the plaintiff alleges that the governmental unit used property that lacked an integral safety component. View "City of North Richland Hills v. Friend " on Justia Law