Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Oljine Noguez and Manuel Zepeda Mendoza were investigated for their alleged involvement in an opioid trafficking operation. Following the investigation, the State of Texas seized their bank accounts and cash, initiating four civil-forfeiture actions. The State alleged that the funds were contraband related to the trafficking operation, attaching a sworn declaration and affidavit from the investigating officer, Bryan Bacon, to each notice of seizure. Nearly two years later, the Claimants filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, arguing that the State had no evidence to support its claims. The State responded but did not attach any exhibits, instead referencing Officer Bacon’s affidavit.The trial court considered the motion and granted summary judgment for the Claimants, noting that the State did not attach the affidavit to its response. The State then filed a motion for leave to file a response with the affidavit attached, which the trial court denied, finalizing its order granting summary judgment to the Claimants. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the State failed to meet its burden by not attaching the affidavit and not sufficiently directing the trial court to specific portions of the affidavit.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) does not require the attachment of previously filed summary judgment evidence. The Court found that the State’s response sufficiently pointed out and discussed the evidence, reversing the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reconsider the no-evidence motion in light of the opinion that previously filed evidence referenced in a response can be considered without being attached. View "THE STATE OF TEXAS v. THREE THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR DOLLARS AND TWENTY-EIGHT CENTS U.S. CURRENCY ($3,774.28)" on Justia Law

Pamela McKenzie was shopping at a Walgreens in Houston in 2019 when she was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. A Walgreens employee called the police, suspecting McKenzie was the same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day. After reviewing surveillance footage, the police determined McKenzie was not the thief and released her. McKenzie claimed that other Walgreens employees had agreed she was not the thief, but the employee called the police anyway. She sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for employee negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision (NHTS).The trial court denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which allows for early dismissal of legal actions based on the exercise of free speech. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence. However, it held that the NHTS claim was not subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it was not entirely based on the employee’s exercise of free speech rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply to McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The court concluded that McKenzie failed to meet her evidentiary burden to avoid dismissal, as she did not provide clear and specific evidence for each essential element of her NHTS claim. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically for the dismissal of McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed. View "WALGREENS v. MCKENZIE" on Justia Law

Myers-Woodward, LLC (Myers) owns 160 acres in Matagorda County, Texas. In 1947, Myers’s predecessors retained the surface estate but transferred the mineral estate to the predecessor of Underground Services Markham, LLC and United Brine Pipeline Company, LLC (collectively, USM). The mineral deed granted USM’s predecessor an interest in all oil, gas, and other minerals on the land, along with rights necessary for mining and transporting these minerals. In 2008, USM acquired all of Texas Brine Company’s interest in the salt on the property. Disputes arose over the ownership of caverns created by salt mining and the calculation of royalties owed to Myers.The district court ruled that USM owned the subsurface caverns created by its salt mining activities but denied USM’s request to use the caverns for storing hydrocarbons produced off-site. The court agreed with Myers that USM could only use the land for purposes specified in the 1947 deed. Regarding royalties, the district court ruled that Myers was entitled to a one-eighth royalty based on the market value of the salt at the point of production, which amounted to $258,850.41. Myers appealed, challenging the royalty calculation and the ownership of the caverns. USM cross-appealed, contesting the limitation on its use of the caverns.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision that Myers, as the surface estate owner, retains ownership of the empty spaces within the salt formations. The court held that the mineral estate does not include ownership of the empty spaces created by salt mining. However, the court reversed the lower courts’ calculation of Myers’s royalty payments, ruling that Myers is entitled to an in-kind royalty of one-eighth of the net proceeds from the sale of the salt. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MYERS-WOODWARD, LLC v. UNDERGROUND SERVICES MARKHAM, LLC" on Justia Law

Cindy Thompson, individually and as heir of Charles Thompson, and CC & T Investments, LLC, sought to void a default judgment and a subsequent purchaser’s deed, claiming the taxing authorities failed to properly serve her with suit papers, leading to foreclosure of tax liens. The subsequent purchaser, Mae Landry, argued that Thompson had notice of the property’s sale years before the collateral attack.The trial court sustained the collateral attack, setting aside the default judgment and tax sale. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed, holding that fact issues exist regarding the adequacy of service in the underlying tax suit. The subsequent purchaser petitioned for review, asserting that the owner’s notice of the property’s sale years earlier defeats her claim as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a property owner may not set aside a subsequent property purchase on due process grounds if the owner obtained notice of the default judgment or the property’s sale during the statutory limitations and redemption period. Such an owner has notice of any due process violation in time to assert a legal remedy. Additionally, a subsequent purchaser may advance equitable defenses against a collateral attack if a prior owner unreasonably delays, to the current owner’s detriment, in suing to quiet title after obtaining notice of the judgment or the property’s sale. However, the evidence in this case fails to conclusively demonstrate the date of such notice.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "THOMPSON v. LANDRY" on Justia Law

