Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A state environmental agency received a broad public records request from a nonprofit organization seeking documents related to a recent assessment on ethylene oxide. The agency responded the next day, asking the organization to clarify whether it wanted confidential information, which would require a formal opinion from the state attorney general and could delay production. The requester promptly confirmed it sought all responsive records, including any considered confidential but subject to disclosure under the public records law. The agency believed many documents were exempt under a deliberative-process exception and, within what it believed to be the deadline, sent a request to the attorney general for a ruling. The attorney general later determined that the agency had missed the ten-business-day deadline by two days, so the information was presumed public unless there was a compelling reason to withhold it.The agency then provided additional evidence that it was closed on July 5 due to the Independence Day holiday, that its request was timely mailed, and that it had sought clarification from the requester. Nonetheless, the Attorney General declined to reconsider. The agency filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, and the nonprofit intervened, seeking to compel disclosure. The Office of the Attorney General later conceded its original calculation was mistaken, but the district court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, ordering disclosure of over 6,000 pages. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding the request for a ruling was untimely and rejecting the agency’s arguments about deadlines and clarifications.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ten-business-day deadline for the agency’s request was reset by its timely, good-faith request for narrowing or clarification, and that the agency established timely submission of its request under the mailbox rule. It reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the deliberative-process privilege protects the records. View "TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between holders of a nonparticipating royalty interest and an oil and gas operator concerning how royalties should be calculated under the terms of a 1960 deed. The deed reserved for the royalty owners an undivided one-sixteenth interest in all oil, gas, and other minerals produced from a specified tract, “free of cost forever.” The operator, as the successor to the original grantee, produced, transported, treated, and processed oil and gas, then sold the products downstream. Historically, the operator deducted postproduction costs from the downstream sales price to determine the value of the raw minerals at the wellhead for calculating the royalty.In 2021, the royalty owners brought suit, arguing that their royalty should be calculated on the downstream sales price for processed gas without deduction of postproduction costs, except severance taxes. The 49th District Court of Webb County granted summary judgment for the royalty owners and certified an interlocutory appeal of whether the “free of cost forever” language precluded deduction of postproduction costs. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the deed’s language reflected an intent to free the royalty from such costs under Texas law.The Supreme Court of Texas granted review and reversed. The Court held that, by its plain language, the deed reserves a royalty on minerals “produced from the above described acreage,” not on minerals transported, processed, or enhanced for downstream sale, and contains no language indicating a valuation point other than at the wellhead. The phrase “free of cost forever” merely clarifies the royalty is free of exploration and production costs, not postproduction costs. Therefore, the royalty owners bear postproduction costs incurred after production. The Court rendered partial summary judgment for the operator and remanded for further proceedings. View "FASKEN OIL AND RANCH, LTD. v. PUIG" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer who had a long career with the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) was terminated after an off-duty incident at his daughter’s high school. During this incident, the officer, who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), confronted school counselors and school police in a threatening manner, displayed his badge and handcuffs, and threatened to arrest the officers attempting to respond to his daughter’s mental health crisis. Criminal charges were considered but ultimately dropped. DPS investigated and determined that the officer’s PTSD impaired his ability to reasonably perform his job, and terminated his employment.The officer then brought suit against DPS, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The trial court denied DPS’s motions for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s denial with respect to the officer’s disability discrimination claim related to his PTSD, but dismissed his other claims for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas granted review. It held that Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code prohibits disability discrimination only as to physical or mental conditions that do not impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform a job. The Court determined that the officer’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to serve as a DPS officer, based on the statutory standard and evidence in the record. Therefore, the statutory prohibition against discrimination did not apply, and the officer’s claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and rendered judgment dismissing the officer’s claims against DPS. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. CALLAWAY" on Justia Law

A man suffered a serious injury to his right index finger in a bandsaw accident and was treated by a plastic surgeon who recommended amputation. The patient refused amputation, and the doctor attempted to salvage the finger through surgery and follow-up care. Another surgeon later treated the patient and ultimately performed a “ray amputation,” removing the entire finger and a portion of the hand. The patient sued the original doctor, alleging that negligent treatment led to an infection and necessitated the more extensive amputation. Medical experts for both sides testified that the initial injury left a very low chance of saving the finger.The case was tried to a jury in a Texas district court, which rendered an 11–1 defense verdict, finding neither the doctor nor the patient proximately caused the injury. The charge included a “loss of chance” instruction, requiring the jury to find the finger had more than a 50% chance of survival with proper care. The patient objected to this instruction before and after the verdict, arguing it was not appropriate under Texas law. After trial, the patient moved for a new trial, attaching a letter from the dissenting juror describing deliberations and alleged confusion about the charge. The district court granted a new trial, later amending its order to provide seven reasons, mainly contesting the “loss of chance” instruction. The doctor sought mandamus relief from the Texas Court of Appeals, which denied relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and conditionally granted mandamus relief. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on legally incorrect grounds, including its misunderstanding of the “loss of chance” doctrine, which is recognized under Texas law in both death and injury cases. The Court directed the district court to vacate its new trial order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict. View "IN RE LAPUERTA" on Justia Law

