Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent appealed the URSB's determination that her property was an urban nuisance and that the property should be demolished. The trial court affirmed the USRB's finding that respondent's home was an urban nuisance and awarded the city attorneys fees. The trial court then severed respondent's constitutional claims and tried them to a jury. At the close of trial, the City moved unsuccessfully for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Board's nuisance determination was res judicata, precluding respondent's takings claim. The jury rejected the City's contention that respondent's home was a public nuisance and awarded her for the destruction of her house. The trial court denied the City's post-verdict motions and signed a judgment in conformance with the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the USRB's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The City subsequently petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the URSB's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that the determination was not preclusive because substantial evidence review of nuisance determination resulting in a home's demolition did not sufficiently protect a person's rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. View "City of Dallas v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A property owner appealed an administrative determination that his property was a nuisance and he also asserted a takings claim. The property owner then nonsuited the case. He later filed this suit, again alleging that the government illegally took his property. Because the property owner was collaterally estopped from doing so, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Patel v. City of Everman" on Justia Law

Rafael Casados suffered a fatal, work-related injury while working for two employers that both had workers' compensation coverage. Casados' parents sued one of the employers. At issue was whether workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy to Casados' parents, which would bar their suit against Port Elevator. Because Port Elevator had a workers' compensation policy, Casados was an employee, he suffered a work-related injury, and the jury failed to find Port Elevator grossly negligent, the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), Tex. Lab. Code 406, provided that the exclusive remedy was against the employer's insurer - not the employer. Accordingly, the claim at issue in this appeal was barred. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Port Elevator. View "Port Elevator-Brownsville, L.L.C. v. Casados, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a divorce action between relator and his wife. The relator asked the court to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion when it issued an order granting a motion for new trial "based on all grounds in the motion." The court held that because the successor trial court judge in this case did not state sufficient reasons for his ruling, contrary to the court's holding in In re Columbia, the court conditionally granted relief. View "In re Jeffrey Cook" on Justia Law

This case arose when Norma Sandoval and her sister, Nora Martinez, jointly filed suit against SCI alleging fraud, deceptive trade practices, and other tort claims arising from their respective interment rights and services contracts for family burial plots at Mont Meta Memorial Park. Martinez's contract allowed the court to appoint an arbitrator, while Sandoval's contract required the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to appoint the arbitrator if the parties could not reach a mutual agreement. The trial judge severed the cases and then appointed an arbitrator for Martinez's case. Over the objection of SCI, the trial court also appointed the same arbitrator to arbitrate Sandoval's case. At issue on appeal was whether SCI allowed a lapse or mechanical breakdown in the contractual process for selection of an arbitrator, thereby validating the trial court's intervention to appoint the arbitrator. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing an arbitrator instead of following the agreed-upon method of selection outlined in the contract. As a matter of law, the two-month delay in the selection of an arbitrator in this case, by itself, did not establish a lapse or failure of the parties to avail themselves of the contractual selection method. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, the court conditionally granted SCI's petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its prior order appointing David Calvillo as arbitrator. View "In re Service Corp. Int'l and SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc." on Justia Law

This mandamus proceeding arose from an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The parties entered into a contract for interment rights and services. The contract obligated the parties to arbitrate this dispute over the care and maintenance of the cemetery. The arbitration agreement provided that an arbitrator would either be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or appointed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The parties failed to agree to an arbitrator and the trial court appointed an arbitrator without allowing a reasonable opportunity to procure an appointment by AAA. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus. View "In re Service Corp. Int'l and SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding Allcat, a limited partnership, and one of its limited partners sought an order directing the Comptroller to refund franchise taxes Allcat paid that were attributable to partnership income allocated, but not distributed, to its natural-person partners. Allcat claimed it was entitled to a refund for two reasons. First, the tax facially violated Article VIII, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution because it was a tax on the net incomes of its natural-person partners that was not approved in a statewide referendum. Second, as applied by the Comptroller, to Allcat and its partners, the franchise tax violated Article VIII, Section 1(a) of the Constitution, which required taxation to be equal and uniform. The court held that: (1) the tax was not a tax imposed on the net incomes of the individual partners, thus it did not facially violated Article VIII, Section 24; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the equal and uniform challenge. View "In re Allcat Claims Service, L.P. and John Weakly" on Justia Law

This case concerned an arbitration provision that allowed each party to appoint one arbitrator to a panel, subject to certain requirements. At issue was whether Americo wavied its objection to the removal of the arbitrator it selected. The underlying dispute concerned the financing mechanism for Americo's purchase of several insurance companies from Robert Myer. Pursuant to the financing agreement, Americo and Myer submitted their dispute to arbitration under American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. The arbitrators found in favor of Myer, and Americo filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court granted the motion, holding that Americo was entitled to any arbitrator that met the requirements set forth in the financing agreement and that the arbitrator removed by the AAA met those requirements. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Americo had waived these arguments by not presenting them to the AAA. Because the record demonstrated otherwise, the court rejected the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Americo Life, Inc., et al. v. Myer, et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a dispute over whether the City of Dallas paid its firefighters and police officers in accord with a 1979 ordinance adopted pursuant to a voter-approved referendum. Claiming the City had not properly paid them, some firefighters and police officers brought a class action asserting breach of contract claims and seeking a declaratory judgment. For the reasons set out in City of Dallas v. Albert, the court concluded that: (1) the ordinance's adoption by means of referendum did not result in the City's loss of immunity from suit; (2) the City had immunity from suit as to the declaratory judgment action; (3) by non-suiting its counterclaim the City did not reinstate immunity from suit as to the Officers' claims that were pending against the City when it non-suited the counterclaim; and (4) the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether the Legislature waived the City's immunity by amending the Local Government Code. View "City of Dallas v. Martin, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute between the parties over easements and right-of-ways on plaintiffs' property. Defendant contended that the tort claims against it were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. The court held that plaintiffs' common-law tort claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the estoppel effect of the alleged fraudulent concealment ended in December 2002. Because plaintiffs did not file suit until more than two years after this date, their claims were time-barred. The court agreed that claims for declaratory judgment were moot because defendant had removed its cable lines from plaintiffs' properties prior to trial. Accordingly, the court granted defendant's petition for review and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Etan Industries, Inc., et al. v. Lehmann" on Justia Law