Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants’ failure to fully comply with a temporary restraining order did not justify sanctions even more severe than death-penalty sanctions imposed by the trial court.Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Defendants. Without taking evidence, the court signed a TRO prohibiting Defendants from engaging in certain conduct. Plaintiffs later filed a motion for contempt and sanctions, alleging that Defendants knowingly violated the TRO. The trial court granted the motion in an order stating that “death penalty sanctions should be imposed” against Defendants. The court then awarded sanctions of $897,938. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Defendants knowingly violated the TRO without a compelling excuse; but (2) the extreme sanction imposed for the violations of the TRO was an abuse of discretion. View "Altesse Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A turnover order is not a final, appealable judgment when it merely orders funds subject to an as yet unadjudicated ownership dispute into the court’s registry.Here, a turnover order directed funds subject to disputed ownership claims into the court’s registry “without prejudice” to the rights of either the judgment creditor or non-judgment debtor to later seek the funds’ release. Nearly six months after the trial court signed the turnover order, Respondent filed a motion to enforce the turnover order and to have the registry funds released to it on the grounds that Petitioner triggered a condition for releasing the funds when it neglected to appeal the turnover order. The trial court ordered the turnover order enforced and registry funds released to Respondent (the “release order”). The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction due to Petitioner’s failure to timely appeal the turnover order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner timely appealed the release order; and (2) the turnover order’s provisions did not function as a mandatory injunction, which meant the release order was the final judgment on Petitioner’s claims. View "Alexander Dubs Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co." on Justia Law

In this case involving an arbitration provision in short-term loan contracts the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling (1) the borrowers’ claims against the lender came within the arbitration provision, and (2) the lender did not waive its right to arbitrate by providing information to the district attorney that checks written to the lender by the borrowers had been returned for insufficient funds.The borrowers sued the lender, claiming that the lender wrongfully used the criminal justice system to collect unpaid loans by filing false charges against them. The lender responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause was inapplicable because the borrowers' claims related solely to the lender’s illegal use of the criminal justice system and that the lender waived its right to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the borrowers’ claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision; and (2) the lender did not substantially invoke the judicial process, and therefore, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding the the lender waived its right to arbitrate. View "Henry v. Cash Biz, LP" on Justia Law

In this case involving an arbitration provision in short-term loan contracts the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling (1) the borrowers’ claims against the lender came within the arbitration provision, and (2) the lender did not waive its right to arbitrate by providing information to the district attorney that checks written to the lender by the borrowers had been returned for insufficient funds.The borrowers sued the lender, claiming that the lender wrongfully used the criminal justice system to collect unpaid loans by filing false charges against them. The lender responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause was inapplicable because the borrowers' claims related solely to the lender’s illegal use of the criminal justice system and that the lender waived its right to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the borrowers’ claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision; and (2) the lender did not substantially invoke the judicial process, and therefore, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding the the lender waived its right to arbitrate. View "Henry v. Cash Biz, LP" on Justia Law

Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A., a Medicaid provider, was entitled to a contested-case hearing on the merits of the State’s claim to recoup alleged overpayments.Texas law directs the Inspector General to recover from a Medicaid provider any “overpayment” identified in a fraud or abuse investigation. Here, Shamrock received a “Notice of Payment Hold." Shamrock requested an expedited administrative hearing. Shamrock later received a “Final Notice of Overpayment.” The parties agreed to consolidate the payment hold and overpayment issues into one proceeding. The administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the overpayment and payment-hold cases due to Shamrock’s failure to submit a timely written request for an appeal. Shamrock filed suit. The trial court granted the Inspector General’s plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. Shamrock appealed, arguing that the ALJ and Inspector General had a ministerial duty to abide by a Rule 11 agreement created by the parties’ communications and the Inspector General’s written representations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the parties agreed that Shamrock would defend itself against the overpayment claims in a contested-cse hearing; (2) the ALJ failed to perform the purely ministerial act of enforcing the Rule 11 agreement; and (3) therefore, the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity applied to Shamrock’s suit. View "Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Texas Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order directing a relator to turn over his computer and other electronic devices for forensic examination.Marion Shipman partnered with Mark and Jamie Shelton in various real estate ventures. After their business dealings ceased, a bank sued the Sheltons. Jamie brought a third-party action against Shipman, alleging fraud and breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Jamie sought to discover a variety of records regarding Shipman’s business dealings with the Sheltons. Dissatisfied with Shipman’s production, Jamie filed a motion to compel and then a second motion to compel, the motion at issue in this case. In his motion, Jamie asserted that Shipman may have destroyed material evidence in this case and asked that the trial court tcompel Shipman to turn over his computer for forensic inspection. The trial court ordered Shipman to product his computer and all “media” for forensic examination. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Shipman to produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of every kind, whether business or personal, and regardless of whether they were related to the issues in the lawsuit, for seventeen years. View "In re Marion Shipman" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order directing a relator to turn over his computer and other electronic devices for forensic examination.Marion Shipman partnered with Mark and Jamie Shelton in various real estate ventures. After their business dealings ceased, a bank sued the Sheltons. Jamie brought a third-party action against Shipman, alleging fraud and breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Jamie sought to discover a variety of records regarding Shipman’s business dealings with the Sheltons. Dissatisfied with Shipman’s production, Jamie filed a motion to compel and then a second motion to compel, the motion at issue in this case. In his motion, Jamie asserted that Shipman may have destroyed material evidence in this case and asked that the trial court tcompel Shipman to turn over his computer for forensic inspection. The trial court ordered Shipman to product his computer and all “media” for forensic examination. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Shipman to produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of every kind, whether business or personal, and regardless of whether they were related to the issues in the lawsuit, for seventeen years. View "In re Marion Shipman" on Justia Law

A client’s communications with his registered patent agent, made to facilitate the agent’s provision of authorized legal services to the client, are privileged under Tex. R. Evid. 503.Andrew Silver brought a breach of contract action against Tabletop Media, LLC, alleging that it failed to pay him for his patent. During discovery, Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and Raffi Gostanian, the patent agent who represented Silver before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Silver refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were covered by the lawyer-client privilege. The trial court granted Tabletop’s motion to compel production. Thereafter, Silver sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that, under certain circumstances, the existing lawyer-client privilege extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the agent’s client. View "In re Andrew Silver" on Justia Law

A client’s communications with his registered patent agent, made to facilitate the agent’s provision of authorized legal services to the client, are privileged under Tex. R. Evid. 503.Andrew Silver brought a breach of contract action against Tabletop Media, LLC, alleging that it failed to pay him for his patent. During discovery, Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and Raffi Gostanian, the patent agent who represented Silver before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Silver refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were covered by the lawyer-client privilege. The trial court granted Tabletop’s motion to compel production. Thereafter, Silver sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that, under certain circumstances, the existing lawyer-client privilege extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the agent’s client. View "In re Andrew Silver" on Justia Law

The limitations on mental anguish damages do not require a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant before mental anguish damages can be recovered for mishandling a corpse.Cody Nelson sued SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc. for negligence in proceeding with the cremation of his mother’s body without his authorization, claiming mental anguish damages for having been denied the opportunity to pay his last respects to his mother. The siblings of Nelson’s mother signed an authorization for SCI to arrange an expedited cremation during Nelson’s absence. The trial court rendered judgment for SCI, concluding that because SCI did not contract with Nelson, it could not be liable to him for mental anguish damages. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that SCI and Nelson had a special relationships without being in contractual privity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Texas common law requires a special relationship, and not necessarily a contractual one, as the basis for mental anguish damages when the defendant had negligently mishandled a corpse. View "SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law