Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Randall Seger died while working on a hydraulic-lift drilling rig when it suddenly collapsed, his parents obtained a judgment against the drilling company. The drilling company then assigned its rights against the insurers to the parents, and the parents brought a Stowers action against the insurers. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co. The court held that, because the evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury verdict to the contrary, Randall was a leased-in worker as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiffs' claimed loss was excluded from coverage under the commercial general liability (CGL) policy and the Stowers action fails as a result. The court did not reach the damages issue addressed by the court of appeals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, which reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment that plaintiffs take nothing, but on different grounds. View "Seger v. Yorkshire Ins." on Justia Law

ERG, a Texas entity, filed suit against a Canadian entity and a Bermudian shareholder in Texas for tortious interference with its share purchase agreement. ERG also filed suit against the Bermudian owner of the Colombian oil and gas operations in Texas for fraud. The court held that when the Canadian entity sought to purchase shares of a Bermudian entity that owns Colombian assets from a Bermudian shareholder and did not intend to develop a Texas business, it did not purposefully avail itself of Texas’s jurisdiction. The court held, however, that Texas courts have specific - although not general - jurisdiction over the Bermudian owner of the Colombian oil and gas operations. In this case, the claims against the Bermudian owner turn on its Texas-based executives’ alleged misrepresentations in Texas to a Texas entity. While these claims alleging malfeasance stemming from the actions of the executives here, and of those to whom they gave marching orders, is relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis, these contacts are insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over the Bermudian owner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Searcy v. Parex Resources, inc." on Justia Law

After a burst of gas exploded out of a pipe and caused injury to Johannes Elmgren, a boilermaker for an independent contractor, he and his wife filed suit against Ineos and Jonathan Pavlovsky, an Ineos employee who the Elmgrens alleged was the “furnace maintenance team leader.” The court concluded that Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code applies to all categories of negligence claims, including those based on respondeat superior, but Chapter 95 does not apply to claims against an employee or agent of a property owner; plaintiffs in this case failed to present any evidence to trigger an exception to the protection Chapter 95 provides to Ineos; and thus the court: (1) affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ premises-liability claims against Ineos, (2) reversed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent-activity and negligent-undertaking claims against Ineos and rendered judgment in favor of Ineos on those claims, and affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s summary judgment on the claims against Pavlovsky and remanding those claims to the trial court. View "Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren" on Justia Law

Defendants are three nonresident private-equity fund limited partnerships and their general partner. The funds invested in a newly created Texas subsidiary that purchased a chain of Texas hospitals from a Texas company. Cornerstone, a Texas company allegedly in the market to purchase the hospitals, filed suit alleging that this conduct was tortious and subjects defendants to Texas’s jurisdiction with respect to claims arising out of that conduct. The court held that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the Funds and the General Partner where the claims arise out of defendants' Texas contacts and where exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding v. Nautic Mgmt." on Justia Law

Southwest Royalties, Inc., an oil and gas exploration company, filed a tax refund claim with the Comptroller, arguing that it was entitled to a tax exemption for some of its equipment related to oil and gas production operations such as casing, tubing, and pumps, together with associated services. The Comptroller denied relief. Southwest subsequently sued the Comptroller and the Attorney General, asserting that the equipment for which it sought refunds was used in separating oil, gas, and associated substances (collectively, hydrocarbons) into their different components. The trial court rendered judgment for the State, concluding that Southwest failed to meet its burden of proving that the exemption applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Southwest was not entitled to an exemption from paying sales taxes on purchases of the equipment because it did not prove that the equipment for which it sought a tax exemption was used in “actual manufacturing, processing, or fabricating” of hydrocarbons within the meaning of Tex. Tax Code Ann. 151.318(2), (5), or (10). View "Southwest Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