Two property owners in the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of College Station, Texas, challenged city ordinances regulating off-premise signage and driveway construction. They argued that these regulations, imposed without granting them the right to vote in city elections, violated the Texas Constitution's requirement for a "republican form of government." The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ordinances were void and unenforceable.The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, agreeing with the City that the form of local government is a political question for the legislature, not the courts. The plaintiffs appealed, but while the appeal was pending, the legislature amended the law to allow ETJ residents to unilaterally opt out of a city's ETJ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's dismissal, not addressing the new statutory opt-out provision.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the legislative change provided a nonjudicial remedy that could moot the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The court vacated the lower court judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to abate the proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to complete the opt-out process. The court emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance, noting that the new law offered a means of relief that should be pursued before addressing broader constitutional questions. View "ELLIOTT v. CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS" on Justia Law

Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado were involved in a motor vehicle collision with Crystal Krueger, who was driving a vehicle owned by Whataburger Restaurants LLC. Ferchichi sued Krueger and Whataburger for negligence. During mediation, Whataburger's counsel revealed the existence of a surveillance video of the plaintiffs, which they refused to share outside of mediation. Ferchichi filed a motion to compel the video and for sanctions. Whataburger responded with a motion to dismiss the sanctions request under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).The trial court denied Whataburger's TCPA motion, but the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion for sanctions was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Ferchichi failed to establish a prima facie case for the sanctions request. The court remanded the case to the trial court to award Whataburger its costs and attorney’s fees and to consider sanctions against Ferchichi.In a separate case, Haven at Thorpe Lane, a student-housing complex, was sued by students for fraud and deceptive trade practices. Haven filed a motion to compel discovery from two mothers of the plaintiffs, who had created a Facebook group criticizing Haven. The mothers filed a TCPA motion to dismiss Haven's motion to compel. The trial court denied the TCPA motion, but the Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion to compel was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Haven failed to establish a prima facie case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both cases and held that motions to compel and for sanctions are not "legal actions" under the TCPA. Therefore, the TCPA does not apply. The court reversed the judgments of the courts of appeals and remanded both cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "HAVEN AT THORPE LANE, LLC v. PATE" on Justia Law

A suspected shoplifter with an outstanding arrest warrant shot two police officers at a retail store, killing one and injuring the other. The officers were attempting to arrest the suspect at the request of an off-duty officer working as a security guard for the retailer. The deceased officer's parents and the injured officer sued the security guard, the retailer, and the security company.The trial court dismissed the claims against the security guard under the Tort Claims Act, finding his actions were within the scope of his employment as a police officer. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the retailer and the security company. The plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed in part, holding that a jury could find the security guard's conduct before the warrant check was outside the scope of his police duties. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims based on the warrant check and subsequent conduct but found fact issues precluded summary judgment on other claims against the retailer.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the security guard's conduct was within the scope of his employment as a police officer, entitling him to dismissal under the Tort Claims Act. The court also adopted the public-safety officer's rule, limiting the duties owed to officers injured by the negligence that necessitated their response. Applying this rule, the court found no evidence that the retailer breached its duty to warn the officers of a known, dangerous condition. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing the claims against the security guard and granting summary judgment for the other defendants. View "SEWARD v. SANTANDER" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

Christine Stary and Brady Ethridge divorced in 2018 and agreed to share custody of their three children. In March 2020, Stary was arrested and charged with felony injury to a child, but the charges were dismissed in February 2025. Ethridge applied for a civil protective order a week after Stary's arrest, alleging family violence and seeking an order lasting longer than two years. The trial court issued a temporary order preventing Stary from contacting her children. At the hearing, Ethridge testified about instances of Stary injuring the children, supported by medical records. Stary denied the allegations and testified on her own behalf. The trial court found that Stary committed felony family violence and issued a lifetime protective order prohibiting all contact between Stary and her children.The trial court's decision was appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed the order. The appellate court held that a lifetime protective order prohibiting a parent from contacting her children is not equivalent to terminating parental rights and does not require heightened procedural safeguards. One justice dissented, arguing that the order effectively terminated Stary's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that constitutional due process requires clear and convincing evidence to support a protective order prohibiting contact between a parent and her children for longer than two years. The court emphasized that such orders profoundly interfere with a parent's fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their children. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, requiring the trial court to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard and consider the best interest of the children. View "STARY v. ETHRIDGE" on Justia Law