Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The nearly identical wills of Vencie Beard and Melba Beard contained a provision stating that if both the husband and wife died in a “common disaster or under circumstances making it impossible to determine [who] died first,” the testator bequeathed specified cash amounts to nine individuals. Melba died at 8:59 p.m. and Vencie died at 10:55 p.m. on the same night after Vencie shot and killed Mebla before taking his own life. The trial court determined that the Beards died in a common disaster and that the Simultaneous Death Act (SDA) was incorporated into the Beards’ wills. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Beards’ deaths did not trigger the common-disaster provisions in their wills. View "Stephens v. Beard" on Justia Law

The nearly identical wills of Vencie Beard and Melba Beard contained a provision stating that if both the husband and wife died in a “common disaster or under circumstances making it impossible to determine [who] died first,” the testator bequeathed specified cash amounts to nine individuals. Melba died at 8:59 p.m. and Vencie died at 10:55 p.m. on the same night after Vencie shot and killed Mebla before taking his own life. The trial court determined that the Beards died in a common disaster and that the Simultaneous Death Act (SDA) was incorporated into the Beards’ wills. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Beards’ deaths did not trigger the common-disaster provisions in their wills. View "Stephens v. Beard" on Justia Law

Michael McMillen, an attorney who served as Deputy Counsel for the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), prepared a memorandum concluding that the Commission’s practice of obtaining payments from certain recipients of Medicaid benefits lacked legal justification. McMillen submitted the memorandum to the Deputy Inspector General for the Commission and asserted that he made a noter report to the head of the OIG Internal Affairs Division and to the Commission’s Executive Commissioner. McMiller was later terminated. McMillen sued the Commission and its Executive Commissioner under the Whistleblower Act, alleging retaliatory discharge. Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that McMillen’s allegations were not sufficient to invoke the Act and waive immunity. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McMillen did not report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reported-to persons in this case were an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. Remanded. View "McMillen v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, the decree gave Mother the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the couple’s two sons and ordered Father to pay monthly child support. After Mother moved to another city with the children, Father filed a motion to modify the divorce decree to obtain the right to determine the children’s residence and to reduce his child support. The trial court granted Father’s petition. After the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction had expired, Mother filed a motion to reopen and vacate order, arguing that she had not been given notice of Father’s motion to modify because she did not live at the address where the citation was posted. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Mother’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, concluding that Mother’s motion did not extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction and post-judgment deadlines to run from the date she received notice of the trial court’s order because it was not captioned a motion under Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that justice plainly required the trial court and court of appeals to treat Mother’s motion as extending post-judgment deadlines and that Mother's appeal was timely filed. Remanded. View "In re Interest of J.Z.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued Respondent, her employer, to recover damages for an injury she received during the course of her employment. Respondent moved to compel arbitration based on its employee handbook. Petitioner opposed arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and illusory. The trial court denied the motion, basing its ruling on only some of Petitioner’s unconscionability arguments and without discussing her remaining arguments. Respondent filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals reversed, thus rejecting the trial court’s express grounds in its ruling. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that she raised other grounds to deny arbitration that the court of appeals did not address. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition and reversed, holding that the could of appeals could not order arbitration without addressing all of Petitioner’s arguments or remanding the case to the trial court to address them. View "Cardwell v. Whataburger Restaurants LLC" on Justia Law

Four oil and gas leases were assigned in one instrument. At issue in this case was how to calculate a production payment reserved in the assignment of the four leaseholds. When two of the leases terminated, the payor asserted that the production payment should be reduced to reflect the loss of the underlying mineral-lease interests. The payee responded by asserting that the production payment burdened the four leases jointly and that the assignment included authorization to adjust the payment. The trial court construed the assignment as allowing for the production payment’s adjustment based on the expiration of an underlying lease. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the production payment could not be reduced because the assignment failed to include “express language providing for a piecemeal reduction of the production payment.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court rendered the correct judgment in this case. View "Apache Deepwater, LLC v. McDaniel Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were Mexican citizens who broadcast television programs on over-the-air signals that originated in Mexico but traveled into parts of Texas. Respondents were residents of Texas who alleged that Petitioners defamed them in some of those television programs. Petitioners filed special appearances challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the special appearances. In an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioners had minimum contacts with Texas and that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Petitioners will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

In general, an overriding royalty on oil and gas production must bear its share of postproduction costs unless the parties agree otherwise. The Hyder family leased 948 mineral acres to Chespeake Exploration, LLC. The Hyders and Chesapeake agreed that the overriding royalty in the parties’ lease was free of production costs but disputed whether it was also free of postproduction costs. The trial court rendered judgment for the Hyders, awarding them postproduction costs that Chesapeake wrongfully deducted from their overriding royalty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the parties’ lease clearly freed the overriding royalty of postproduction costs. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder" on Justia Law

More than fifty years ago, various real-property interests were distributed to three children under their mother’s will. Heirs of the original devisees argued over the proper construction of the will provisions and the quantum of royalty bequeathed to each sibling. At issue was whether double-fraction language in the will fixed the siblings’ devised royalty at 1/24 - allowing the fee owner the exclusive benefit of any negotiated royalty exceeding 1/8 - or whether the testatrix intended the devisees to share equally in all future royalties. The trial court rendered judgment that the testatrix’s will entitled each child to 1/3 of any and all royalty interest on all the devised land tracts. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, after considering the will in its entirety, the testatrix intended her children to share future royalties equally, bequeathing to each child a 1/3 floating royalty, not a 1/24 fixed royalty. View "Hysaw v. Dawkins" on Justia Law

This case involved two Collin County properties - the Staley Tract, which was landlocked, and the Stiles Tract, the property adjacent to the Staley Tract. Both properties were once part of an 1853 land grant from the State. In 1886, the land grant was partitioned into separate tracts and severed. The eventual owner of the Staley Tract (“Staley”) sought to establish a roadway easement across the Stiles Tract. The trial court rendered judgment finding that Staley was not entitled to an easement across the Stiles Tract. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that, at the time the two tracts were severed, the easement would have resulted in access to a public road from the landlocked property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Staley failed to establish entitlement to a necessity easement across the Stiles Tract. View "Staley Family P’ship, Ltd. v. Stiles" on Justia Law