Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

In Texas, the District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District, Christina Mitchell Busbee, objected to the sale of a property that was purchased with the District's forfeiture funds and was legally owned by Medina County. The District Attorney argued that the County could not sell the property without her consent and that she was entitled to the sale proceeds. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled that the District Attorney did not have standing to make these claims because the relevant statute, Chapter 59, authorizes only the Attorney General to enforce its terms. The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed, holding that the question of whether the District Attorney was authorized to sue under Chapter 59 did not pertain to her constitutional standing to sue, but rather to the merits of her claims. The Court concluded that the District Attorney did have constitutional standing to sue because she had alleged a concrete injury traceable to the County's conduct and redressable by court order. The case was remanded back to the trial court to consider the County's additional jurisdictional challenges. View "BUSBEE v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, TEXAS" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Texas examined the requirements for terminating parental rights based on a parent's noncompliance with a service plan ordered by the court. The mother had been ordered to follow a service plan after her children were removed from her care due to allegations of neglectful supervision. The plan required her to attend counseling sessions, parenting classes, and substance abuse classes. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services later sought to terminate the mother's parental rights based on her alleged failure to comply fully with the service plan.The lower courts held that the mother's failure to strictly comply with the plan's requirements necessitated termination of her parental rights. However, the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with this interpretation. The court stated that the requirement for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with a service plan is not strict compliance with every detail of the plan. The court emphasized that the noncompliance must involve a requirement that is specifically established in the plan and is material to the plan's overall purpose. In light of this, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on her noncompliance with the service plan.The court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower courts in part and rendered judgment vacating those portions of the trial court’s order terminating the mother's parental rights. The remainder of the trial court’s termination order was affirmed. View "IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.G., R.J.G., D.G.M." on Justia Law

In this case handled by the Supreme Court of Texas, the parents of two children, Kate Cox and Justin Cox, along with their doctor, Dr. Damla Karsan, filed a suit to challenge the enforcement of Texas laws that prohibit abortion. Mrs. Cox was about 20 weeks pregnant with a baby diagnosed with trisomy 18, a serious genetic disorder. The suit sought to apply a medical-necessity exception provided in the Texas law, which allows an abortion if a woman's life is threatened or she faces a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function due to her pregnancy.The court, in its decision, clarified that the exception to the abortion prohibition is based on the reasonable medical judgment of a doctor, not a court. It was noted that Dr. Karsan presented a "good faith belief" that Mrs. Cox meets the exception's requirements but did not assert that her belief meets the objective standard of "reasonable medical judgment."The court held that judges lack the authority to broaden the statutory exception by interpreting it and held the trial court erred in applying a different, lower standard instead of requiring reasonable medical judgment. The court emphasized that the exception requires a doctor's decision whether a pregnant woman’s complications pose the required risks.The court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the temporary restraining order that had restrained the Attorney General from enforcing the abortion laws against Dr. Karsan and others related to the case, based solely on the verified pleading. The court also noted that nothing in their opinion prevents a physician from acting if, in that physician’s reasonable medical judgment, they determine that the pregnant woman has a life-threatening physical condition. View "IN RE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, addressed two questions relating to the interpretation of Section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The questions pertained to the application of this statute when a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the court could have had jurisdiction had the claimants properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts and when the subsequent action is to be filed within 60 days after the dismissal becomes final.The first question was whether Section 16.064(a) applies when the prior court dismissed the action because of lack of jurisdiction, but the court would have had jurisdiction if the claimants had properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court of Texas answered in the affirmative, concluding that the statute applies even if the prior court could have had jurisdiction, as long as it dismissed the action due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.The second question was whether the subsequent action was filed within sixty days after the dismissal became final. The Supreme Court of Texas also answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a dismissal or other disposition becomes final under Section 16.064(a)(2) when the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the courts' power to alter the dismissal has ended.The factual background of the case involved two flight attendants who alleged that they were injured when a smoke detector on a flight malfunctioned. They initially filed a suit against The Boeing Company in a federal district court in Houston, then refiled their claims in a federal district court in Dallas. After the Dallas district court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction (based on inadequate pleading of diversity jurisdiction), the flight attendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the flight attendants subsequently refiled their claims in state court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the action based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Houston district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, leading to the certified questions. View "SANDERS v. THE BOEING COMPANY (U.S. Fifth Circuit 22-20317)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus in this action brought by Plaintiff, Thalia Harris, against Defendant, her insurer, for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by quashing requested discovery and by ordering Defendant's counsel to pay $2,000 as a sanction.Following a car collision, Plaintiff settled with the other driver for his policy limits and sued Defendant for UIM benefits. Defendant disputed the amount of Plaintiff's alleged damages and sought production from her primary care physician of Plaintiff's medical records spanning a period of ten years during which Plaintiff was involved in five other car accidents, some of which caused injuries similar to those Plaintiff sustained in the accident at issue. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion to quash the discovery and for sanctions. The Supreme Court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order quashing deposition notices and ordering sanctions, holding (1) the trial court's order vitiated or several compromised Defendant's ability to present a viable defense at trial, and an appeal was not an adequate remedy; and (2) the trial court clearly abused its discretion by quashing Plaintiff's discovery requests. View "In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment in this dispute over a particular provision in a land-improvement contract, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the contract was ambiguous and could not be established as a matter of law.The trial court interpreted the disputed provision as a matter of law and instructed the jury accordingly. The court then entered judgment based on the jury's verdict, which resolved the issues of liability and damages. The court of appeals reached the same result as the trial court but nevertheless reversed, determining that, despite its analysis of the language of the contract, the provision was still ambiguous. The court then ordered a new trial so that a jury could determine the meaning of the contractual text. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court correctly construed the subject provision, and the court of appeals erred in ruling that the provision was ambiguous. View "U.S. Polyco, Inc. Texas Central Business Lines Corp." on Justia Law

