Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parties were litigating a dispute involving an estate and family trusts when a family corporation filed for bankruptcy. The parties signed an agreement with a provision stating that they would attempt to settle any disputes by mediation and, if unsuccessful, by binding arbitration. The bankruptcy court’s order approving the settlement contained a permanent injunction prohibiting the parties from suing each other “on subjects pertaining to the subject matter of this litigation” without first obtaining its permission to do so. Later, that court denied Leonard permission to file suit and ordered the parties to comply with the agreement. The parties signed an arbitration agreement and “agreed to a resolution through arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Texas General Arbitration Act.” Leonard subsequently filed a Complaint in Arbitration, alleging fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duties. After a hearing, the arbitrator dismissed most of the claims, stating that his ruling was based both on the statute of limitations and lack of standing Other parties sought to confirm the arbitration award; Leonard moved to vacate, alleging the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. Manifest disregard is not a ground for vacatur under the Act. The court of appeals held, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed, that the TAA’s enumerated vacatur grounds (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 171.087) are exclusive. View "Hoskins v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

The Texas Optometry Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to control the practice of optometry; authorizes the Optometry Board and the Attorney General to sue a violator for a civil penalty; and provides that “[a] person injured as a result of a violation . . . is entitled to the remedies. In 1992, Wal-Mart opened “Vision Centers” in its Texas retail stores, selling ophthalmic goods. Wal-Mart leased office space to optometrists. A typical lease required the optometrist to keep the office open at least 45 hours per week or pay liquidated damages. In 1995, the Board advised Wal-Mart that the requirement violated the Act. Wal-Mart dropped the requirement and changed its lease form, allowing the optometrist to insert hours of operation. In 1998, the Board opined that any commercial lease referencing an optometrist’s hours violated the Act; in 2003, the Board notified Wal-Mart that it violated the Act by informing optometrists that customers were requesting longer hours. Optometrists sued, alleging that during lease negotiations, Wal-Mart indicated what hours they should include in the lease and that they were pressured to work longer hours. They did not claim actual harm. A jury awarded civil penalties and attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit certified the question of whether such civil penalties, when sought by a private person, are exemplary damages limited by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Texas Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, noting that “the certified questions assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Act authorizes recovery of civil penalties by a private person, rather than only by the Board or the Attorney General.” View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte" on Justia Law

From 2003-2014, Bornmann directed a research laboratory that synthesized cancer drugs at University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center. In 2013, Bornmann’s team apparently discovered an antibiotic with the potential to treat cancer and type-2 diabetes. Bornmann signed an invention disclosure report (IDR) describing the antibiotic and listing Bornmann among several contributors, including DePinho, President of MD Anderson, who was credited with providing laboratory space and supervision. Later MD Anderson decided not to renew Bornmann's contract and to close his lab. Bornmann filed a petition to take Rule 202 depositions of DePinho and Dennis. Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to authorize a deposition “to investigate a potential claim or suit.” Bornmann theorized that “his lab [was being] closed to benefit the personal interests of Dr. DePinho,” that an IDR without his signature would be filed, and that a provisional patent would be filed and licensed to a company owned by DePinho or his wife.Bornmann sought to depose Depinho concerning the IDR signatures and Dennis on timing and filing, in order to “investigate a potential tortious interference claim against Dr. DePinho as well as other potential causes of action.” The Texas Supreme Court vacated an order authorizing the discovery. A court may not order Rule 202 depositions to investigate unripe claims View "In re: DePinho and Dennis" on Justia Law

