Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether a resident physician was entitled to dismissal of a malpractice claim on grounds that she was an employee of a governmental unit. Shana Lenoir died after receiving prenatal care at the University of Texas Physicians Clinic. Shana’s family filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Leah Anne Gonski, a second-year medical resident who treated Shana. The trial court granted Gonski’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the election-of-remedies provision of the Tort Claims Act warranted dismissal because Gonski was an employee of the University of Texas System Medical Foundation, a governmental unit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Gonski failed to establish that she was an employee of the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Gonski was not an employee of the Foundation under the Tort Claims Act. View "Marino v. Lenoir" on Justia Law

Laura Murphy, who at the relevant period worked as an independent practitioner under contract with West Texas OB Anesthesia, filed claims against El Paso Healthcare System, d/b/a Las Palmas Medical Center, for statutory retaliation and tortious interference with the continuation of the business relationship between Murphy and West Texas OB. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, which found El Paso Healthcare liable on both causes of action and awarded $631,000 in damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment that Murphy take nothing on her claims, holding that Murphy failed to establish that El Paso Healthcare illegally retaliated against her or interfered with her legal rights under her existing agreement with West Texas OB. View "El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

After BP America Production turned of the well valve to a gas well, Red Deer Resources, LLC, the top-lease holder, filed suit, asking the trial court to declare that BP’s lease had terminated. The jury found that the well was incapable of production in paying quantities the day after BP closed the valve and eight days after the last gas was sold or used. Based on these findings, the trial court declared that BP’s lease had lapsed and terminated, thus terminating BP’s lease in its secondary term. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of BP, holding that because Red Deer never obtained a finding that the well was incapable of production in paying quantities on the material date under the plain language of the lease, BP’s lease remained valid. View "BP America Production Co. v. Red Deer Resources, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued their former attorneys and the law firm at which they practiced alleging legal malpractice arising from prior litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor without specifying the grounds. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, concluding that no summary judgment evidence existed to raise a material fact issue as to causation, an essential element of a legal malpractice claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in applying the but-for causation test to Plaintiffs’ malpractice claims; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted because the evidence failed to raise a material fact issue as to the causation element of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. View "Rogers v. Zanetti" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was how the harm likely to result from a malicious prosecution should be evaluated in calculating exemplary damages. The Supreme Court held that the potential harm analysis should focus only on the probable damages resulting from malicious prosecution, not the consequences of wrongful imprisonment. Defendant in this case failed to meet his burden of proving that the criminal justice system would ultimately fail to resolve this case correctly where the chances of wrongful imprisonment were essentially zero given the expired statute of limitations. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in considering imprisonment-related damages. The Supreme Court remanded the exemplary-damages award to the court of appeals for a more substantial remittitur. View "Bennett v. Grant" on Justia Law

Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code 150.002 provides that if an expert affidavit in a lawsuit or arbitration for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by licensed or registered professionals is not filed in accordance with the statute, the trial court shall dismiss the claim, and the dismissal may be with prejudice. The Supreme Court held that the statute affords trial courts discretion to dismiss either with or without prejudice. In this case, the statute required dismissal of the amended petition against Defendant. The trial court dismissed the claims without prejudice, but the court of appeals dismissed them with prejudice because, while the amended petition was accompanied by an expert affidavit, an expert affidavit was not filed with the original petition. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the claims with prejudice, as the record did not conclusively demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims lacked merit or that the trial court’s decision violated any guiding rules and principles and therefore was an abuse of discretion. View "Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington" on Justia Law

Respondent, who owned a ranch, sued Petitioner, which produced natural gas on the ranch, for underpayment of royalties and underproduction of its lease. The parties resolved their dispute with two agreements that contained an arbitration provision. Respondent later sued Petitioner for environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazardous materials on the ranch. Before arbitration commenced, Respondent asked the Railroad Commission (RRC) to investigate contamination of the ranch by Petitioner. Meanwhile, an arbitration panel awarded Respondent $15 million for actual damages and $500,000 for exemplary damages. At issue on appeal was whether the RRC had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims, precluding the arbitration, and whether the arbitration award should be vacated for the evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator or because the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding (1) because Respondent’s claims were inherently judicial, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, and vacatur was not warranted for failure to abate the arbitration hearing; and (2) the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. View "Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

When Cadena Comercial USA Corp., a company formed to operate convenience stores, sought a retailer’s permit to sell alcohol, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) protested, arguing that, if the permit were granted, the ownership interests of Fomento Economico Mexicano, S.A.B. de C.V. (FEMSA) in Cadena and the Heineken Group, which owns breweries, would violate Texas’s “tied house” statutes that prohibit overlapping ownership between the manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing segments of the alcoholic beverage industry. The lower courts agreed with the TABC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that FEMSA’s indirect ownership interest in the Heineken Group and its breweries, in combination with its indirect ownership interest in Cadena, would result in a violation of Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. 102.07(a) if Cadena’s application for a permit were granted. View "Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission" on Justia Law

Respondent, a Texas Tech professor and associate dean, sued Petitioner, a colleague, for defamation after he was passed over for promotion. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Tort Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision foreclosed suit against her in her individual capacity because she made the allegedly defamatory statements in the scope of her employment by Texas Tech, a governmental unit. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to offer evidence she was not furthering her own purposes rather than her employer’s when she made the allegedly defamatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner was objectively acting within the scope of her employment when she made the allegedly defamatory statements, and therefore, Petitioner was entitled to dismissal pursuant to the election-of-remedies provision. View "Laverie v. Wetherbe" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Ike struck Galveston island, Insured contracted her Insurer and reported that the storm had damaged her home. Insurer determined that its policy covered some of the damage but declined to pay Insured benefits because the total estimated repair costs did not exceed the policy’s deductible. Insured sued Insurer for breach of the insurance policy and for unfair settlement practices. As damages, Insured sought only insurance benefits under the policy, plus attorney’s fees and costs. The jury found that Insurer violated the Texas Insurance Code, and the violation resulted in Insured’s loss of benefits Insured should have paid under the policy but did not find that Insurer failed to comply with its obligations under the policy. The trial court entered final judgment in Insured’s favor. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial in the interest of justice after announcing five rules that address the relationship between contract claims under an insurance policy and tort claims under the Insurance Code. View "USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca" on Justia Law