A municipally owned utility in San Antonio owns power poles used for distributing electricity. Since 1984, a telecommunications provider (and its predecessor) has attached its equipment to these poles under a written agreement. The contract set a per-pole attachment fee, allowed for annual rate increases, and included a clause requiring both parties to comply with all applicable laws affecting their rights and obligations under the agreement. Over time, the utility charged one telecommunications provider higher rates, while continuing to invoice another provider at the original rate, resulting in a disparity in charges. After amendments to the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) in 2005 prohibited discriminatory pole attachment rates and required uniform and federally capped rates, the provider paying the higher fee sued, seeking relief for breach of contract and statutory violations.The trial court, after abating proceedings while the Public Utility Commission (PUC) considered the matter, granted partial summary judgment for the utility on statutory and unjust enrichment claims, but for the provider on the breach-of-contract claim. The utility appealed. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement did not incorporate new statutes into its terms, and thus the provider could not base its contract claim on the utility’s alleged statutory violations.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the parties’ contract—by its express terms—incorporated post-1984 legal changes affecting their rights and obligations, including the 2005 PURA amendments. The Court concluded that the provider could pursue its contract claim based on the utility’s alleged failure to comply with current law, including prohibitions on discriminatory and excessive pole attachment rates. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SPECTRUM GULF COAST, LLC v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

A shopper at a grocery store slipped and fell in a puddle of clear liquid in the toy aisle. She noticed water around her and observed water dripping from a ceiling rafter above the puddle. Her companion, who was nearby, initially thought the water came from the ceiling but later stated he did not actually see a drip. The store manager, responding to the incident, saw water on the floor but no evidence of a leak, and attributed the source to rain, which had ended two hours earlier. The store had experienced multiple roof leaks in the past year due to renovations, but no leaks were reported in the toy aisle before or after the incident. Surveillance footage showed no employee had walked down the aisle in the two hours prior to the fall.The trial court excluded the plaintiff’s expert report and granted summary judgment for the grocery store, finding no evidence of the store’s actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the store’s knowledge of previous leaks elsewhere in the building could raise a fact issue about its constructive knowledge regarding the puddle in the toy aisle. The appellate court also partially reinstated some expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that to survive a no-evidence summary judgment in a premises liability slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff must present evidence of how long the dangerous condition existed. The Court concluded there was no evidence addressing the duration of the puddle’s presence. Prior leaks elsewhere in the store, the size of the puddle, or evidence about inspections were insufficient to show constructive knowledge of the puddle at the relevant time and place. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated summary judgment for the grocery store. View "H-E-B, L.P. v. PETERSON" on Justia Law

Several defendants in a long-running lawsuit hired an attorney whose legal assistant had previously worked for the plaintiffs’ original counsel and had participated in confidential discussions and work central to the litigation. Years after leaving the plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm, the legal assistant began performing secretarial work on the same case for the defendants’ new lawyers, without receiving any instruction not to work on matters she had previously handled or been exposed to during her prior employment. She worked intermittently on the case for several years, including filing documents that were electronically served on the plaintiffs’ current counsel.After discovering the legal assistant’s involvement, the plaintiffs’ representatives researched the issue and, within about two months, moved to disqualify opposing counsel and their firm, arguing that the required steps to protect client confidences were not taken. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied relief to the defendants, who then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for mandamus, arguing that disqualification was improper because the legal assistant was not a “side-switcher” at the time of her hiring, her work was minimal and occurred years after her initial involvement, and the plaintiffs had waived their right to seek disqualification by delay.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a law firm must instruct a nonlawyer employee, at or before the time the employee begins work on a conflicted matter, not to work on any matter on which the nonlawyer worked during prior employment, even if the conflict arises years after hiring. The Court also held that the plaintiffs did not as a matter of law waive their right to seek disqualification. Because the required prophylactic measures were not taken, and waiver was not shown, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "IN RE ZAIDI" on Justia Law

