Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a retrial, a jury found that Mother had endangered her daughter and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. The court of appeals affirmed. The attorney in Mother’s second appeal moved to withdraw. The court of appeals granted the motion to withdraw without considering whether new counsel should be appointed. Mother, who was indigent, filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which motion was transferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court abated the case to consider the issue of Mother’s right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and Mother’s motion for appointment of counsel, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by allowing counsel to withdraw; and (2) the right to counsel under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 107.103(a) includes all proceedings in the Court, including the filing of a petition for review, and if a court of appeals allows an attorney to withdraw, it must provide for the appointment of new counsel to pursue a petition for review. View "In re P.M." on Justia Law

The Golf Channel, Inc. entered into an agreement with Stanford International Bank Limited (Stanford) under which Golf Channel received $5.9 million in exchange for media-advertising services. It was later discovered that Stanford used a classic Ponzi-scheme artifice. At issue in this case was whether Golf Channel must return all remuneration paid for services rendered absent proof the transaction benefited Stanford’s creditors. The Fifth Circuit initially ordered Golf Channel to relinquish its compensation, concluding that media-advertising services have “no value” to a Ponzi scheme’s creditors despite the same services being potentially “quite valuable” to the creditors of a legitimate business. On rehearing, the Circuit vacated its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), under which an asset transferred with intent to defraud a creditor may be reclaimed for the benefit of the transferor’s creditors unless the transferee took the asset in good faith and for “reasonably equivalent value.” The Supreme Court held that TUFTA does not contain separate standards for assessing “value” and “reasonably equivalent value” based on whether the debtor was operating a Ponzi scheme and that value must be determined objectively at the time of the transfer and in relation to the individual exchange at hand. View "Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc." on Justia Law

N.C., a state-prison inmate, filed a petition to expunge criminal records. The trial court denied the petition. N.C. appealed but failed to include two filings required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14. The court of appeals dismissed the action without giving N.C. an opportunity to cure the Chapter 14 filing defects. N.C. filed a timely notice of rehearing. Thereafter, N.C. complied with the court’s instructions and corrected both Chapter 14 filing defects. The court of appeals, however, denied N.C.’s motion for rehearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in accordance with McLean v. Livingston, the court of appeals must give an inmate an opportunity to cure a Chapter 14 filing defect in an appellate proceeding, through an amended filing, before the court can dismiss the appeal. View "Ex Parte N.C." on Justia Law

Stacey and Mark Bent sued USAA for breach of their homeowners’ policy and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. The Bents subsequently stopped making mortgage payments, and their lender foreclosed on their home. The Bents’ case against USAA, however, proceeded to trial. The jury concluded that USAA had not breached the homeowner’s policy but did violate chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict but later granted the Bents’ motion for new trial. The court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion on each of its bases for ordering a new trial. The Bents sought relief in mandamus from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the Bents’ mandamus petition, holding (1) three of the trial court’s bases for ordering a new trial failed to satisfy the facial requirements set forth in In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P. and In re United Scaffolding, Inc.; and (2) on the remaining basis at issue on appeal, the court of appeals correctly found that the record did not support the trial court’s stated rationale. View "In re Bent" on Justia Law

Alfonso and Lydia Lira owned a German Shepherd named Monte Carlo. After Monte escaped from Lydia’s property, the City of Houston’s animal control department, known as BARC, picked up Monte and gave him to a Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue (GHGSDR) volunteer to foster the dog. When Lydia discovered that BARC had transferred Monte to GHGSDR, the Liras requested Monte’s return, but GHGSDR refused to return Monte. The Liras sued GHGSDR, asserting, among other claims, a claim for conversion. The trial court entered a permanent injunction directing GHGSDR to return Monte to the Liras. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the Liras had lost their right to recover possession of Monte. At issue on appeal was whether the City ordinances divested the Liras of their ownership. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the relevant ordinances did not expressly or impliedly divest the Liras of their ownership rights to Monte; and (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that Monte belonged to the Liras and enjoining GHGSDR to return him to his owners. View "Lira v. Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue, Inc." on Justia Law

