Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Houston voters approved “Proposition One,” allowing the city to create a “Pay-As-You-Go” Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund. Perez and others filed an election contest while the city enacted the Drainage Fee Ordinance (DFO), creating a new public utility and requiring Houston to establish drainage fees “against all real property in the city subject to such charges” and “provide drainage for all real property in the city on payment of drainage charges unless the property is exempt.” The DFO based the drainage fees on the benefited property’s type and square footage. Failure to pay drainage fees carried various penalties.In 2015, the Supreme Court held that Proposition One’s ballot language was misleading, rendering the Amendment invalid. Perez then challenged Houston’s assessment, collection, and expenditure of the drainage fee. In 2018, Houston passed a new charter amendment curing many of the defects Perez alleged in the drainage fee ordinance. Perez was left with ongoing claims for reimbursement of the drainage fees she paid before 2018 and for an injunction against the future expenditure of fees collected before 2018. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims but remanded to allow Perez to replead in light of intervening events. Perez’s claims required her to articulate a viable theory of the DFO’s illegality to overcome Houston’s governmental immunity; her only theory failed as a matter of law. View "Perez v. Turner" on Justia Law

Anthony sued Theresa for a divorce. Theresa failed to answer. The court rendered a default judgment granting the divorce and dividing the marital estate. Theresa sought a new trial contending that Anthony’s attorney lied, telling her that the final hearing had not yet been scheduled. On appeal from the denial of her motion, Theresa brought a “sufficiency of the evidence” challenge, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in the property division. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Theresa had not preserved that argument.The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to file a "Craddock" motion for a new trial in the trial court does not foreclose a party’s ability to raise on appeal an evidentiary challenge to a default property division. The court noted that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(d) specifically offers a defaulting party an appellate remedy to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a case tried to the bench. A motion under Craddock does not attempt to show an error in the judgment; rather, it seeks to excuse the defaulting party’s failure to answer by showing the Craddock elements. View "Marriage of Williams" on Justia Law

