Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a negligence claim can arise from the condition or use of an improvement even when negligence elsewhere is alleged to have contributed to a plaintiffs' injuries so long as the other statutory requirements are satisfied.Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and trespass to chattels against Defendant, the owner of property upon which Plaintiffs were working to drill a water well. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that there was negligence regarding a condition of the water well Plaintiffs were drilling, and this negligence caused damages. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied to Plaintiffs' claims. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Chapter 95 applied; and (2) the trial court properly granted summary judgment because Defendant proved conclusively that it could not be held liable under Chapter 95 given its lack of control over the work. View "Energen Resources Corp. v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's summary judgment in this case involving a school district's breach of warranty claims against a general contractor and an artificial-field-turf manufacturer, holding that the court of appeals erred.The Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the contractor, holding (1) a trial court’s on-the-record, oral ruling sustaining an objection to summary judgment evidence suffices to strike the evidence from the summary judgment record when the ruling is not reduced to a written order; and (2) the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the contractor and remanding the claims against the turf manufacturer for a new trial without addressing the merits of the issues on appeal that could result in rendition of judgment in favor of the manufacturer. View "FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Pleasant Grove Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA) does not affect the enforceability of an additional-insured provision under the Texas Anti-Indemnity Act (TAIA).A general contractor's employee injured in an accident obtained a negligence judgment in Texas state court against the subcontractor that operated the crane (Berkel) and the company that leased the crane (Maxim). Berkel was an indemnity and Maxim was an indemnity for TAIA purposes because Berkel had provided Maxim with coverage as an additional insured. After the injured worker settled with Maxim, Maxim unsuccessfully sought reimbursement from Berkel's insurer (Zurich). The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Berkel, concluding that Berkel and the injured worker were "statutory co-employees" of the general contractor under the TWCA, and therefore, the TWCA provided the worker's exclusive remedy. In a separate suit in federal court, Maxim and Zurich disputed over whether the additional-insured coverage was enforceable. The Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that the word "employee" in Tex. Ins. Code 151.103 bears its common meaning, which is not affected by whether the indemnity and injured employee are considered co-employees for purposes of the TWCA. View "Maxim Crane Works, LP v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical negligence claims, holding that Texas Medical Liability Act applied, and therefore, Plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report on Defendants was fatal to her claims.At issue was (1) whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendants negligently administered various treatments that caused scarring and discoloration to her skin constituted "health care liability claims" under the Act, and (2) whether the Act prohibited Plaintiff from filing an amended petition after the Act's deadline for serving expert reports. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's claims constituted health care liability claims subject to the Act's expert report requirements; (2) the Act did not prohibit Plaintiff from filing an amended petition; and (3) because Plaintiff failed timely to serve an expert report, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the Act. View "Lake Jackson Medical Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the court of appeals to vacate its order granting relief and to instruct the trial court to vacate the order it issued in compliance with the court of appeals' directive, holding that a facility's general policies and procedures fall outside the scope of pre-report discovery permitted in medical-liability cases.Kenneth Smith, on behalf of his wife, Donna Smith, brought this action alleging that Donna fell multiple times while in the care of a nursing facility owned by LCS SP, LLC. Before Smith served LCS with an expert report he requested LCS's general operating policies and procedures for the five years before he brought suit. When LCS objected, Smith moved to compel the discovery. The trial court denied the motion, delaying the discovery until after Smith served LCS with the expert report required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(s). Smith petitioned for mandamus relief, which the court of appeals conditionally granted. LCS then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to compel the requested discovery. View "In re LCS SP, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case involving proper service of lawsuits on financial institutions that act as fiduciaries the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment that the defendant financial institution take nothing on its equitable bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served and that the default judgment rendered against it must be set aside.At issue was which of two Texas statutes applied in this case: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 17.028, which provides that citation may be served on Defendant by serving its "registered agent," or chapter 505 of the Estates Code, which provides that a foreign corporate fiduciary must appoint the Secretary of State as an "agent for service of process." Plaintiff in this case served the Secretary rather than the defendant's designated registered agent. Because it had not updated its Chapter 505 designation of the person to whom the Secretary should forward process, Defendant did not receive the citation, and default judgment was entered against it. The Supreme Court rendered summary judgment granting Defendant's bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served. View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the City of San Antonio was not immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001-101.109, for injuries arising from the use of law enforcement vehicles, holding that the court of appeals erred.Plaintiff was injured when he was riding his motorcycle behind a police officer's vehicle but three lanes over and the car in front of him braked. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the officer was negligent in turning on his emergency lights. The trial court concluded that the City failed to prove that the officer was entitled to official immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the City for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the City made the necessary showing that its officer acted in good faith. View "City of San Antonio v. Riojas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting the City of San Antonio's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that their injuries arose from a police officer's vehicular pursuit of a fleeing suspect who crashed into their car, holding that the court of appeals erred.After Plaintiffs sued the City pursuant to section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the officer's actions were too attenuated from Plaintiffs' injuries and that the officer's actions were not reckless and did not violate applicable laws or ordinances. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the City's immunity was waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. View "City of San Antonio v. Maspero" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute presenting two certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the Supreme Court held that the Northfield exception to the "eight-corners rule" is permissible under Texas law. See Northfield Insurance Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F,3d 523 (5th Cir. 2004).Plaintiff brought the underlying suit alleging that Insured negligently drilled an irrigation well, damaging Plaintiff's land. Insured demanded a defense from its two liability insurers, BITCO General Insurance Corp., which defended under a reservation of rights, and Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company, which refused to defend. BITCO sued Monroe seeking a declaration that Monroe owed a defense to Plaintiff. The certified questions in this case related to the subsidiary issue of whether Texas law permits consideration of stipulated extrinsic evidence to determine whether the duty to defend exists when the plaintiff's pleading is silent about a potentially dispositive coverage fact. The Supreme Court held (1) the Northfield exception is permissible provided that the extrinsic evidence meets three conditions; and (2) the stipulation offered in this case may not be considered because it overlaps with the merits of liability. View "Monroe Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Bitco General Insurance Corp." on Justia Law