Centerpoint Builders was hired as the general contractor to build an apartment complex. Centerpoint contracted with a subcontractor to install wooden roof trusses. Centerpoint purchased the trusses directly from Trussway, Ltd., the truss manufacturer. Merced Fernandez, an independent contractor, was rendered paraplegic when a truss broke while he was walking across it. Fernandez sued several entities, including Centerpoint and Trussway, and eventually settled. Centerpoint filed a cross-action against Trussway alleging that Trussway was required to indemnify Centerpoint for any loss arising from Fernandez’s suit. Trussway filed its own indemnity cross claim against Centerpoint. Centerpoint sought partial summary judgment, arguing that it was a seller under Tex. Civil Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. chapter 82 and was thus entitled to indemnity as a matter of law. Chapter 82 entitles the “seller” of a defective product to indemnity from the product manufacturer for certain losses. The trial court concluded that Centerpoint was a seller under chapter 82. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Centerpoint did not fit the statutory definition of a seller and was therefore not eligible to seek indemnity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Centerpoint, as the general contractor, was not a “seller” entitled to seek indemnity under chapter 82. View "Centerpoint Builders GP, LLC v. Trussway, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Texas Medical Board disciplined Minda Lao Toledo, a physician, for unprofessional conduct and issued a press release regarding the matter. After KBMT Operating Company aired a report of the Board’s action Toledo sued KMBT and three of its employees (collectively, KBMT) for defamation. KBMT filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, which allows for the early dismissal of a legal action implicating a defendant’s rights of free speech unless the plaintiff can establish each element of the claim with clear and specific evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Toledo established a prima facie case of defamation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the truth of a media report of official proceedings of public concern must be measured against the proceedings themselves and not against information outside the proceedings; and (2) in this case, Toledo did not meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case that KBMT’s broadcast was false, and therefore, the Act requires that Toledo’s action be dismissed. View "KBMT Operating Co., LLC v. Toledo" on Justia Law

While investigating a leak in First Texas Bank’s roof, Chris Carpenter fell, crushing two vertebrae. Carpenter sued the Bank, alleging that its ladder was defective. In response, the Bank argued that it could not be liable for Carpenter’s injuries pursuant to Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because it did not control Carpenter’s work or know of any defect in its ladder. Chapter 95 limits a property owner’s liability to a contractor who “constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies an improvement to real property.” The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Carpenter was not a “contractor” under the statute because a contractor must have an “actual” contract to perform specific work for stated compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) in the context of Chapter 95, a contractor is simply someone who works on improvement to real property; but (2) the record in this case did not establish that the Bank had retained Carpenter to perform work covered by the statute at the time he was injured. View "First Texas Bank v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

John Sampson injured his shoulder when he tripped on an improperly secured extension cord at the University of Texas at Austin (UT) campus. Sampson filed a negligence suit alleging that UT waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 101.021. UT filed a plea to the jurisdiction, motion to dismiss, and no-evidence motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, all of which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed Sampson’s claim for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Sampson alleged a premises defect claim under the Tort Claims Act and failed to present evidence to show that a disputed material fact existed regarding UT’s actual knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Sampson’s claim is properly characterized as a premises defect claim; and (2) Sampson failed to present evidence that UT had actual knowledge of the tripping hazard created by the extension cord. View "Sampson v. Univ. of Texas at Austin" on Justia Law

After arresting Miguel Herrera, police officers seized his Lincoln Nagivator. An inventory search of the vehicle revealed drugs in the vehicle. The state filed a notice of seizure and intended forfeiture, asserting that the Navigator was “contraband” under Chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court denied the seizure, concluding that the vehicle search was unlawful and, therefore, the evidence should be excluded. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling (1) the stop leading up to the arrest was unlawful; (2) Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 59.03(b) precludes the state from initiating a civil-forfeiture proceeding based on an illegal search; and (3) after the evidence found in the vehicle was excluded, the state was left with no evidence that the Navigator was contraband. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an illegal seizure does not require exclusion in a Chapter 59 civil-forfeiture proceeding. Remanded. View "State v. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator" on Justia Law