Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that an attorney's pre-suit efforts to publicize allegedly defamatory statements are shielded from liability by either attorney immunity or the judicial-proceedings privilege, holding that the court of appeals erred as to this issue.Landry's, Inc. sued Defendants for defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference, abuse of process, trespass, and civil conspiracy. The trial court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the judicial-proceedings privilege immunized Defendants from liability for the allegedly defamatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the dissemination of the allegedly defamatory statements was not protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege, nor did the privilege cover other publicity statements; (2) attorney immunity did not bar Landry's defamation claims; and (3) the court of appeals correctly affirmed the dismissal of the business disparagement and tortious interference claims. View "Landry's, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the denial of Petitioner's petition to expunge his driving while intoxicated (DWI) arrest records pursuant to Tex. Crim. Proc. Code 55.01(a)(2)(A), holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's DWI arrest records were not eligible for expunction under article 55.01(a)(2).At issue was whether an arrest involving multiple offenses is divisible for purposes of expunging arrest records under article 55.01. The court of appeals applied the "arrest-based" construction of the statute, under which expunction is available only if all of the offenses comprising an arrest are eligible for expunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under article 55.01(a)(2)(A), misdemeanor offenses are eligible for expunction on an individual basis; and (2) Petitioner was entitled to partial expunction of his arrest records. View "Ex Parte R.P.G.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 did not apply to an inventor's motion for a new trial when the trial court struck the intervenor's petition before it rendered the final judgment, holding that, contrary to the conclusion of the court of appeals, Rule 26.1 does apply.A condominium owner and his homeowners' association and property manager settled the owner's claims asserting that Defendants wrongfully foreclosed their lien against the owner's condominium. In light of the settlement, the trial court struck the intervention petition of the owner's accounting firm (firm) and rendered final judgment. Thereafter, the firm filed a motion for new trial and a notice of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the firm did not qualify as a "party" whose new trial motion could extend the appellate deadline. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the firm was a party to the judgment, and therefore, its timely filing of the new trial motion extended the deadline for filing a notice of appeal; and (2) the firm timely filed its notice of appeal. View "Eichner v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that a validly executed correction instrument under Tex. Prop. Code 5.029 must be signed by the property's current owners, holding that the court of appeals incorrect interpreted the "if applicable" clause in the statute.To be effective, the instrument correcting a material error in a recorded original instrument of conveyance by agreement must be executed by each party to the original instrument or, "if applicable, a party's heirs, successors, or assigns." See section 5.029(b)(1). At issue as when are a party's heirs, successors or assigns are applicable such that their agreement is necessary to make such a correction. The court of appeals concluded that the original parties could not correct their mistake in the original instrument of conveyance solely by their agreement after an assignment and, rather, a validly executed correction instrument under section 5.029 must be signed by the property's current owners. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the original parties to a recorded original instrument of conveyance may validly execute a correction instrument under section 5.029, even after a third party has acquired an interest in the original transaction; and (2) the statute does not require that an original party's "heirs, successors, or assigns" sign a correction agreement when the original parties all execute the correction. View "Broadway National Bank v. Yates Energy Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that a fact issue existed as to whether a general contractor on a construction project owed a duty of care to its independent contractor's employee who was injured on the job, holding that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the existence of a duty.The trial court entered judgment in favor of the general contractor, concluding that there was no evidence to support the negligence elements of duty, breach, and causation. The court of appeals reversed as to the negligence claim, concluding that a fact issue existed regarding whether the contractor exercised actual control and thus owed the employee a duty, whether the contractor breached that duty, and whether the contractor's breach proximately caused the employee's injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contractor owed the employee no duty as a matter of law. View "JLB Builders, LLC v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to issue mandamus relief to compel Commissioner George P. Bush, head of the General Land Office, to refer the City of Galveston's claim that that the Land Office owed reimbursement to the City, holding that the City was not entitled to mandamus relief.The dispute in this case arose from a block grant contract that required the City to administer federal disaster relief funds. The City hired a private contractor to do some of the work, and the private contractor later sued the City for alleged amounts owed under the parties' contract. After the City settled with the private contractor it filed a claim for reimbursement from the Land Office for the settlement amount paid by the City. Bush refused to refer the City's claim to the State Office of Administrative Hearings for an administrative law judge to hear it. The City brought this action asking that the Supreme Court exercise its original mandamus jurisdiction over state officials to compel Bush to refer the claim. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that where, as part of the settlement, the City agreed not to sue Bush in any "related proceeding," mandamus relief was precluded. View "In re City of Galveston, Texas" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to render judgment in favor of Insurer on the jury's verdict, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to render judgment on the verdict.Insured sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from Insurer. Insurer in this case declined to participate in a jury trial to establish the at-fault motorist's liability and demanded a separate trial on its liability under the UIM policy. Before trial on the UIM claim, the court commenced a jury trial on Insured's negligence claim against the at-fault motorist. The parties settled and the claim was dismissed without rendition of judgment on the jury's verdict. Insurer then argued that a separate trial on the UIM claim was no longer necessary because of the jury's findings and the settlement payment. The trial court denied Insurer's motion for judgment based on the jury verdict from the negligence trial. Insurer sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) collateral estoppel did not bind Insured to a verdict that was not reduced to judgment; and (2) Insurer's post-dismissal consent to be bound by the negligence suit's outcome did not make the negligence verdict enforceable against Insured in the contract suit. View "In re USAA General Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals holding that limitations barred a mineral estate lessee's claims for injuries to its interests in one of its nine separate leases but did not bar the lessee's claims for injuries to its interests in the other eight leases, holding that the evidence did not conclusively establish that the first legal injury occurred outside the limitations period.At issue was when, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the lessee's claim that hydrogen sulfide an operator injected back into the earth migrated beneath the surface and injured the lessee's interest in the minerals underlying nearby properties accrued. The trial court concluded that the lessee's claims occurred at least two years before the lessee first filed them and were therefore untimely. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not establish a right to summary judgment based on limitations. View "Regency Field Services LLC v. Swift Energy Operating LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order granting a motion to strike a counteraffidavit served under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 18.001 and precluding the offering party from contesting the reasonableness of the subject medical expenses at trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion.In granting the motion to strike, the trial court concluded that the counteraffidavit failed to comply with the requirements of section 18.001. The court then prohibited the offering party from testifying regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the medical bills. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court erred by striking the counteraffidavit and by granting relief that found no legal basis in section 18.001 for the purported failure to comply with the statute. View "In re Allstate Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals in this premises liability case, holding that volunteers working in a third-party vendor's booth at a festival were licensees and not invitees of the landowner.Plaintiffs were the parents of four teenage volunteers at the San Lorenzo Church's annual festival. The teenagers were injured when a fire broke out in the interior of the booth they were working in. The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment on the jury's verdict failing to find that the Church negligently caused the volunteers' injury or that the Church controlled the injury-causing activity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the volunteers were the Church's invitees as a matter of law and that the verdict for the Church was against the preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the volunteers were licensees of the Church rather than invitees; and (2) Plaintiffs did not show either that the evidence conclusively established that the Church breached its duty to the volunteers as licensees or that the trial court otherwise committed reversible error. View "Catholic Diocese of El Paso v. Porter" on Justia Law