TexCom sought to develop a commercial-waste-disposal facility on a 27-acre site in Montgomery County, near Conroe, that had one existing nonoperative injection well. TexCom sought to operate the existing well and construct up to three additional wells. Class I underground injection-control wells manage industrial waste by injecting it thousands of feet underground but can potentially harm drinking water and petroleum, so these injection wells undergo an extensive permitting process with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). A permit application must be accompanied by a letter from the Railroad Commission (RRC) concluding that the proposed wells “will not endanger or injure any known oil or gas reservoir.” RRC issued such a letter for TexCom but rescinded it after six years of administrative hearings, around the same time TCEQ issued its final order granting the permit application.The Texas Supreme Court affirmed TCEQ’s order granting the permit application as supported by substantial evidence; a migration finding, combined with the injection zone’s geological suitability, is sufficient to support TCEQ’s ultimate finding that the wells would be protective of water. The rescission did not deprive TCEQ of jurisdiction, and, on these facts, TCEQ did not violate the Texas Administrative Procedure Act by declining to reopen the administrative record for further proceedings. View "Dyer v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Blanchard hired Industrial Specialists to provide turnaround services at Blanchard’s refinery in Texas City. Three years into the contract, a fire occurred in a regenerator vessel, injuring several Industrial Specialists employees and one employee of another contractor. The employees sued Blanchard and all of its other contractors but did not sue Industrial. Blanchard demanded a defense and indemnity from Industrial under the parties’ contract. Industrial rejected the demand. Blanchard and the other contractors settled all the employees’ claims for $104 million. Blanchard paid $86 million, then filed suit, seeking to enforce the indemnity provision.The trial court denied competing summary-judgment motions without explaining its reasons but granted Industrial's unopposed motion to pursue a permissive interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d). The court of appeals denied the petition in 2019, stating that it “fail[ed] to establish each requirement” for a permissive appeal. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept this permissive interlocutory appeal or by failing to more thoroughly explain its reasons. The final-judgment rule may entail “inevitable inefficiencies,” and permissive appeals may reduce those inefficiencies, but the permissive-appeal process should not “morph into an alternative process for direct appeals to this Court, particularly from orders denying summary-judgment motions.” View "Industrial Specialists, LLC, v. Blanchard Refining Company LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this case asserting that the city of Houston's house mayor and city council members acted ultra vires in spending tax revenue in Fiscal Year 2020 on anything other than the drainage fund, holding that the taxpayers had standing to assert their claims and sufficiently pleaded ultra vires acts.Plaintiffs, two Houston taxpayers, brought this case alleging that City officials misallocated tax revenue because the City Charter requires a certain amount of tax revenue to be allocated to a fund exclusively for drainage and street maintenance and that the officials acted ultra vires in spending the revenue on anything else. The officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the taxpayers lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs alleged an illegal expenditure sufficient to support taxpayer standing; and (2) the City officials were not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs' ultra vires claim on governmental immunity grounds at this time. View "Jones v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the application the Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Dealers Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 57.001-.402, in this case did not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws in Tex. Const. art. I, 16.In the 1990s, Fire Protection Service, Inc. (FPS), orally agreed to be an authorized dealer and servicer of the life rafts manufactured by Survitec Survival Products, Inc. Nearly six years after the promulgation of the Act, which prohibits a supplier from terminating a dealer agreement without good cause, Survitec notified FPS that it was terminating their relationship. FPS sued for a violation of the Act. The district court entered judgment for Survitec. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that the application of the Act to the parties' agreement does not violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16. View "Fire Protection Service, Inc. v. Survitec Survival Products, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, absent a clear abuse of discretion, governmental immunity protects a zoning commission's determination that a proposed subdivision conforms with applicable law.After the City of Georgetown's Planning and Zoning Commission approved a preliminary plat for a new 89-home subdivision neighboring Escalera Ranch, a subdivision to the north the Escalera Ranch Owners' Association sued the Commission members, asserting that their approval of the plat was a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court granted the Commissioners' plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the Association lacked standing to sue. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioners adhered to their duty in determining that the preliminary plat conformed to the applicable standards. View "Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners' Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Medical Board is not required by federal law or permitted by Texas law to merely revise an initial report of a temporary sanction, rather than void it, when the Board later finds that the allegations have not been proved.Federal and State law require the Board to report a disciplinary action against a physician to the National Practitioner Data Bank to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from state to state. The Board issued a temporary sanction against Dr. Robert Wayne Van Boven while it investigated misconduct allegations. The Board then issued a final order concluding that Van Boven was not subject to sanctions. Van Bovcen brought this ultra vires action against Board officials directing them to file a Void Report with the Data Bank, which would remove the initial report against him and a subsequent revision-to-action report from disclosure. The trial court denied Defendants' plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board officials' actions in this case were ultra vires and that the officials were not immune from Van Boven's claims. View "Van Boven v. Freshour" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing a pending appeal as moot without resolving a jurisdictional issue, holding that remand was required.Defendants, a Taiwanese company and its CEO who were sued under various tort theories, specially appeared and challenged personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the special appearances, and Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. The trial court then rendered final judgment against Defendants. When the deadline for filing an appeal had expired, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals granted the motion, holding that, following rendition of final judgment, the jurisdictional issue could only be challenged by filing a separate notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a second notice of appeal from the final judgment was unnecessary for the appellate court to maintain its pre-existing jurisdiction over the still-live jurisdictional dispute. View "Chen v. Razberi Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

In this eminent domain dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's judgment in favor of a pipeline company, holding that remand was required for a new trial to determine the market value of the property taken.A landowner challenged the pipeline company's right to condemn, arguing that the transport of polymer-grade propylene did not the pipeline company common-carrier status. After excluding the landowner's evidence of sales of other pipeline easements the trial court found in favor of the pipeline company. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that whether the pipeline served a public use presented a fact question for a jury to resolve and that the trial court erred in excluding the landowner's testimony about easement sales. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Tex. Bus. Org. Code 2.105 grants common-carrier eminent domain authority for the construction and use of a polymer-grade propylene pipeline; (2) the company demonstrated that its pipeline served a public use, and that determination is a legal one; and (3) a property owner may testify to sales of pipeline easements across the property made to other pipeline carriers. View "Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline Partnership, LLC" on Justia Law