Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1994, the Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage and Family Therapists (the Therapists Board) adopted a rule listing specific therapeutic services that licensed marriage and family therapists (MFTs) may provide. As relevant to this appeal, the rule permits MFTs to provide “diagnostic assessment…to help individuals identify their emotional, mental, and behavioral problems.” In 2008, the Texas Medical Association filed suit against the Board seeking a declaratory judgment that the rule was invalid because it grants MFTs authority that the Texas Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists Act does not grant and that the Texas Medical Practice Act reserves for medical licensees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Medical Association. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Texas Occupations Code authorizes MFTs to provide diagnostic assessments, and therefore, the diagnostic-assessment rule is valid. View "Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Texas Medical Ass’n" on Justia Law

ExxonMobile Corporation conducted oil and gas drilling and production operations on the Lazy R Ranch for nearly sixty years. After ExxonMobil sold its operations, the Ranch filed suit, claiming soil and groundwater contamination. The Ranch originally claimed remediation costs as money damages, but shortly before ExxonMobil moved for summary judgment, the Ranch dropped its claim and sought only an injunction ordering ExxonMobil to remediate the contamination. The ranch also requested an injunction mandating abatement of the contamination. The trial court granted summary judgment for ExxonMobil without specifying the grounds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that that fact issues remaining regarding ExxonMobil’s statute of limitations defense. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) some claims, but not all, were barred by limitations; and (2) the Court declines to consider the availability of injunctive relief to remedy such contamination because the issue was not properly raised in the trial court. Remanded. View "ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP" on Justia Law

Landowner hired Architects to design a commercial retail project and oversee construction. Landowner subsequently sued, alleging breach of contract and negligence in the project’s design and negligence. With its original petition, Landowner filed a third-party licensed architect’s affidavit stating his professional opinion about Architects’ work. Architects filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the affidavit did not meet the requirements for a certificate of merit under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 150.002(a)-(b). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying dismissal of the negligence claim but reversed the order as to the contract claim, concluding that the affidavit at issue was deficient as to that claim. Architects appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the affidavit nor the record confirmed that the affiant possessed the requisite knowledge to issue the certificate of merit, and therefore, the certificate was not sufficient for Landowner’s negligence claim to proceed. View "Levinson Alcoser Associates, L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd." on Justia Law

Under Chapter 614, Subchapter B of the Texas Government Code, a covered peace officer cannot be disciplined based on a complaint unless certain procedural requirements are met. At issue in this case was whether Subchapter B’s disciplinary procedures apply to at-will employment relationships, whether those procedures apply to any complaint of misconduct or only citizen-generated complaints, and whether a complaint must be signed by the victim of the alleged misconduct and presented to the employee before discipline is imposed. When a deputy sheriff’s (Employee) employment was terminated, Employee appealed to the sheriff, complaining of procedural irregularities in the process leading to his discharge. The sheriff summarily upheld the termination decision. The employee then sued the sheriff and the county (collectively, Employer), alleging that the sheriff’s department violated Government Code sections 614.022 and 614.023 by terminating his employment without giving him a copy of a signed complaint and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the allegations before he was disciplined. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Employer violated Chapter 614. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, assuming that Chapter 614, Subchapter B applied under these circumstances, Employer complied with the statute. View "Colorado County, Texas v. Staff" on Justia Law

An oil-and-gas lessor sued the lessee for failure to pay royalties. The trial court concluded that the lessor’s neighboring landowners were necessary parties to the suit and dismissed the case without prejudice because the lessor failed to join them. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring joinder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abuse its discretion in requiring joinder under Tex. R. Civ. P. 39 and dismissing the case because the adjacent landowners did not claim an interest relating to the subject of the lessor’s suit against the lessee. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas sought relief from two attorney general decisions concluding that the City must disclose confidential attorney-client communications pursuant to public-information requests the City received regarding the McCommas Bluff Landfill and a convention-center hotel. The information constituted public information under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA), but because the information was subject to the attorney-client privilege, the City argued that the information was excepted from disclosure under the PIA. This dispute arose because the City failed to timely request an attorney general decision affirming that the requested information fell within one of the asserted exceptions, as required by the PIA. The lower courts determined that the attorney-client confidences at issue need not be disclosed to the public-information requestors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) failing to meet the PIA’s deadline to assert a statutory exception to disclosure does not, in and of itself, constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and therefore, requested information is not subject to compelled disclosure under the PIA solely on that basis; and (2) there was a compelling reason to withhold information covered by the attorney-client privilege in this case. View "Paxton v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

Wallace Hall, a regent for The University of Texas System, filed suit against William McRaven in his official capacity as the System’s Chancellor, for McRaven’s refusal to grant Hall complete access to records containing student-admissions information. Hall sought a declaratory judgment that McRaven acted ultra vires in refusing to provide the unredacted information. The trial court granted McRaven’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that McRaven’s conduct was not ultra vires and that sovereign immunity required dismissal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that McRaven did not exceed his authority, and therefore, Hall’s case was properly dismissed. View "Hall v. McRaven" on Justia Law

Elie and Rhonda Nassar filed a claim with Liberty Mutual Insurance Policy under their homeowners’ policy when their property was damaged by Hurricane Ike. Disputes arose over the value of various items of damaged property, and this appeal concerned which party of the Liberty Mutual insurance policy covered the Nassars’ damaged fencing. At issue was the proper interpretation of two policy provisions that separate coverage for the “dwelling” and “other structures.” The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual, concluding that the Nassars’ fencing was an “other structure.” The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Nassars’ interpretation of the policy language was reasonable and the policy was unambiguous, and therefore, the Nassars’ fencing was covered under the “dwelling” provision as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Nassar v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Alan Petrie was assaulted and robbed in The Gallery apartment complex’s visitor parking lot. Petrie sued the apartment complex and its owners (collectively, Gallery), alleging that it knew or shown have known about the high crime rate on its premises and in the surrounding area yet failed to use ordinary care to make the complex safe. The trial court concluded that Gallery owed no duty to Petrie. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was evidence that Gallery knew or should have known of a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to properly consider whether the risk of harm was unreasonable. The Court further rendered judgment in Gallery’s favor because Petrie failed to argue or offer any evidence of the burden that preventing such a crime would impose on Gallery. View "UDR Texas Properties, L.P. v. Petrie" on Justia Law

Wade Brady sued LeaAnne Klentzman and the West Fort Bend Star (collectively, the media defendants) for libel and libel per se, arguing that a newspaper article portrayed him as “unruly and intoxicated” when he interacted with a state trooper. The jury found that some statements in Klentzman’s article were defamatory, that some of the statements were not substantially true, and that Klentzman acted with malice. The jury awarded damages against the media defendants for mental anguish and damage to Wade’s reputation and exemplary damages against Klentzman and the Star. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the jury charge improperly placed the burden of proving truth on the media defendants; (2) to recover exemplary damages, Wade had to show that the media defendants acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) legally sufficient evidence existed that Wade suffered actual damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly remanded the case for a new trial so the jury could evaluate the evidence under the proper standard. View "Brady v. Klentzman" on Justia Law