Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marcos Guerra was buried at Mont Meta Memorial Park cemetery in a plot that had been sold to someone else. When his family refused the cemetery's request that it be allowed to move the body to another burial plot, the cemetery did so anyway. Guerra's family members subsequently sued defendants, the corporation that owned and operated the cemetery and its parent corporation. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support jury findings that defendants were liable for actions of the cemetery's employees and whether plaintiffs suffered compensable mental anguish because Guerra's body was disinterred and moved to another grave without permission. Also at issue was whether evidence of other lawsuits against defendants was properly admitted. The court held that there was legally insufficient evidence to support either the liability findings or mental anguish findings. The court also held that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other lawsuits, verdicts, and judgments and that such evidence was harmful and required the case to be remanded for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, rendered judgment in part, and remanded for a new trial in part. View "Service Corp. Int'l, et al. v. Guerra" on Justia Law

This action arose out of condemnation proceedings initiated by the State after the landowners and the State could not agree on the amount of compensation for a .33 acres out of a 3.5 acre tract of land fronting U.S. Highway 290 in Travis County. At issue was whether the trial court erred by only charging the jury to find the pre-taking value of the tract when there was evidence the taking did not cause damage to the remainder and whether there was any evidence the remainder suffered compensable damages. The court concluded that the trial court committed charge error by inquiring whether the landowner suffered damages to the remainder. The court also held that there was no evidence the taking caused compensable damages to the remainder and based on the jury findings, the value of the tract taken could be determined. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals judgment and remanded to the trial court for rendition of judgment. View "State v. Petropoulos" on Justia Law

Petitioners and respondent agreed to submit their claims to arbitration but could not agree on an arbitrator. Because of this disagreement, the trial judge intervened and appointed an arbitrator to preside over their dispute. At issue was whether the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.016 of an interlocutory appeal of an order appointing an arbitrator. Also at issue was whether, in the alternative, petitioners should be granted mandamus relief to prevent form from overriding substance. The court held that the court of appeals correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 51.016. The court also instructed the court of appeals to consider this appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus because petitioners specifically requested mandamus relief in the court of appeals and preserved that issue in this court and because judicial efficiency militated against requesting petitioners to file a separate original proceeding.

Relator was held in contempt of court and confined for perjuring himself during a deposition. At issue was whether a trial court could hold a litigant in contempt for perjury committed during a deposition and whether the court should exercise mandamus jurisdiction to provide a forum for a civil litigant who was deprived of liberty pursuant to a court's contempt order, and the Court of Criminal Appeals had declined to exercise its habeas jurisdiction. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion where such perjury did not obstruct the operation of the court. The court also held that relator had no adequate remedy by appeal where the underlying suit was civil in nature and the Court of Appeals declined to grant relator leave to file a habeas petition in that court. Accordingly, mandamus was the appropriate remedy to correct the trial court's abuse of discretion and the court conditionally granted relief.

Appellant, an African-American resident of Texas, sued appellees alleging that their credit-scoring systems employed several undisclosed factors which resulted in disparate impacts for minorities and violated the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601, 3619. At issue, in a certified question, was whether Texas law permitted an insurance company to price insurance by using a credit-score factor that had a racially disparate impact that, were it not for the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b), would violate the FHA, absent a legally sufficient nondiscriminatory reason, or would using such a credit-score factor violate Texas Insurance Code ("Code") sections 544.002(a), 559.051, 559.052, or some other provision of Texas law. The court answered the certified question by holding that Texas law did not prohibit an insurer from using race-neutral factors in credit-scoring to price insurance, even if doing so created a racially disparate impact.

This appeal arose from a franchise tax dispute involving the apportionment of receipts from the licensing of geophysical and seismic data to customers in Texas. Petitioner, a taxpayer, complained that respondent mischaracterized these receipts as Texas business and thereby had erroneously increased its franchise tax burden. At issue was whether these receipts should be categorized as receipts from the use of a license or as receipts from the sale of an intangible asset. The court held that the court of appeals erred in upholding respondent's franchise tax assessment because petitioner's receipts from licensing its seismic data were not receipts from the use of a license in the state within Tex. Tax Code 171.103(a)(4)'s meaning. Receipts from this intangible asset was not allocated according to its place of use under subsection (4) but rather, were included under subsection (6)'s catch-all provision as a limited sale of an intangible and allocated under the location of the payor rule. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Respondent filed a sex discrimination suit against petitioner alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code 21.001-.556, where petitioner terminated its employment of respondent citing as the basis for its decision a reduction in force due to worsening business conditions. The parties sought arbitration and petitioner appealed the arbitrator's reward. At issue was whether the Texas General Arbitration Act ("TAA"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 171.001-.098, precluded an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error, and if not, whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, preempted enforcement of such an agreement. The court held that the TAA presented no impediment to an agreement that limited the authority of an arbitrator in deciding a matter and thus allowed for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error. The court also held that the FAA did not preempt enforcement of an agreement to expanded judicial review of an arbitration award enforceable under the TAA. The court further held that, on remand, the court of appeals must determine whether the record was sufficient to review petitioner's complaints. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed and the case remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of petitioner's challenges to the arbitration award.

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. One of the disputes was between petitioners, BP American Production Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., and Vastar Resources, Inc. (collectively, "BP"), the lessee and operator, and respondents, the Marshall family, the lessors. The other dispute was between BP's successors-in-interest, Wagner Oil Co. (collectively, "Wagner"), and another lessor, respondents Vaquillas Ranch Co. Ltd. ("Vaquillas"). At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshall family's fraud claim against BP and whether Vaquillas lost title by adverse possession after Wagner succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that, because the Marshall family injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations and therefore, the Marshall family's fraud claims against BP were time barred. The court also held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession.

Respondents, owners of a vendors lien on each of four tracts of land, sued to have their liens declared superior to petitioner's liens. At issue was whether petitioner's liens were not unenforceable pursuant to section 32.06 of the Texas Tax Code's requirements for transfer. The court held that petitioner's tax liens were not unenforceable when verified copies were recorded in lieu of originals; when the procedure wherein the tax collector made the required certification before a notary, sealed with a notarial seal, in lieu of a seal of his own, complied with section 32.06(d); and when the tax collector's record-keeping and receipts were irrelevant to the enforceability of petitioner's liens.

Grubbs Infinity ("Grubbs"), the insured, sued Universal Underwriters of Texas Insurance Company ("Universal") for underpayment of its insurance policy claim after Grubbs suffered hail damage to buildings on its property. At issue was whether the party demanding appraisal had waived its right to insist on the contractual procedure when the parties disagreed, but neither sought appraisal until one had filed suit. The court conditionally granted Universal's petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to grant Universal's motion to compel appraisal where Universal had not waived its appraisal right and where Grubbs failed to demonstrate a showing of prejudice.