Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendant in this negligence and premises-liability case arising from a fatal construction-site accident, holding that remand was required in light of recent opinion.Plaintiffs sued Defendant for negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed as to the negligence and premises-liability claims. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that, in applying the general rule and holding that Plaintiffs' petition could not constitute competent summary-judgment evidence, the court of appeals did not have the benefit of this Court's recent opinions in Regency Field Services, LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2021) and Energen Resources Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. 2022). The Supreme Court remanded this case for further consideration of the instant case in light of Regency and Energen and other subsequently issued opinions providing guidance on the legal issues presented. View "Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas properly taxed an insurer based on premiums it received from sales of "stop-loss" policies under Texas Insurance Code Chapters 222 and 257, holding that the Comptroller properly assessed the taxes at issue.Blue Cross Blue Shield sought a refund of its 2012 premium and maintenance taxes collected from its stop-loss policies, arguing that the policies did not cover risks on "individuals or groups" under Chapter 222. The trial court agreed and ruled for Blue Cross. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the premiums Blue Cross collected on its stop-loss policies were subject to taxation under Chapter 222; and (2) because Blue Cross collected these premiums under its authority to write health insurance, they were subject to Chapter 257's maintenance tax. View "Hegar v. Health Care Service Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted UPS Ground Freight, Inc.'s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate a portion of a September 30, 2020 discovery order in this wrongful-death suit, holding that the discovery requests were overbroad and that UPS had no adequate remedy by appeal.In the discovery order at issue, the trial court ordered UPS to product the results of alcohol and drug tests conducted on all current and former drivers at its Irving facility for certain periods preceding a fatal multi-vehicle accident. The Supreme Court agreed with UPS that the discovery requested and compelled by the trial court was insufficiently narrowed and was overly broad in scope. The Court ordered the trial court to vacate the portion of the discovery order compelling production of information and records pertaining to drug-and-alcohol test results for current and former UPS driver who were not parties to the litigation and who were not involved in the accident giving rise to this action. View "In UPS Ground Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court in the underlying partition action, holding that Subchapter C of Chapter 9 of the Family Code supplements, rather than supplants, the remedial options available to former spouses who wish to divide property that went undivided in divorce.In 1987, the legislature enacted Subchapter C, which created a new option - besides partitions - for former spouses to divide property that escaped division in divorce. Subchapter C set forth a "just and right" standard for a judge to divide community property post-divorce. At issue was whether Subchapter C made that new remedy the exclusive remedy and vested exclusive jurisdiction over that remedy in the original divorce court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) if either former spouse prefers the "just and right" standard, Subchapter C supplies it; and (2) the statutory text does not impose any jurisdictional restrictions. View "S.C. v. M.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the probate court to modify a trust under Texas Trust Code 112.054 but denying the trustee's demand for a jury trial, holding that there is no statutory right to a jury in a section 112.054 judicial trust-modification proceeding.In reversing the probate court, the court of appeals held that the Trust Code conferred a right to a jury trial and that the error in denying the trustee's jury demand was harmful. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Trust Code's incorporation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure creates a right to a trial by jury in a section 112.054 judicial trust-modification proceeding. View "In re Troy S. Poe Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment declaring invalid the Department of Family and Protective Services Rule 748.7, which governs immigration detention centers, and enjoining the Department from granting licenses under the rule, holding that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Rule 748.7.Plaintiffs, a nonprofit advocacy group, a day-care operator and several detainee mothers, individually and on behalf of their children, brought this action alleging that the Department lacked authority to adopt Rule 748.7 because it increased the safety risk to the detainees and their children. The trial court declared the rule invalid and enjoined the Department from granting licenses under the rule. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims. View "Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services" on Justia Law

In this challenge to a share issuance the Supreme Court held that the probate court improperly submitted an invalid theory of liability to the jury and that the trial court's charge error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.In the weeks before he died, Dick Poe, the sole director of Poe Management, Inc. (PMI), authorized the corporation to issue new shares and then bought the new shares for $3.2 million, making him the majority owner of PMI. Dick's death vested control of the family-owned car-dealership enterprise in the two co-executors of Dick's estate. Richard, Dick's son and PMI's only other shareholder, brought this action challenging the share issuance as a breach of Dick's fiduciary duty. The trial court rendered judgment in favor Richard. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the probate court erred in charging the jury in two respects and that the errors were harmful. View "In re Estate of Poe" on Justia Law

Senate Bill 1, the Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021, 87th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 1, 1.01, was intended “to make all laws necessary to detect and punish fraud” in connection with elections. A federal district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of its provisions making it an offense for certain officials to “solicit[]” the submission of applications to vote by mail from persons who have not requested such applications" and that impose civil penalties for violations.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified three questions to the Supreme Court: whether one plaintiff, a volunteer deputy registrar, is a “public official” to whom the antisolicitation provision applies; whether certain types of speech constitute “solicitation” under that provision; and whether the Attorney General can enforce the civil penalties. The parties subsequently agreed that the answer to the first and third questions is no. With respect to the second certified question, the Texas Supreme Court answered that the statute’s definition of “solicits” is not so narrowly limited as to cover only seeking applications for violative mail-in ballots, nor is it so broad as to cover speech that merely informs listeners that they may apply. The court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of “solicits” under Election Code Section 276.016(a)(1). View "Paxton v. Longoria" on Justia Law

In 2010, Houston voters approved “Proposition One,” allowing the city to create a “Pay-As-You-Go” Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund. Perez and others filed an election contest while the city enacted the Drainage Fee Ordinance (DFO), creating a new public utility and requiring Houston to establish drainage fees “against all real property in the city subject to such charges” and “provide drainage for all real property in the city on payment of drainage charges unless the property is exempt.” The DFO based the drainage fees on the benefited property’s type and square footage. Failure to pay drainage fees carried various penalties.In 2015, the Supreme Court held that Proposition One’s ballot language was misleading, rendering the Amendment invalid. Perez then challenged Houston’s assessment, collection, and expenditure of the drainage fee. In 2018, Houston passed a new charter amendment curing many of the defects Perez alleged in the drainage fee ordinance. Perez was left with ongoing claims for reimbursement of the drainage fees she paid before 2018 and for an injunction against the future expenditure of fees collected before 2018. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims but remanded to allow Perez to replead in light of intervening events. Perez’s claims required her to articulate a viable theory of the DFO’s illegality to overcome Houston’s governmental immunity; her only theory failed as a matter of law. View "Perez v. Turner" on Justia Law

Anthony sued Theresa for a divorce. Theresa failed to answer. The court rendered a default judgment granting the divorce and dividing the marital estate. Theresa sought a new trial contending that Anthony’s attorney lied, telling her that the final hearing had not yet been scheduled. On appeal from the denial of her motion, Theresa brought a “sufficiency of the evidence” challenge, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in the property division. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Theresa had not preserved that argument.The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to file a "Craddock" motion for a new trial in the trial court does not foreclose a party’s ability to raise on appeal an evidentiary challenge to a default property division. The court noted that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(d) specifically offers a defaulting party an appellate remedy to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a case tried to the bench. A motion under Craddock does not attempt to show an error in the judgment; rather, it seeks to excuse the defaulting party’s failure to answer by showing the Craddock elements. View "Marriage of Williams" on Justia Law