In this case involving mandates requiring people to wear face masks or other coverings to prevent the spread of COVID-19 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and opinion of the court of appeals and dismissed this interlocutory appeal, holding that the appeal was moot.In 2021, the City of El Paso obtained a temporary injunction against the enforcement of GA-38, a gubernatorial executive order that prohibited local mask-wearing requirements. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2023, Senate Bill 29, codified as Tex. Health & Safety Code 81.B.001-.004, which provided that a governmental entity may not impose mask-wearing requirement to prevent the spread of COVID-19, went into effect. Further, GA-38 expired. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and dismissed this appeal, holding that no live controversy remained between the parties. View "Abbott v. City of El Paso" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal as moot and vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in this case arising from the Covid-19 pandemic, holding that the public interest was best served by vacatur of the court of appeals' opinion and that the State was prevented from challenging on the merits due to mootness.When the San Antonio Independent School District (ISD) required that its employees take a Covid-19 vaccine by October 15 2021, the State sued, seeking a temporary injunction arguing that the vaccine requirement violated a gubernatorial executive order. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied the ensuing appeal as moot, holding that neither the enforceability of the ISD's vaccine mandate, which was barred by Senate Bill 29, nor the enforceability of executive order GA-39, which had expired, left a live controversy between the parties. View "State v. San Antonio Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Father's appeal of the termination of his parental rights, holding that Father properly invoked the court's jurisdiction, and therefore the court erred in dismissing Father's appeal on jurisdictional grounds.After a joint bench trial and in a single order the trial court ordered termination of both Father's and Mother's rights. Father noticed his appeal to one of two courts of appeals with jurisdiction to entertain his appeal, and Mother noticed her appeal to the other court. Although Father amended his notice to consolidate his appeal into the court of appeals in which Mother's appeal was pending, the court of appeals determined that the amended notice did not vest it with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the merits were properly before the court of appeals at issue, and therefore, the court erred in dismissing Father's appeal for want of jurisdiction. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law