Garofolo took out a $159,700 home-equity loan. She made timely payments and paid off the loan in, 2014. Ocwen had become the note’s holder. A release of lien was promptly recorded in Travis County, but Garofolo did not receive a release of lien in recordable form as required by her loan’s terms. Garofolo notified Ocwen she had not received the document. Upon passage of 60 days following that notification, and still without the release, Garofolo sued, alleging violation of the home-equity lending provisions of the Texas Constitution and breach of contract. She sought forfeiture of all principal and interest paid on the loan. The federal district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit certified questions of law to the Texas Supreme Court, which responded that the constitution lays out the terms and conditions a home equity loan must include if the lender wishes to foreclose on a homestead following borrower default, but does not create a constitutional cause of action or remedy for a lender’s breach of those conditions. A post-origination breach of terms and conditions may give rise to a breach-of-contract claim for which forfeiture can sometimes be an appropriate remedy. When forfeiture is unavailable, the borrower must show actual damages or seek some other remedy such as specific performance. View "Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Serv., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Steven Phillips was convicted of and pled guilty to several crimes. A DNA test conducted several years later excluded Phillips as the perpetrator. The trial court granted habeas relief. Thereafter, Phillips applied to the Comptroller for wrongful imprisonment compensation under the Tim Cole Act (“the Act”). The Comptroller found that Phillips was due $2 million for the time he was incarcerated. Phillips also requested compensation for child support he had failed to pay. A 1978 Arkansas divorce decree ordered Phillips to pay Cheryl Macumber child support. In 2013, Macumber sued Phillips in Texas to register and enforce the Arkansas divorce decree. The trial court rendered judgment (“the Enforcement Judgment”) for Macumber, finding she was entitled to $304,861. Phillips requested that the Comptroller pay child support compensation based on the amount awarded by the Enforcement Judgment. The Comptroller concluded that compensation owed under the Act was $25,125. Phillips petitioned for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted conditional relief, holding (1) the Comptroller is not bound by a court’s judgment in a child support enforcement proceeding; (2) the Comptroller’s determinations are subject to review by the Supreme Court; and (3) in this case, the Comptroller is directed to recalculate the compensation owed to Phillips under section 103.052(1)(2) of the Act. View "In re Phillips" on Justia Law

More than half of the State’s school districts and various entities and individuals brought this school funding challenge arguing, among other things, that the current school finance system violates the adequacy and suitability requirements of Tex. Const. art. VII, 1. The trial court declared the school system constitutionally inadequate, unsuitable and financially inefficient in violation of Article VII, section 1, that the system is unconstitutional as a statewide ad valorem tax in violation of Tex. Const. art. VIII, 1(e), and that the system does not meet constitutional adequacy and suitability requirements for two subgroups of students. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the current school funding regime meets minimum constitutional requirements, despite its imperfections. View "Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coalition" on Justia Law

After Tenant moved into her apartment, her apartment and several adjoining units were severely damaged in a fire that originated in Tenant’s clothes dryer. Insurer paid Landlord’s insurance claim and then sued Tenant for negligence and breach of the Apartment Lease Contract. The jury found that Tenant breached the lease agreement and awarded $93,498 in actual damages and attorney’s fees from Insurer. Tenant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting several grounds for avoiding enforcement of the contract. The trial court granted Tenant’s motion and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the residential-lease provision imposing liability on Tenant for property losses resulting from “any other cause not due to [the landlord’s] negligence or fault” was void and unenforceable because it broadly and unambiguously shifted liability for repairs beyond legislatively authorized bounds. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals properly rejected Tenant’s ambiguity defense; but (2) the court of appeals erred in invalidating the lease provision on public-policy grounds. Remanded. View "Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. White" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was amendments to a Houston air-quality ordinance (the Ordinance). BCCA Appeal Group filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Ordinance was invalid and unenforceable under the Texas Clean Air Act, the Water Code, and the Texas Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for BCCA, concluding that the Ordinance violated the Texas Constitution and was preempted by the Act, and enjoined the City from enforcing the Ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Act and the Water Code and did not violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Texas Constitution by incorporating Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) rules in such a way as to include future amendments. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the Ordinance’s enforcement provisions and registration requirement are preempted and therefore unenforceable; but (2) the Ordinance’s incorporation of TCEQ rules does not violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Texas Constitution. View "BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working for BNSF Railway Company’s predecessor-in-interest in 1974 and, approximately five years later, began to ride on locomotives as a breakman. While riding on the locomotives, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered long-term vibratory exposure resulting in an occupational injury. Plaintiff sued BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) to recover damages. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff $1.9 million in costs and damages. BNSF appealed, arguing that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was timely filed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Plaintiff take nothing, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Defendant, a municipality, to install pollution control equipment at a power plant. Plaintiff fully performed the agreement, but Defendant withheld the retainage from Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant and requested reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, costs, and interest. Defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that attorney’s fees were outside the scope of statutorily-waived immunity as Tex. Local Gov’t Code 271.152 was written at the time of the agreement. In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had no immunity from suit because it was performing a proprietary function in its dealings with Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was performing a proprietary function and, therefore, was not immune from suit based on governmental immunity; and (2) a claim for attorney’s fees arising from those proprietary actions does not implicate governmental immunity. View "Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law