Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In appraising real property, an appraisal district may choose to divide a single tract into multiple accounts for various reasons. Valero Refining-Texas L.P. (Valero), the property owner in this case, protested some, but not all, of those accounts and not the valuation of the whole tract, claiming unequal taxation. Galveston Central Appraisal District moved for want of jurisdiction, arguing that an equal-and-uniform challenge can be determined only if made to the appraised value of the entire tract, not just to some of the component tax accounts. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury found that the property had been appraised unequally. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. The District appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine an unequal appraisal challenge to anything but an entire tract. The court of appeals rejected the jurisdiction argument, concluding that the issue was one of fact, but ruling that there was no evidence to support the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction of Valero’s appeal; (2) there was some evidence to support the jury’s findings; and (3) as a matter of law, appraisals of individual accounts may be challenged as unequal. View "Valero Refining - Texas, L.P. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District" on Justia Law

Travis Coleman was a terminal technician formerly employed by ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (EMPCo). Coleman sued EMPCo and his two former supervisors for defamation, alleging that the statements by his supervisors about the circumstances that led to Coleman’s termination were untrue. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) applied to Coleman’s suit. The court of appeals ruled that EMPCo did not meet its burden to show that the TCPA applied to Coleman’s suit because the communications among EMPCo employees were related to Coleman’s job performance and had only a “tangential relationship to health, safety, environmental, and economic concerns." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that EMPCo successfully established TCPA applicability. Remanded. View "ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer (Defendant), claiming assault, sexual assault, and battery, among other causes of action. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing, in part, that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act’s (TCHRA) statutory cause of action preempted Plaintiff’s common law claims. The trial court granted the motion without providing a basis for its ruling. Plaintiff appealed only the trial court’s ruling on her assault claim against Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the TCHRA preempted Plaintiff’s assault claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) where the gravamen of a plaintiff’s claim is not harassment, but rather, assault, the TCHRA does not preempt the plaintiff’s common law assault claim; and (2) because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was assault, Defendant did not establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the TCHRA. Remanded. View "B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

Before resigning his director and treasurer positions with Briar Green, Robert Primo wrote himself two checks from Briar Green’s account totaling approximately $100,000. Briar Green made a claim for the alleged loss with its fidelity insurer, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company, which paid the claim in exchange for an assignment of Briar Green’s rights and claims against Primo. Travelers then sued Primo to recover the funds. Primo asserted a third-party claim against Briar Green and demanded that Great American Insurance Co., which carried Briar Green’s directors-and-officers (D&O) liability policy, defend him in the Travelers suit. Travelers subsequently non-suited its claims against Primo, and Primo non-suited his third-party claims. Primo then filed a contractual-indemnity action against Briar Green to recover the fees and expenses he had incurred in the Travelers suit. The suit resulted in a judgment for Primo. Meanwhile, Primo sued Great American in another action seeking reimbursement for the fees and expenses incurred in the Travelers suit. The trial court granted summary judgment for Great American. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy provided no coverage for Primo’s claims because an insured-versus-insured exclusion in the D&O liability insurance policy applied. View "Great American Insurance Co. v. Primo" on Justia Law

In 1994, the Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage and Family Therapists (the Therapists Board) adopted a rule listing specific therapeutic services that licensed marriage and family therapists (MFTs) may provide. As relevant to this appeal, the rule permits MFTs to provide “diagnostic assessment…to help individuals identify their emotional, mental, and behavioral problems.” In 2008, the Texas Medical Association filed suit against the Board seeking a declaratory judgment that the rule was invalid because it grants MFTs authority that the Texas Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists Act does not grant and that the Texas Medical Practice Act reserves for medical licensees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Medical Association. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Texas Occupations Code authorizes MFTs to provide diagnostic assessments, and therefore, the diagnostic-assessment rule is valid. View "Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Texas Medical Ass’n" on Justia Law

ExxonMobile Corporation conducted oil and gas drilling and production operations on the Lazy R Ranch for nearly sixty years. After ExxonMobil sold its operations, the Ranch filed suit, claiming soil and groundwater contamination. The Ranch originally claimed remediation costs as money damages, but shortly before ExxonMobil moved for summary judgment, the Ranch dropped its claim and sought only an injunction ordering ExxonMobil to remediate the contamination. The ranch also requested an injunction mandating abatement of the contamination. The trial court granted summary judgment for ExxonMobil without specifying the grounds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that that fact issues remaining regarding ExxonMobil’s statute of limitations defense. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) some claims, but not all, were barred by limitations; and (2) the Court declines to consider the availability of injunctive relief to remedy such contamination because the issue was not properly raised in the trial court. Remanded. View "ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP" on Justia Law

Landowner hired Architects to design a commercial retail project and oversee construction. Landowner subsequently sued, alleging breach of contract and negligence in the project’s design and negligence. With its original petition, Landowner filed a third-party licensed architect’s affidavit stating his professional opinion about Architects’ work. Architects filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the affidavit did not meet the requirements for a certificate of merit under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 150.002(a)-(b). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying dismissal of the negligence claim but reversed the order as to the contract claim, concluding that the affidavit at issue was deficient as to that claim. Architects appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the affidavit nor the record confirmed that the affiant possessed the requisite knowledge to issue the certificate of merit, and therefore, the certificate was not sufficient for Landowner’s negligence claim to proceed. View "Levinson Alcoser Associates, L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd." on Justia Law

Under Chapter 614, Subchapter B of the Texas Government Code, a covered peace officer cannot be disciplined based on a complaint unless certain procedural requirements are met. At issue in this case was whether Subchapter B’s disciplinary procedures apply to at-will employment relationships, whether those procedures apply to any complaint of misconduct or only citizen-generated complaints, and whether a complaint must be signed by the victim of the alleged misconduct and presented to the employee before discipline is imposed. When a deputy sheriff’s (Employee) employment was terminated, Employee appealed to the sheriff, complaining of procedural irregularities in the process leading to his discharge. The sheriff summarily upheld the termination decision. The employee then sued the sheriff and the county (collectively, Employer), alleging that the sheriff’s department violated Government Code sections 614.022 and 614.023 by terminating his employment without giving him a copy of a signed complaint and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the allegations before he was disciplined. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Employer violated Chapter 614. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, assuming that Chapter 614, Subchapter B applied under these circumstances, Employer complied with the statute. View "Colorado County, Texas v. Staff" on Justia Law

An oil-and-gas lessor sued the lessee for failure to pay royalties. The trial court concluded that the lessor’s neighboring landowners were necessary parties to the suit and dismissed the case without prejudice because the lessor failed to join them. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring joinder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abuse its discretion in requiring joinder under Tex. R. Civ. P. 39 and dismissing the case because the adjacent landowners did not claim an interest relating to the subject of the lessor’s suit against the lessee. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas sought relief from two attorney general decisions concluding that the City must disclose confidential attorney-client communications pursuant to public-information requests the City received regarding the McCommas Bluff Landfill and a convention-center hotel. The information constituted public information under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA), but because the information was subject to the attorney-client privilege, the City argued that the information was excepted from disclosure under the PIA. This dispute arose because the City failed to timely request an attorney general decision affirming that the requested information fell within one of the asserted exceptions, as required by the PIA. The lower courts determined that the attorney-client confidences at issue need not be disclosed to the public-information requestors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) failing to meet the PIA’s deadline to assert a statutory exception to disclosure does not, in and of itself, constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and therefore, requested information is not subject to compelled disclosure under the PIA solely on that basis; and (2) there was a compelling reason to withhold information covered by the attorney-client privilege in this case. View "Paxton v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law