Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The lower courts in this case erred by requiring a signatory to arbitrate its non-contractual claims against non-signatories.Jody James Farms, JV purchased a crop revenue coverage insurance policy from Rain & Hail, LLC through the Altman Group. The insurance policy contained an arbitration clause. Neither the Altman Group nor any of its employees signed the agreement. After Rain & Hail denied coverage for a grain sorghum crop loss suffered by Jody James and the parties arbitrated the dispute, Jody James sued the Altman Group and its agent (collectively, the Agency) for breach of fiduciary duty and deceptive trade practices. The Agency successfully moved to compel arbitration under the insurance policy. At arbitration, Jody James asserted that it had a right to proceed in court against the Agency because the Agency was a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement. The arbitrator resolved that issue and the merits of the dispute in the Agency’s favor. The trial court confirmed the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed because (1) Jody James and the Agency did not agree to arbitrate any matter; and (2) Jody James may not be compelled to arbitrate under agency, third-party-beneficiary, or estoppel theories. View "Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed as moot the City of Krum’s interlocutory appeal from Taylor Rice’s suit contesting the validity of a sex offender residency restrictions ordinance (SORRO) enacted by the City, holding that Rice’s claims were rendered moot during the pendency of this appeal.Rice pled guilty to sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old. Rice was required to register as a sex offender, and at the time, the City of Krum had in place a SORRO prohibiting certain registered sex offenders such as Rice from residing “within 2,000 feet of any premises where children commonly gather.” The SORRO barred Rice from living in his parents’ house. Rice sued Krum, arguing that Krum lacked the authority to pass the SORRO. Krum filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Rice lacked standing to sue. The trial court denied the plea, and Krum filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed. Krum filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court, reiterating its jurisdictional arguments. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments, holding that Rice’s claims had been rendered moot by changes in the law, and therefore the courts lacked jurisdiction over these claims. View "City of Krum, Texas v. Rice" on Justia Law

Relator, who was designated a sexually violent predator and civilly committed pursuant to the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, was not entitled to appointed counsel in proceedings on the State’s motion to amend his civil commitment order to conform to the Act’s 2015 amendments.The trial court denied Relator’s request for appointed counsel on the State’s motion to modify Relator’s civil commitment order. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief to Relator, ordering the trial court to vacate its orders and appoint counsel to represent Relator in further proceedings on the State’s motion to modify. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that Relator was not entitled to appointed counsel on the State’s motion to amend his civil commitment order to conform to the amended Act, and therefore, the court of appeals abused its discretion in granting Relator mandamus relief. View "In re State of Texas" on Justia Law

The court of appeals erred in holding that the commercial-speech exemption applied so Defendant could not seek expedited dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).Defendant hired Plaintiff, which provided “virtual assistant” services to businesses, to receive and fulfill customer orders placed through Defendant’s website. Defendant later accused Plaintiff of failing to follow its instructions on how to fill those orders and over-ordering products, demanding compensation for lost profits. When Plaintiff refused to pay, Defendant published statements about the parties’ dispute on various online platforms, including a personal blog, YouTube, and social media. Plaintiff sued for defamation. Defendant moved to dismiss the suit under the TCPA. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the commercial-speech exemption applied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the TCPA’s commercial-speech exemption did not apply because Defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements did not arise out of his sale of goods or services or his status as a seller of those goods and services. Rather, Defendant’s statements constituted protected speech warning Plaintiff’s actual or potential customers about the quality of Plaintiff’s services. View "Castleman v. Internet Money Limited" on Justia Law

The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) applied to tort claims brought by a nonclient against an attorney based in part on statements the attorney made in open court on behalf of his client, and the attorney was entitled to dismissal under the TCPA.The trial court denied Defendant-attorney’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the TCPA applied to the claims against Defendant, Plaintiff made a prima facie case for each element of his claims, and Defendant failed to prove his attorney-immunity defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the TCPA applies to protect an attorney’s in-court statements on behalf of his client during a judicial proceeding; and (2) assuming without deciding that Plaintiff carried his burden to make a prima facie case as to the elements of his claims against Defendant, Defendant was nevertheless entitled to dismissal under the affirmative defense of attorney immunity. View "Youngkin v. Hines" on Justia Law

