Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the City of San Antonio was not immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001-101.109, for injuries arising from the use of law enforcement vehicles, holding that the court of appeals erred.Plaintiff was injured when he was riding his motorcycle behind a police officer's vehicle but three lanes over and the car in front of him braked. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the officer was negligent in turning on his emergency lights. The trial court concluded that the City failed to prove that the officer was entitled to official immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the City for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the City made the necessary showing that its officer acted in good faith. View "City of San Antonio v. Riojas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting the City of San Antonio's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that their injuries arose from a police officer's vehicular pursuit of a fleeing suspect who crashed into their car, holding that the court of appeals erred.After Plaintiffs sued the City pursuant to section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the officer's actions were too attenuated from Plaintiffs' injuries and that the officer's actions were not reckless and did not violate applicable laws or ordinances. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the City's immunity was waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. View "City of San Antonio v. Maspero" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute presenting two certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the Supreme Court held that the Northfield exception to the "eight-corners rule" is permissible under Texas law. See Northfield Insurance Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F,3d 523 (5th Cir. 2004).Plaintiff brought the underlying suit alleging that Insured negligently drilled an irrigation well, damaging Plaintiff's land. Insured demanded a defense from its two liability insurers, BITCO General Insurance Corp., which defended under a reservation of rights, and Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company, which refused to defend. BITCO sued Monroe seeking a declaration that Monroe owed a defense to Plaintiff. The certified questions in this case related to the subsidiary issue of whether Texas law permits consideration of stipulated extrinsic evidence to determine whether the duty to defend exists when the plaintiff's pleading is silent about a potentially dispositive coverage fact. The Supreme Court held (1) the Northfield exception is permissible provided that the extrinsic evidence meets three conditions; and (2) the stipulation offered in this case may not be considered because it overlaps with the merits of liability. View "Monroe Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Bitco General Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court concluding that an automobile-liability insurance policy required the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured against claims for damages arising from an accident involving the use of a "golf cart," holding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the insured.Plaintiff, acting as next friend of her minor daughter, sued the the Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School District and its employee, alleging that her daughter was severely injured after being thrown from a golf cart. The School District, which had obtained automobile-liability insurance from the Texas Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self Insurance Fund, requested that the Insurance Fund provide a defense against Plaintiff's claims and indemnify the School District against liability. The Insurance Fund then brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend the School District. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the School District. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Insurance Fund had no duty to defend the School District because the term "golf cart" did not refer to a "covered auto" as that term was used in the policy. View "Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School District v. Texas Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment against a utility in this personal injury action, holding that a limitation of liability provision in a utility tariff approved by state regulators barred the utility's liability for damages suffered by a residential customer's houseguests.The tariff at issue provided that the utility "shall not be liable for any damage or loss" in the limited circumstance where damage or loss is "caused by the escape of gas" from the residence's housepiping or appliances. Plaintiffs in this case were injured in precisely that way while they were houseguests at the home of one of the utility's residential customers. The trial court and court of appeals concluded that the liability limitation was applicable only to damage or loss sustained by the utility's customer and therefore, the tariff's liability limitations did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the filed-rate doctrine, the liability limitation plainly and expressly precluded the utility's liability for Plaintiffs' damagers and appleid to them as "consumers" of the utility's gas services. View "CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that substantial evidence did not support the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) decision granting an application filed by Dos Republicas Coal Partnership (DRCP) seeking renewal of a permit for wastewater discharge at a coal mine, holding that DRCP was the correct permit applicant.At the time of this dispute, TCEQ rules required both the operator and the owner of the facility to apply for a permit. DRCP owned the mine, but the dispute was whether DRCP or the contractor it hired to conduct day-to-day activities at the time was the mine's "operator." TCEQ concluded that DRCP was the mine's operator. The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that the application lacked the required applicant and should have been denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DRCP was the entity responsible for the overall operation of the facility and was therefore the correct permit applicant. View "Texas Commission on Environment Quality v. Maverick County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that remand is not the proper remedy for a successful factual-sufficiency challenge to Tex. Fam. Code 161.006(b)(1)(D) and (E) when termination is otherwise valid on another predicate ground.The trial court terminated Father's parental rights, basing its termination on three predicate grounds and finding that termination was in the child's best interest. The court of appeals affirmed termination under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(O) for failure to comply with the service. Because a predicate ground for termination under (M) is prior termination for endangerment under (D) or (E), however, the court of appeals examined the sufficiency of the evidence and held that the evidence for termination under subsections (D) and (E) was not factually sufficient. The court then remanded the case for a new trial on (D) and (E). The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in remanding the case for a new trial on the factually insufficient predicate grounds. View "In re M.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rendering judgment that delivery of the grantor's fractional share in the pipeline occurred in the gathering pipeline rather than the transportation pipeline, holding that the court of appeals did not err.A deed conveying the mineral estate in this case reserved a nonparticipating royalty interest in kind, meaning that the grantor retained ownership of a fractional share of all minerals in place. The deed required delivery of the grantor's fractional share "free of cost in the pipe line, if any, otherwise free of cost at the mouth of the well or mine[.]" The parties agreed that the royalty did not include production and postproduction costs incurred before delivery into the existing gas pipeline but disagreed about the pipeline's location under the terms of the deed. The trial court concluded that delivery occurred in the transportation pipeline. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that delivery occurs in the gathering pipeline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the deed in this case. View "Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. Bluestone Natural Resources II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that Father's evidence that he would be paroled in the near future was speculative.Child was born while Father was in prison. When Child was nineteen months old the trial court terminated Father's parental rights, finding that he would remain incarcerated and unable to care for Child for at least two years from the date the petition was filed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Department of Family and Protective Services failed to negate Father's testimony that he would be paroled "in the near future." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals impermissibly substituted its own judgment for the trial court's judgment and erred by failing to defer to the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. View "In re C.L.E.E.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, at least where specific jurisdiction is asserted, Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a discovery need not relate exclusively to jurisdictional issues without touching on merits issues.The parties in this suit concerning water leaks from plastic pipe made of cross linked polyethylene failed to agree on the scope of two corporate representative depositions, and so the trial court granted a motion to compel the depositions on a list of thirty topics proposed by Plaintiffs. The nonresident defendant sought mandamus relief, which the court of appeals granted, concluding that the trial court erred in compelling discovery on topics that touched both jurisdictional and merits issues. The Supreme Court directed the court of appeals to vacate its mandamus order, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion merely by compelling discovery on jurisdictional topics; (2) the standard for trial courts to apply is that the information sought must be essential to prove at least one part of the plaintiff's theory of personal jurisdiction; and (3) general principles that limit the scope of discovery apply equally to jurisdictional discovery. View "In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC" on Justia Law