Three parents of children who attend schools within the Clint Independent School District filed suit alleging that the District unconstitutionally distributes its funds among the schools within the District. The trial court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Parents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. The court reversed, concluding that Texas law did not require the Parents to exhaust administrative remedies because their claims were solely for violations of their children’s state constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 7.057(a) requires the Parents to exhaust their administrative remedies before they can seek relief in the courts. View "Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez" on Justia Law

During nationwide tobacco litigation in the 1990s, the State individually settled its lawsuit against several of the largest tobacco companies over smoking-related Medicaid costs. In return for the manufacturers’ commitment to make annual payments of $500 million to the State in perpetuity, the State waived, without limitation, any future reimbursement claims against the settling manufacturers. In 2013, the Legislature passed legislation that sought to recover the State’s health costs costs imposed by non-settling manufacturers’ products through a tax on those manufacturers. Respondents - manufacturers, retailers, and distributors who are subject to this taxation scheme - sued the State alleging that the tax is unconstitutional under the Equal and Uniform Clause of the Texas Constitution and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The trial court declared the tax unconstitutional under both the state and federal Constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed by addressing only the Equal and Uniform Clause claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the taxation scheme does not violate the Equal and Uniform Clause of the Texas Constitution. Remanded. View "Hegar v. Texas Small Tobacco Coalition" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, the Wassons assumed an existing ninety-nine-year lease of property owned by the City of Jacksonville that specified that the property was to be used for residential purposes only. In 2009, the Wassons conveyed their interest in the lease to Wasson Interests, Ltd (WIL), which violated the lease terms. The city sent WIL an eviction notice, but the City and WIL subsequently entered into a reinstatement agreement that required WIL to cease and desist all commercial activity in violation of the lease. Later, the City sent WIL yet another eviction notice, contending that WIL’s use of the property violated the reinstatement agreement. WIL sued for breach of contract. The City filed a combined motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on several grounds, including governmental immunity. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed based on governmental immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common-law distinction between proprietary and governmental acts applies to contract claims; and (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that in a breach of contract action, a City has immunity for proprietary acts. Remanded for a determination as to whether the lease contract was entered into in the City’s proprietary or governmental capacity. View "Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville" on Justia Law

Shortly after the City of Houston enacted a drainage-free ordinance, Houston Belt & Terminal Railway, BNSF Railway, and Union Pacific Railway (collectively, the Railroads) received notices of proposed charges for their properties in Houston. Daniel Krueger, the City’s Director of Public Works and Engineering, determined that the properties were “benefitted” and thus subject to drainage charges and determined that the Railroads should pay roughly $3 million based on their benefitted properties’ “impervious surface” area. The Railroads filed suit against the City and Krueger in his official capacity, alleging ultra vires claims against Krueger and seeking prospective injunctive relief. The trial court sustained the City’s plea to the jurisdiction as to the Railroads’ ultra vires claims based on governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the Railroads pleaded a viable ultra vires claim challenging Krueger’s determination that their properties were benefitted but that the railroads’ challenge to Krueger’s “impervious surface” determination did not fall within the ultra vires exception. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Railroads’ pleadings affirmatively alleged that Krueger acted “without legal authority” in both his “benefitted property” and “impervious surface” determinations, and thus the pleadings alleged viable ultra claims as to each. View "Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Caffe Ribs, Inc. (Caffe) purchased condemned property that was contaminated. After the property was placed into the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) Voluntary Cleanup Program, two of the property’s previous owners (Previous Owners) began remediation. The TCEQ requested four additional groundwater monitoring wells, but the Previous Owners were not able to comply with the request due in part to the State’s impending condemnation. The State then initiated statutory condemnation proceedings against Caffe. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial. At retrial, the State presented testimony that it would take eight years of cleanup to render the property marketable and that the property’s value should be substantially discounted on that basis. Caffe sought to offer testimony that the State’s condemnation project delayed the property’s cleanup, but the trial court excluded the testimony. The jury determined the value of the property to be just under $5 million. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the exclusion of Caffe’s proffered testimony was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence concerning the State’s role in delaying the condemned property’s environmental cleanup. Remanded for a new trial. View "Caffe Ribs, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law