Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

T-4 permit to Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC to obtain common-carrier status, which would give it eminent domain authority pursuant to the Natural Resources Code. Denbury Green, which was formed to build and operate a carbon dioxide pipeline known as “the Green Line” as a common carrier in Texas, filed suit against Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. for an injunction allowing access to certain tracts of land so that it could complete a pipeline survey. While the suit was pending, Denbury Green took possession of Texas Rice’s property pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code 21-021(a). The trial court concluded that Denbury Green was a common carrier with eminent domain authority. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the common-carrier test the Court established. The trial court granted summary judgment for Denbury Green. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that reasonable mind could differ regarding whether, at the time Denbury Green intended to build the Green Line, a reasonable probability existed that Green Line would serve the public. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Denbury Green is a common carrier as a matter of law. View "Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

The First Pentecostal Church of Beaumont entrusted over one million dollars for safekeeping to The Lamb Law Firm, P.C., and the firm deposited the money into its trust account. In just over one year, the church’s money was gone. The church sued the law firm; Kip Lamb, the firm’s owner; and Leigh Parker, one of the firm attorneys representing the church. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Parker. The church appealed, challenging the court’s rulings with respect to the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and joint venture. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment on the church’s claims for civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and joint venture; but (2) reversed the church’s claim that it was entitled to equitable remedies as to Parker for breach of fiduciary duties he owed to the church, holding that the church did not need to prove that Parker’s breach of fiduciary duty caused actual damages as to the equitable remedies it sought, and the church did not waive its claim for equitable remedies. View "First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker" on Justia Law

D Magazine published an article that identified Janay Rosenthal as someone who “has figured out how to get food stamps while living in the lap of luxury.” Rosenthal sued D Magazine for defamation and other causes of action. The trial court granted the magazine’s motion to dismiss as to Rosenthal’s statutory claims but denied it as to the defamation claim, concluding that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of defamation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Rosenthal presented sufficient evidence in support of the defamation elements to survive D Magazine’s motion for early dismissal, and therefore, dismissal of the claim under the Texas Citizens Participation Act was not warranted at this stage of the proceedings; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to award the magazine attorney’s fees in light of its dismissal of other claims. View "D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal" on Justia Law

In 1992, Shields Brothers, Inc. sued the Engelman Irrigation District, a governmental entity, alleging that Engelman had breached a contract to deliver water to Shields. Engelman alleged in its defense that it had governmental immunity. The district court denied the immunity defense, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury found damages for lost profits. The trial court rendered judgment for Shields in the amount of $271,138.80, plus interest and attorney fees. The judgment became final in 1998. The Engelman I judgment went unpaid, however, and the case continued to be litigated. In Engelman III, brought in 2010, Engelman sought a declaratory judgment that the Engelman I judgment was void under Tooke v. City of Mexia, decided by the Supreme Court in 2006. The trial court denied declaratory relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Tooke applies only narrowly to judgments still being challenged on direct appeal and does not apply broadly to all prior final judgments; and (2) therefore, the long-final judgment in this case cannot be upended via collateral attack. View "Engelman Irrigation District v. Shields Brothers, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case the trial court entered judgment terminating a bottom lease based on jury findings that the lease failed to produce in paying quantities over a specified period of time. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the rule against perpetuities did not invalidate the top lease, and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on the production-in-paying-quantities question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly remanded for a new trial where (1) the top lease did not violate the rule against perpetuities; and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on cessation of production in paying quantities. View "BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd." on Justia Law

Several related nonresident corporate defendants entered into an agreement with Texas companies to settle a New York lawsuit. In the underlying suit, Plaintiff, a nonresident, alleged that, by virtue of the settlement agreement, the parties to the agreement tortiously interfered with another nonresident company’s indemnity obligations to Plaintiff. To support Texas’s specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants, Plaintiff alleged that the agreement was partially negotiated in Texas and substantially performed in Texas. The nonresident corporate defendants filed special appearances. The trial court denied the special appearances, concluding that Texas had specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court had specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in this suit. Remanded. View "M&F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co." on Justia Law

In appraising real property, an appraisal district may choose to divide a single tract into multiple accounts for various reasons. Valero Refining-Texas L.P. (Valero), the property owner in this case, protested some, but not all, of those accounts and not the valuation of the whole tract, claiming unequal taxation. Galveston Central Appraisal District moved for want of jurisdiction, arguing that an equal-and-uniform challenge can be determined only if made to the appraised value of the entire tract, not just to some of the component tax accounts. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury found that the property had been appraised unequally. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. The District appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine an unequal appraisal challenge to anything but an entire tract. The court of appeals rejected the jurisdiction argument, concluding that the issue was one of fact, but ruling that there was no evidence to support the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction of Valero’s appeal; (2) there was some evidence to support the jury’s findings; and (3) as a matter of law, appraisals of individual accounts may be challenged as unequal. View "Valero Refining - Texas, L.P. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District" on Justia Law

Travis Coleman was a terminal technician formerly employed by ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (EMPCo). Coleman sued EMPCo and his two former supervisors for defamation, alleging that the statements by his supervisors about the circumstances that led to Coleman’s termination were untrue. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) applied to Coleman’s suit. The court of appeals ruled that EMPCo did not meet its burden to show that the TCPA applied to Coleman’s suit because the communications among EMPCo employees were related to Coleman’s job performance and had only a “tangential relationship to health, safety, environmental, and economic concerns." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that EMPCo successfully established TCPA applicability. Remanded. View "ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer (Defendant), claiming assault, sexual assault, and battery, among other causes of action. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing, in part, that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act’s (TCHRA) statutory cause of action preempted Plaintiff’s common law claims. The trial court granted the motion without providing a basis for its ruling. Plaintiff appealed only the trial court’s ruling on her assault claim against Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the TCHRA preempted Plaintiff’s assault claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) where the gravamen of a plaintiff’s claim is not harassment, but rather, assault, the TCHRA does not preempt the plaintiff’s common law assault claim; and (2) because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was assault, Defendant did not establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the TCHRA. Remanded. View "B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

Before resigning his director and treasurer positions with Briar Green, Robert Primo wrote himself two checks from Briar Green’s account totaling approximately $100,000. Briar Green made a claim for the alleged loss with its fidelity insurer, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company, which paid the claim in exchange for an assignment of Briar Green’s rights and claims against Primo. Travelers then sued Primo to recover the funds. Primo asserted a third-party claim against Briar Green and demanded that Great American Insurance Co., which carried Briar Green’s directors-and-officers (D&O) liability policy, defend him in the Travelers suit. Travelers subsequently non-suited its claims against Primo, and Primo non-suited his third-party claims. Primo then filed a contractual-indemnity action against Briar Green to recover the fees and expenses he had incurred in the Travelers suit. The suit resulted in a judgment for Primo. Meanwhile, Primo sued Great American in another action seeking reimbursement for the fees and expenses incurred in the Travelers suit. The trial court granted summary judgment for Great American. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy provided no coverage for Primo’s claims because an insured-versus-insured exclusion in the D&O liability insurance policy applied. View "Great American Insurance Co. v. Primo" on Justia Law