Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus sought by Relators for relief from trial court orders granting Christina Broussard's motions to quash certain discovery subpoenas in this case brought by Broussard against Relators for personal injuries and economic losses following a rear-end collision, holding that the discovery requests sought relevant information.The subpoenas sought post-accident medical-billing information from Broussard's medical providers and third-party production of Broussard's pre-accident medical, education, employment, and insurance records. Relators argued that the requested discovery was relevant to the issue of damages causally attributable to the accident. The trial court quashed the discovery subpoenas. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief without prejudice to Relators' seeking relief, if necessary, after the trial court has had an opportunity to reconsider its rulings, holding that the trial court should reconsider its orders in light of this Court's opinion in In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2021). View "In re Central Oregon Truck Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In this oil and gas case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's summary judgment, holding that a fact issue remained on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease and that Plaintiffs' argument was not barred by res judicata but that the court of appeals erred by reversing a take-nothing summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims.At issue was the meaning and application of an express covenant to protect against drainage that appeared in a lease addendum that expressly limited the location of wells that may trigger Defendant-Lessee's obligation to protect against drainage but did not directly address the location of wells that may cause drainage. Plaintiffs-Lessors argued that the covenant allowed for separate triggering and draining wells and that Defendant breached the covenant by failing to protect against drainage from a non-triggering well. In response, Defendant argued that it had a duty to protect only against drainage from the limited class of triggering wells. The Supreme Court held (1) the addendum was ambiguous because both interpretations of the covenant were reasonable; (2) the court of appeals improperly reversed the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims; and (3) remand was required for further proceedings on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease. View "Rosetta Resources Operating, LP v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that the attorney-immunity defense was inapplicable to federal wiretap claims but reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant-attorney on Plaintiffs' state wiretap claims, holding that the attorney-immunity defense was inapplicable to the federal wiretap claims but did attach to the state wiretap claims.Plaintiffs brought this private party civil suit asserting that Defendant and others had violated the federal and Texas wiretap statutes by using and disclosing illegally intercepted electronic communications. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was immune from liability as a matter of law because Plaintiffs' claims all stemmed from her role as an attorney in a modification proceeding. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the state wiretapping claims; but (2) Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the claims under the federal wiretap statute because this Court is not convinced that federal courts would apply Texas's common-law attorney-immunity defense to that statute. View "Taylor v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a timely-served expert report demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act.Plaintiffs brought this case alleging that negligent perinatal care during labor and delivery caused their infant's brain damage and other serious health conditions. On the infant's behalf, Plaintiffs sued their treating physician and other healthcare providers and served expert reports on Defendants, including a report by Dr. James Balducci, an obstetrician. Plaintiff's treating physician filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the claims against the treating physician with prejudice on the grounds that Dr. Balducci's report was insufficient to support Plaintiffs' healthcare liability claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the expert report satisfied the "fair summary" standard in Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(l), (r)(6). View "E.D. v Texas Health Care, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court holding that the settlement agreement between the parties in this case barred the claims asserted in this suit and in an arbitration proceeding, holding that the trial court did not err.A billion-dollar break-up between two large corporations engaged in the international petroleum business resulted in numerous claims and lawsuits, which the parties finally resolved through a comprehensive settlement agreement. The trial court concluded that the settlement agreement, including its release provisions and a disclaimer of reliance, were valid and enforceable and barred the claims asserted in both this lawsuit and in the arbitration proceeding. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the settlement agreement did not bar certain claims. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the final judgment of the trial court, holding that the parties fully and finally resolved the current claims through their comprehensive settlement agreement. View "Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras America Inc." on Justia Law

In this case involving a claim for wrongful imprisonment compensation under the Tim Cole Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 103.001-.154, the Supreme Court denied G.S.'s request for mandamus relief, holding that G.S. did not satisfy the Act's requirements.G.S. pleaded guilty to indecency with a child but was later granted habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After it was discovered that G.S.'s alleged victim had fabricated the accusations and G.S. arrest and conviction were expunged, G.S. applied for wrongful imprisonment compensation under the Act. The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts denied the application. G.S. subsequently filed his petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that G.S. did not establish his actual innocence as required by the Act, and therefore, he failed to prove his entitled to compensation under the Act. View "In re G.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a party who does not receive notice of an interlocutory order denying arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act in time to appeal because of the trial court clerk's error may seek review by mandamus.Plaintiff sued her employer alleging negligence. Defendant moved to compel arbitration based on its mandatory arbitration policy. The trial court denied the motion to compel, ruling that the policy was unconscionable. The court of appeals remanded the case, after which Defendant filed a supplemental motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, but the clerk failed to give Defendant notice of the order. Defendant finally received notice of the order five months after it issued. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court promptly to issue an order compelling arbitration of Plaintiff's claims, holding (1) the clerk's failure to give notice of the trial court's order deprived Defendant of an adequate appellate remedy; and (2) the arbitration agreement was not illusory. View "In re Whataburger Restaurants LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991), does not continue to toll the limitations period when a co-party of a malpractice plaintiff pursues the appeal in a higher court but the malpractice plaintiff does not participate in that stage of the proceedings.In Hughes, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney commits malpractice in either the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted. In this case, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for legal malpractice in the underlying proceedings. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hughes tolling applies only to all appeals in which the malpractice plaintiff participates; and (2) Plaintiff's malpractice claim was barred by limitations. View "Zive v. Sandberg" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case the Supreme Court granted in part the motion to dismiss an appeal from the reversal of a termination of parental rights decree, holding that the case was moot.N.J. gave birth when she was fifteen. Three months later, the Department of Family and Protective Services began termination proceedings against N.J. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict terminating N.J.'s parental rights. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over N.J. The Department petitioned for review. After the Supreme Court granted the petition the Department moved to dismiss, explaining that N.J. had executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights more than one year earlier after she had reached the age of majority. The Supreme Court dismissed the appealed portion of the case, holding that the case was moot in light of N.J.'s decision to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. View "Texas Department of Family & Protective Services v. N.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiff in this medical negligence action, holding that the district court erred in how it structured periodic payments after applying the periodic-payments statute in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, Subchapter K to Plaintiff's award of future medical expenses.Plaintiff, the mother of A.M.A., brought this action on his behalf alleging that, upon A.M.A.'s delivery, the nurses' delay in summoning the obstetrician when A.M.A.'s heartrate dropped to nondetectable levels for extended periods caused his cerebral palsy. The jury found for A.M.A.and awarded $1.208 million for future healthcare expenses after he turns eighteen. The trial judge applied the periodic payment statute to the award. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in the way that it structured the periodic payments. View "Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. v. A.M.A." on Justia Law