Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was whether a newly-elected district court judge or the former judge he or she replaced may file findings of fact following a bench trial over which the former judge presided before his or her term expired. The court of appeals concluded that neither judge could file the findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals properly found that the new judge could not file the findings because she lacked the authority to file them; but (2) the court of appeal erred by failing to direct the new judge to request that the former judge file the findings because the former judge was the only judge with the power to file findings, even after he left the bench. View "Ad Villarai, LLC v. Pak" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that several members of the Harris County Appraisal Review Board were presently or formerly employed by the Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) under provisions of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act (TUCA) such that when their workload was reduced or their terms of service ended, they became eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) determined that the claimants were entitled to unemployment compensation. The district court set the TWC’s decisions aside. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the TWC did not arbitrarily or unreasonably ignore its own regulation; (2) the Tax Code does not prohibit or prevent a Board member from being an employee of HCAD for TUCA purposes; and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the TWC’s determination that the claimants were entitled to unemployment compensation. View "Harris County Appraisal District v. Texas Workforce Commission" on Justia Law

Paul Green, a former bus monitor for Dallas County Schools (DCS), was terminated because he admitted to “urinating on [himself] and in a water bottle while onboard [a] school bus[.]” Green filed this lawsuit, alleging that DCS terminated his employment because he was disabled. During trial, the jury heard testimony about Green’s heart condition and the drug he was taking that purportedly caused urinary incontinence. The trial court rendered judgment for Green. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was no evidence that DCS fired Green “because of” his disability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by treating Green’s heart condition as his only disability; and (2) the evidence supported a finding that Green was terminated because of a different disability - urinary incontinence. View "Green v. Dallas County Schools" on Justia Law

A plaintiff who was not a party to a written contract was not permitted to enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary.DTSG, Ltd. filed suit against First Bank. Richard Brumitt intervened as an additional plaintiff, alleging that he was a third-party-creditor beneficiary of an agreement entered into by DTSG and First Bank. The jury found First Bank liable to both DTSG and Brumitt for breach of contract and for negligent and grossly negligent misrepresentation. The trial court entered judgment based on the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding (1) the agreement between DTSG and First Bank was unambiguous and did not make Brumitt a third-party beneficiary; and (2) the trial court erred by submitting that issue to the jury and by instructing the jury that it could consider extrinsic evidence to add a third-party-beneficiary term to the unambiguous written agreement. The court remanded the case for further consideration of Brumitt’s claims alleging negligent and grossly negligent misrepresentations. View "First Bank v. Brumitt" on Justia Law

Waiver of a nonwaiver provision cannot be anchored in the same conduct the parties specifically agreed would not give rise to a waiver of contract rights.The long-term tenant in this forcible-detainer action frequently defaulted on the lease’s rental payment terms. The commercial landlord, however, regularly accepted, without protest, the tenant’s rental payments when tendered. A contractual nonwaiver provision provided that the landlord acceptance of rent past due “shall not be a waiver and shall not estop Landlord from enforcing that provision or any other provision of [the] lease in the future[.]” In this forcible-detainer action, the landlord sought to oust the tenant, claiming a superior right of immediate possession under a lease-extension option. The tenant, in turn, asserted that the landlord’s conduct in accepting late rental payments waived the contractual nonwaiver clause. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment rejecting the landlord’s forcible detainer action and rendered judgment in the landlord’s favor because the landlord did not act inconsistently with the contract’s express terms and because the tenant failed to identify any evidence supporting an equitable-estoppel bar to eviction. View "Shields Limited Partnership v. Bradeberry" on Justia Law

At issue in this family law dispute was whether a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) entered into the parties after nearly two years of divorce proceedings partitioned a discretionary employee bonus Husband received nine months after the divorce decree was entered. Husband argued that the bonus constituted future income and earnings that were partitioned to him under the MSA. Wife argued that part of the bonus was earned during the marriage and constituted undivided community property. The trial court granted summary judgment for Husband. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the MSA partitioned the bonus, and therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Husband. View "Loya v. Loya" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a private university that operates a state-authorized police department is a “governmental unit” for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 51.014(a)(8), which provides for an interlocutory appeal from an order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.” The private university in this case was the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW), and the case arose from an UIW officer’s use of deadly force following a traffic stop. The parents of the UIW student killed in the incident sued UIW for their son’s death. UIW raised governmental immunity as a defense and asked the trial court to dismiss the suit in a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea. UIW took an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that UIW is a governmental unit for purposes of law enforcement and is therefore entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8). View "University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus" on Justia Law

Plasma Fab, LLC obtained a general liability insurance policy from Scottsdale Insurance Company and financed the policy with BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC. The agreement between BankDirect and Plasma Fab granted BankDirect authority, upon Plasma Fab’s default, to cancel the insurance policy after proper notice has been mailed under section 651.161 of the Texas Premium Finance Act (Act). Because Plasma Fab was habitually late in making premium payments BankDirect eventually sent notice of intent to cancel the policy. The notice, however, violated section 651.161(b) because BankDirect failed to comply with the Insurance Code’s ten-day notice requirement. Plasma Fab was subsequently sued for damages arising out of a fire, and Scottsdale denied coverage. Plasma Fab sued Scottsdale and BankDirect for breach of contract, arguing that Defendants had no right to cancel the policy because BankDirect mailed its notice one day late. The trial court granted summary judgment to Scottsdale and BankDirect. The court of appeals reversed as to Plasma Fab’s claims against BankDirect due to BankDirect’s failure to mail proper notice. On Appeal, BankDirect argued that the Supreme Court should adopt a “substantial compliance” approach to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, when decoding statutory language, the court is bound by the legislature’s prescribed means, not its presumed intent. View "Bankdirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC" on Justia Law

Bartush-Schnitzius Foods Co., a food-product manufacturer, entered into an agreement with Cimco Refrigeration, Inc., a refrigeration contractor, to install a new refrigeration system. When disputes arose over the refrigeration system and payments owed, Cimco sued to recover the balance owed on the contract. The jury found that both parties failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. The trial court, however, rendered judgment solely for Bartush. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment that Bartush take nothing and Cimco recover damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both the trial court and the court of appeals failed to render judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Remanded. View "Bartush-Schnitzius Foods Co. v. Cimco Refrigeration, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Commerce Clause’s limitations on a state’s power to tax interstate commerce bar property taxes levied on natural gas held in Texas without a destination while awaiting future resale and shipment to out-of-state customers. The court of appeals found the tax in this case valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a nondiscriminatory tax on surplus gas held for future resale does not violate the Commerce Clause; and (2) the tax levied in this case withstands constitutional scrutiny, and because it does not violate the Commerce Clause, neither does it violate Tex. Tax Code 11.12, which provides a state-law exemption for taxes that would otherwise violate federal law. View "Etc Marketing, Ltd. v. Harris County Appraisal District" on Justia Law