Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two reporters representing three newspapers asked the Department of Public Safety (DPS) for travel vouchers from Governor Rick Perry's security detail. DPS noted that it was responsible for staffing the governor's protective detail and that it did not publicly discuss information related to the governor's protective detail because that information would be valuable to someone who intended to cause the governor harm. At issue was whether the public's right to information was subject to reasonable limitations when its production could lead to physical harm. The court held that the Legislature recognized the importance of protecting physical safety and that several Public Information Act (PIA), Government Code section 552.101 et seq., exceptions were grounded in a concern for physical safety. The court also noted that the Attorney General had applied a special circumstances exception to disclosure in over 230 cases since the 1970's. Therefore, the court held that there was a common law physical safety exception to the PIA and remanded for further proceedings. View "TX Dept. of Public Safety v. Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

The State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) refused to disclose certain decisions and orders in license suspension cases related to delinquent child support. At issue was whether the information was expressly excepted from disclosure by the Texas Public Information Act, Tex. Gov't Code 552.101-,148. The court declined to read the language of the statute broader than it was written and concluded that the purpose and intent of the statute could be fulfilled by disclosing the requested documents. Accordingly, the court held that the decisions and orders must be disclosed after redaction of information expressly excepted from disclosure and not already in a public record or otherwise in the public domain. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearings, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal challenged a final order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) in a true-up proceeding under Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code. AEP Texas Central Co. (AEP), a transmission and distribution utility, and CPL Retail Energy, L.P., its affiliated retail electric provider, initiated a proceeding under section 39.262 to finalize stranded costs and other true-up amounts and the state, several municipalities, and several other parties who were consumers of electricity or represent consumer interests (collectively, consumers), intervened in the proceeding. The issues before the court concern market value, net book value (NBV), and the capacity auction true-up. The court held that where, as here, the utility managed to sell its stake in a nuclear plant, the court saw no error in using the sale of assets method, which was, if anything, the preferred method for valuing generation assets. The court also held that it saw no error in PUC's approach where the interest rate AEP received on its stranded costs was grossed up. The court further held that section 39.262 unambiguously specified that the statutory capacity auction price, not some other blended price the PUC found more appropriate, must be used in calculating the capacity auction true-up amount. On remand, the PUC must recalculate the capacity auction true-up in a manner consistent with the court's opinion in State v. PUC, rather than relying on the proxy price it selected in the true-up proceeding. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, affirming in part and reversing in part. View "AEP Texas Central Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n of Texas, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued respondent for injuries he sustained when the car he was driving collided with respondent's minivan as she was pulling out of a grocery store parking lot. At issue was whether section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code precluded evidence or recovery of expenses that neither the claimant nor anyone acting on is behalf would ultimately be liable for paying. The court held that only evidence of recoverable medical expenses was admissible at trial. The court also held that the collateral source rule continued to apply to such expenses and the jury should not be told that they would be covered in whole or in part by insurance. Nor should the jury be told that a health care provider adjusted its charges because of insurance. Accordingly, section 41.0105 limited recovery and consequently, the evidence at trial, to expenses that the provider had a legal right to be paid. View "Haygood v. Garza de Escabedo" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas seized vehicles, which it alleged were stolen, from a company that was entitled to petition for their return. Instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, the company sued, alleging that its interest in those vehicles had been taken without just compensation. The court held that because the company had actual knowledge of the vehicles seizure the company knew the cars were seized from its lots, and it knew who seized them, it was required to pursue a chapter 47 proceeding. Accordingly, the court held that the availability of the statutory remedy precluded a takings claims and reversed the court of appeals judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the suit. View "City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a commercial bus driver's diagnosis of tuberculosis and subsequent transmission of the disease to passengers. At issue was whether the transmission of a communicable disease from the driver of a motor vehicle to a passenger was a covered loss under a business auto policy, which afforded coverage for accidental bodily injuries resulting from the vehicle's use. The court held that because communicable diseases were not an insured risk under the policy at issue, the court reversed the judgment and rendered judgment for the insurance carrier. View "Lancer Ins. Co. v. Holiday Tours, et al." on Justia Law

1/2 Price Checks Cashed (Half-Price) brought a suit in a Dallas County justice court asserting breach of contract on the basis of the obligation owed by the drawer of a check under Tex. Bus. & Com. 3.414 and requested attorney's fees. At issue was whether a holder of a dishonored check could recover attorney's fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001(8) in an action against a check's drawer under section 3.414. The court held that Half-Price's section 3.414 claim was a suit on a contract to which section 38.001(a) applied and applying section 38.001(8) to the claim did not disrupt Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code's statutory scheme. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a determination of attorney's fees. View "1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against respondent for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Respondent had been employed by petitioner since 1983 and rose to become a managing director. In 2005, respondent signed a Non-Solicitation Agreement and notice form stating that he wanted to exercise a stock option to acquire 3000 shares of stock of petitioner's parent company. At issue was whether a covenant not to compete signed by a valued employee in consideration for stock options, designed to give the employee a greater stake in the company's performance, was unenforceable as a matter of law because the stock options did not give rise to an interest in restraining competition. The court held that, under the terms of the Covenants Not to Compete Act (Act), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 15.50, 52, the consideration for the noncompete agreement (stock options) was reasonably related to the company's interest in protecting its goodwill, a business interest the Act recognized as worthy of protection. Therefore, the noncompete was not unenforceable on that basis. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeal's judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Marsh USA Inc., et al. v. Cook" on Justia Law

LTTS Charter School ("LTTS") was an open-enrollment school that retained C2 Construction, Inc. ("C2") to build school facilities at a site Universal Academy had leased. C2 filed a breach of contract suit and Universal Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea and Universal Academy brought an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In the court of appeals, C2 moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, arguing that Universal Academy was note entitled to one because it was not a governmental unit under the Torts Claims Act ("Act"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001(3)(D). At issue was whether an open-enrollment charter school was a governmental unit as defined by Section 101.001(3)(D) and thus, able to take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. The court held that open-enrollment charter schools were governmental units for the Act purposes because the Act defined government unit broadly to include any other institution, agency, or organ of government derived from state law; the Education Code defined open-enrollment charters schools as part of the public school system, which were created in accordance with the laws of the state, subject to state laws and rules governing public schools and, together with governmental traditional public schools, have the primary responsibility for implementing the state's system of public education; and the Legislature considered open-enrollment charter schools to be governmental entities under a host of other laws outside the Education Code. Accordingly, because Universal Academy was a governmental unit under the Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear its interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8). View "LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued respondent after her son accidently set fire to her six-year-old daughter's dress with a J-26 model BIC lighter, alleging that the daughter's injuries were the result of manufacturing and design defects in the lighter. At issue was whether the design defect claim was preempted by federal law and the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that a design defect in the lighter was a producing cause of the fire that burned the daughter. The court held that the manufacturing defect claim was not preempted by federal law because the court of appeals found an alternative ground for liability, and the court need not determine whether a claim based solely on respondent's failure to comply with its internal specifications would be preempted. The court also held that petitioner presented legally sufficient evidence that the lighter did not meet manufacturing specifications but failed to prove that the deviation was a producing cause of the daughter's injuries. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for respondent. View "BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter" on Justia Law