GAC Equipment, doing business as Austin Crane Service, hired Diamond Hydraulics to repair a crane’s cylinder, which later bent during a lifting operation. Each party blamed the other: Diamond argued that improper maintenance and operation by Austin Crane caused the failure, while Austin Crane claimed Diamond’s repairs were improper and used unsuitable materials. The dispute intensified during discovery, particularly over Diamond's ability to inspect the cylinder, and both parties made late expert witness designations. As trial approached, Diamond’s designated expert, Dr. Macfarlan, left his job, moved out of state, and refused to testify. Diamond attempted to substitute another expert, Dr. Hoerner, who had participated in preparing the expert report. Austin Crane objected, and the district court denied Diamond’s request to substitute its expert and to continue the trial.The 425th Judicial District Court in Williamson County, Texas, proceeded with the trial without Diamond’s causation expert. The jury found in favor of Austin Crane on both breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. Diamond appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing the late expert substitution. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, focusing on whether Diamond showed good cause for its late expert designation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Supreme Court held that Diamond demonstrated good cause: the unavailability of Diamond’s original expert was beyond its control, Diamond acted promptly and in good faith to substitute an expert, and the excluded testimony was critical to its case. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion and that disparate treatment was given to the parties’ late designations. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "DIAMOND HYDRAULICS, INC. v. GAC EQUIPMENT, LLC" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature enacted a law banning certain medical treatments for minors for the purpose of gender transition, PFLAG, Inc., a nonprofit organization with Texas members, became involved in litigation challenging the law. During this litigation, PFLAG’s executive director submitted an affidavit describing, among other things, how families sought “alternative avenues to maintain care” for transgender youth in Texas. The Office of the Attorney General, suspecting that some medical providers might be concealing violations of the new law through deceptive billing practices, issued a civil investigative demand (CID) to PFLAG seeking documents underlying the affidavit and related information. PFLAG declined to produce the documents and instead petitioned the 261st Judicial District Court in Travis County to set aside or modify the CID. The Attorney General subsequently narrowed the scope of the CID to exclude identifying information of PFLAG’s members and focused the requests more closely on the affidavit’s content.The district court granted a temporary restraining order and, after a trial, issued a final declaratory judgment and injunction largely protecting PFLAG from producing the requested documents. The district court focused its analysis on the original, broader CID and found that the Attorney General lacked a valid basis to believe PFLAG possessed relevant information. The court also concluded that the CID infringed on constitutional rights and failed to comply with statutory requirements.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the district court erred in analyzing only the original CID and not the revised version. The Supreme Court clarified that the Attorney General’s statutory authority to issue a CID requires only a reasonable belief, not proof, that the recipient may have relevant material. The Court found the Attorney General’s belief reasonable given the content of the affidavit and ruled that PFLAG must produce most responsive documents, subject to privilege and redaction of identifying information. The district court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL v. PFLAG, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Nadine Realme, who participated in a Thanksgiving “turkey trot” fun run organized by the City of San Antonio. While following the course through a public park, Realme tripped over a metal pole fragment and broke her arm. She sued the City, alleging negligent maintenance of the park. The City asserted that Texas’s Recreational Use Statute barred ordinary negligence liability for injuries occurring during recreational activities on government property, arguing that the turkey trot was a “recreational” activity under the statute.In the 216th District Court, Realme prevailed. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that while an organized footrace is “recreation” in common parlance, the statute required activities to be “associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” The appellate court concluded that the turkey trot, as an organized human event focused on completing the race, was not sufficiently connected to enjoyment of nature to qualify as “recreation” under the statute. It further determined that Realme’s purpose—to have fun and capture a social media picture—did not establish she entered the premises to enjoy nature or the outdoors.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the statutory definition of “recreation,” emphasizing its nonexhaustive list and ordinary meaning. It held that a community fun run is “recreation” because it provides diversion, play, and enjoyment, fitting the statute’s scope. The Court ruled that the Recreational Use Statute immunizes the City from ordinary negligence liability, reversing the Fourth Court of Appeals’ judgment and rendering judgment for the City on that claim. The Court remanded the case to the Fourth Court of Appeals to address Realme’s gross negligence claim, which had not been considered previously. View "CITY OF SAN ANTONIO v. REALME" on Justia Law