Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case returns from the Fifth Circuit to answer one of three certified questions. Appellee Barnes sought to enforce a Working Interest Unit Agreement (WIUA) and Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) for unpaid royalties as a third-party beneficiary or through privity of estate. Doris Barnes sued individually and as the executrix of the estate of her husband, who was an original signatory to a lease that was later assigned to an oil exploration company. The company created a joint venture to begin drilling on lands covered by Barnes’ lease; partner to this joint venture included Appellant Tawes. When the joint venture went bankrupt, Barnes settled her unpaid royalties with the venture. Tawes did not join in the settlement, which gives rise to Barnes’ current claim for the balance of the unpaid royalties. Arguing that because the Bankruptcy Court and Federal District Court concluded that Barnes was a third-party beneficiary to the JOA’s Royalty Provision, Barnes brought suit to enforce, and Tawes appealed. On certification from the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that Barnes had no right to enforce agreements that gave rise to this suit, finding that the original lease assignment to the exploration company did not extend to Tawes. Finding no theory of recovery, the Court did not address the remaining certified questions. View "Tawes v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Allen Keller Company, a general contractor, was working under contract to the local government to construct a portion of roadway. The contract required strict compliance with its terms, and the company had no discretion to vary any terms. Respondents brought suit against the county, engineers and driver of the car for the wrongful death of their daughter when the car she rode in slid on the rain-slick portion of road completed by the Petitioner several months earlier. The car rolled into a river, and the daughter was caught inside. Since the accident, guard rail was installed on the portion of road completed by Petitioner. Respondents maintained their claims against Petitioner, but settled with all other parties. The trial court granted Petitioner summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed, holding that Petitioner did not prove it had not proximately cause the accident that lead to the daughter's death. On review, the Supreme Court found Petitioner owed Respondents no duty to warn of the dangerous conditions in the design of the road because Petitioner had no discretion in altering terms of road's design specifications. On review, this Court reversed the appellate court's decision in favor of Petitioner.

While married, Petitioner James Iliff was the principal breadwinner for his family of five, and earned approximately $100,000 in salary. He held a Bachelor's Degree in chemistry, and a Masters in Business Administration. In January, 2006, Petitioner voluntarily quit his job, moved in with his mother, and worked intermittently, earning approximately $200 per month. In June, Respondent Jerilyn Iliff filed for divorce. Determining that Petitioner's gross earning potential was not less than $5,000 per month, the divorce court ordered him to pay $1,295 in monthly child support. Petitioner appealed the support order, arguing that under state law, the trial court was required to determine whether his unemployment or underemployment was used primarily to avoid paying child support. The Supreme Court granted Respondent's petition to resolve a split among state courts of appeal on interpretation of state law and the issue of avoiding child support. On review of the underlying cases, the Supreme Court found no requirement that a person owing child support be intentionally unemployed or underemployed to avoid child support, and affirmed the lower courts' decisions against Petitioner.

The Court was asked to consider whether state law allows a sophisticated party in a commercial transaction, represented by counsel, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, without mistake or duress of any kind, to include in a contract a disclaimer, and later disavow that disclaimer as having been false at the time it was made. Petitioner Italian Cowboy Partners entered into a lease agreement with Respondents to open a new restaurant. Petitioners had been in the restaurant business for twenty-five years. The lease Petitioners signed contained a disclaimer against representations or promises with respect to the leased site. But Petitioners sued claiming Respondents misled them regarding the suitability of the chosen rental space for a new restaurant. The Court held that the lower court erred in granting Petitioners damages and attorneys fees based on its interpretation of the disclaimer in the lease, and remanded the case for an additional hearing.