At issue was a trial court order requiring Defendant-hospital to produce information regarding its reimbursement rates from private insurers and public payers for the services it provided to Plaintiff.Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that Defendant’s charges were unreasonable and its hospital lien for the amount of its services was invalid to the extent it exceeded a reasonable and regular rate for services rendered. During discovery, the trial court ordered Defendant to produce information regarding the reimbursement rates at issue. Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandamus arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering production of the information because the reimbursement rates were irrelevant to whether its charges to Plaintiff, who was uninsured, were reasonable. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the amounts Defendant accepted as payment for services from other patients, including those covered by private insurance and government benefits, were relevant to whether the charges to Plaintiff were reasonable and were thus discoverable. View "In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co." on Justia Law

At issue was the function of a clause in a real property deed that “saves and excepts” one-half of “all royalties from the production of oil, gas and/or other minerals that may be produced from the above described premises which are now owned by Grantor” when the deed does not disclose that the grantor does not own all of the royalty interests and does not except any other royalty interests from the conveyance.The trial court held that the deeds did not create a Duhig problem - where the grantor owns less than he purports to convey - by construing the clause as reserving for the grantor one-half of all royalties “which [were then] owned by Grantor.” The court of appeals determined that the clause created a Duhig problem, interpreting the clause as reserving for the grantor one-half of all royalties produced from the “above described premises which [were then] owned by Grantor.” The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) instead of reserving a one-half royalty interest for the grantors, the clause merely excepted that interest from the grant, and therefore, the deeds did not create a Duhig problem; and (2) each party with an interest in the tracts owned a one-quarter interest in the royalties produced. View "Perryman v. Spartan Texas Six Capital Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

A trial court’s authority to distinguish between genuine and non-genuine fact issues includes the authority to apply the so-called “sham affidavit rule” when confronted with evidence that appears to be a sham designed to avoid summary judgment.Under the sham affidavit rule, if a party submits an affidavit that conflicts with the affiant’s prior sworn testimony and does not provide a sufficient explanation for the conflict, a trial court may disregard the affidavit when deciding whether the party has raised a genuine fact issue to avoid summary judgment. In this commercial dispute, the trial court struck an affidavit as a sham under the rule and granted partial summary judgment. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed and adopted the sham affidavit doctrine, which had not previously been explicitly recognized by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision as to the partial summary judgment grant, as the trial court properly concluded that the affidavit in question did not raise a genuine fact issue sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Court then remanded to the court of appeals to consider whether any claims remained unresolved. View "Lujan v. Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law

In this property-tax dispute regarding ownership of tangible personal property, the Supreme Court held (1) when, as in this case, an ownership correction to an appraisal roll does not increase the amount of property taxes owed for subject property in the year of the correction, an appraisal district’s chief appraiser has statutory authority under Tex. Code Ann. Prop. 25.25(b) to make such a correction even when the correction necessarily alters the taxing units’ expectation of who is liable for payment of property taxes; (2) an agreement under Tex. Code Ann. Prop. 1.111(e) may be rendered voidable if it is proven that it was induced by fraud; and (3) a purported owner challenging ownership on the appraisal roll is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Tex. Code Ann. Prop. 42.29. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that Willacy County Appraisal District lacked authority to change a property ownership determination under section 25.25(b), without reaching the issue of whether a section 1.111(e) agreement may be voided if it was induced by fraud, and remanding the case for a determination of attorney’s fees consistent with section 42.29. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Willacy County Appraisal District v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd." on Justia Law

At issue in this statutory-construction case was the damages-cap and election-of-remedies provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) with respect to independent contractors performing essential governmental functions.Plaintiff, the daughter of a pedestrian who was struck and killed by a public bus in Fort Worth, brought claims under the TTCA against the Fort Worth Transportation Authority (FWTA), its two independent contractors, and the bus driver. The Supreme Court held (1) the TTCA’s damages cap applies cumulatively when, as in this case, an independent contractor performed essential governmental functions of a transportation authority; (2) the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision extends to cover an employee of an independent contractor performing essential governmental functions; and (3) the transit defendants in this case were not entitled to attorney’s fees arising out of interpleader. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment in favor of FWTA with respect to issues one and two, and affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Fort Worth Transportation Authority v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law