Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent, who owned a ranch, sued Petitioner, which produced natural gas on the ranch, for underpayment of royalties and underproduction of its lease. The parties resolved their dispute with two agreements that contained an arbitration provision. Respondent later sued Petitioner for environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazardous materials on the ranch. Before arbitration commenced, Respondent asked the Railroad Commission (RRC) to investigate contamination of the ranch by Petitioner. Meanwhile, an arbitration panel awarded Respondent $15 million for actual damages and $500,000 for exemplary damages. At issue on appeal was whether the RRC had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims, precluding the arbitration, and whether the arbitration award should be vacated for the evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator or because the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding (1) because Respondent’s claims were inherently judicial, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, and vacatur was not warranted for failure to abate the arbitration hearing; and (2) the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. View "Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

When Cadena Comercial USA Corp., a company formed to operate convenience stores, sought a retailer’s permit to sell alcohol, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) protested, arguing that, if the permit were granted, the ownership interests of Fomento Economico Mexicano, S.A.B. de C.V. (FEMSA) in Cadena and the Heineken Group, which owns breweries, would violate Texas’s “tied house” statutes that prohibit overlapping ownership between the manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing segments of the alcoholic beverage industry. The lower courts agreed with the TABC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that FEMSA’s indirect ownership interest in the Heineken Group and its breweries, in combination with its indirect ownership interest in Cadena, would result in a violation of Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. 102.07(a) if Cadena’s application for a permit were granted. View "Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission" on Justia Law

Respondent, a Texas Tech professor and associate dean, sued Petitioner, a colleague, for defamation after he was passed over for promotion. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Tort Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision foreclosed suit against her in her individual capacity because she made the allegedly defamatory statements in the scope of her employment by Texas Tech, a governmental unit. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to offer evidence she was not furthering her own purposes rather than her employer’s when she made the allegedly defamatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner was objectively acting within the scope of her employment when she made the allegedly defamatory statements, and therefore, Petitioner was entitled to dismissal pursuant to the election-of-remedies provision. View "Laverie v. Wetherbe" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Ike struck Galveston island, Insured contracted her Insurer and reported that the storm had damaged her home. Insurer determined that its policy covered some of the damage but declined to pay Insured benefits because the total estimated repair costs did not exceed the policy’s deductible. Insured sued Insurer for breach of the insurance policy and for unfair settlement practices. As damages, Insured sought only insurance benefits under the policy, plus attorney’s fees and costs. The jury found that Insurer violated the Texas Insurance Code, and the violation resulted in Insured’s loss of benefits Insured should have paid under the policy but did not find that Insurer failed to comply with its obligations under the policy. The trial court entered final judgment in Insured’s favor. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial in the interest of justice after announcing five rules that address the relationship between contract claims under an insurance policy and tort claims under the Insurance Code. View "USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca" on Justia Law

T-4 permit to Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC to obtain common-carrier status, which would give it eminent domain authority pursuant to the Natural Resources Code. Denbury Green, which was formed to build and operate a carbon dioxide pipeline known as “the Green Line” as a common carrier in Texas, filed suit against Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. for an injunction allowing access to certain tracts of land so that it could complete a pipeline survey. While the suit was pending, Denbury Green took possession of Texas Rice’s property pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code 21-021(a). The trial court concluded that Denbury Green was a common carrier with eminent domain authority. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the common-carrier test the Court established. The trial court granted summary judgment for Denbury Green. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that reasonable mind could differ regarding whether, at the time Denbury Green intended to build the Green Line, a reasonable probability existed that Green Line would serve the public. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Denbury Green is a common carrier as a matter of law. View "Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

The First Pentecostal Church of Beaumont entrusted over one million dollars for safekeeping to The Lamb Law Firm, P.C., and the firm deposited the money into its trust account. In just over one year, the church’s money was gone. The church sued the law firm; Kip Lamb, the firm’s owner; and Leigh Parker, one of the firm attorneys representing the church. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Parker. The church appealed, challenging the court’s rulings with respect to the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and joint venture. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment on the church’s claims for civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and joint venture; but (2) reversed the church’s claim that it was entitled to equitable remedies as to Parker for breach of fiduciary duties he owed to the church, holding that the church did not need to prove that Parker’s breach of fiduciary duty caused actual damages as to the equitable remedies it sought, and the church did not waive its claim for equitable remedies. View "First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker" on Justia Law

D Magazine published an article that identified Janay Rosenthal as someone who “has figured out how to get food stamps while living in the lap of luxury.” Rosenthal sued D Magazine for defamation and other causes of action. The trial court granted the magazine’s motion to dismiss as to Rosenthal’s statutory claims but denied it as to the defamation claim, concluding that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of defamation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Rosenthal presented sufficient evidence in support of the defamation elements to survive D Magazine’s motion for early dismissal, and therefore, dismissal of the claim under the Texas Citizens Participation Act was not warranted at this stage of the proceedings; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to award the magazine attorney’s fees in light of its dismissal of other claims. View "D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal" on Justia Law

In 1992, Shields Brothers, Inc. sued the Engelman Irrigation District, a governmental entity, alleging that Engelman had breached a contract to deliver water to Shields. Engelman alleged in its defense that it had governmental immunity. The district court denied the immunity defense, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury found damages for lost profits. The trial court rendered judgment for Shields in the amount of $271,138.80, plus interest and attorney fees. The judgment became final in 1998. The Engelman I judgment went unpaid, however, and the case continued to be litigated. In Engelman III, brought in 2010, Engelman sought a declaratory judgment that the Engelman I judgment was void under Tooke v. City of Mexia, decided by the Supreme Court in 2006. The trial court denied declaratory relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Tooke applies only narrowly to judgments still being challenged on direct appeal and does not apply broadly to all prior final judgments; and (2) therefore, the long-final judgment in this case cannot be upended via collateral attack. View "Engelman Irrigation District v. Shields Brothers, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case the trial court entered judgment terminating a bottom lease based on jury findings that the lease failed to produce in paying quantities over a specified period of time. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the rule against perpetuities did not invalidate the top lease, and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on the production-in-paying-quantities question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly remanded for a new trial where (1) the top lease did not violate the rule against perpetuities; and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on cessation of production in paying quantities. View "BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd." on Justia Law

Several related nonresident corporate defendants entered into an agreement with Texas companies to settle a New York lawsuit. In the underlying suit, Plaintiff, a nonresident, alleged that, by virtue of the settlement agreement, the parties to the agreement tortiously interfered with another nonresident company’s indemnity obligations to Plaintiff. To support Texas’s specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants, Plaintiff alleged that the agreement was partially negotiated in Texas and substantially performed in Texas. The nonresident corporate defendants filed special appearances. The trial court denied the special appearances, concluding that Texas had specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court had specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in this suit. Remanded. View "M&F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co." on Justia Law