Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Defendant, a municipality, to install pollution control equipment at a power plant. Plaintiff fully performed the agreement, but Defendant withheld the retainage from Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant and requested reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, costs, and interest. Defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that attorney’s fees were outside the scope of statutorily-waived immunity as Tex. Local Gov’t Code 271.152 was written at the time of the agreement. In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had no immunity from suit because it was performing a proprietary function in its dealings with Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was performing a proprietary function and, therefore, was not immune from suit based on governmental immunity; and (2) a claim for attorney’s fees arising from those proprietary actions does not implicate governmental immunity. View "Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

The Texas Tax Code provides that “only the net gain” from the sale of investments should be included in a key component of the statutory franchise-tax formula. In implementing Texas’ statutory franchise-tax liability scheme, the state comptroller adopted a rule requiring businesses to include net gains or net losses. Hallmark Marketing Company filed a franchise-tax protest suit against the state comptroller seeking a refund of more than $200,000 in taxes it paid, arguing that the comptroller’s rule conflicts with the very statute it purports to enforce. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the comptroller. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tex. Tax Code 171.105(b) does not require Hallmark to include a net loss from the sale of investments. Remanded. View "Hallmark Marketing Co., LLC v. Hegar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for defamation. The trial court dismissed the suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, which provides for the award of attorney’s fees and expenses, as well as sanctions “sufficient to deter” future similar actions. The trial court granted a portion of the attorney’s fees and expenses requested by Defendant but declined to award sanctions. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses but remanded for the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny sanctions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts below used the wrong standard in determining the attorney’s fees portion of the award. Remanded to the trial court for its determination of “reasonable attorney’s fees” under the appropriate standard. View "Sullivan v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a public official, sued Defendants, a politically oriented blog and its executive director, for libel. The trial court dismissed the action under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, concluding that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that Defendant published the alleged falsehood with “actual malice.” Plaintiff appealed, arguing that actual malice was not an element of his claim because his status in relation to the defamation was more that of a private individual than a public official. The court of appeals agreed with Plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that actual malice was an element of Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Remanded. View "Greer v. Abraham" on Justia Law

In In re P.M., the Supreme Court concluded that, in government-initiated parental rights termination proceedings, the statutory right of indigent parents to counsel endures until all appeals are exhausted. In this case, the trial court terminated the parental rights of C.S.F. The court of appeals affirmed. Acting pro se and outside the time for filing a petition for review, C.S.F. filed a motion in the Supreme Court seeking an extension of time and a hand-written indigency affidavit. The Supreme Court referred the case to the trial court for appointment of counsel to represent C.S.F. in the Supreme Court, holding that C.S.F. should be able to pursue any argument regarding her case with the assistance of new counsel. View "C.S.F. v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a state-prison inmate, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that he was eligible for mandatory release and that three Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) officials failed to discharge their duty to release him. The trial court granted the TDCJ officials’ plea to the jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed and filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs with his notice of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to file a declaration of prior actions or a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14. Petitioner then filed an amended notice of appeal, which included the required Chapter 14 filings, and a motion for rehearing, asserting that the amended notice of appeal cured the deficiency in his notice of appeal. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals must give an inmate the opportunity to cure a Chapter 14 filing defect before it can dismiss the appeal. View "McLean v. Livingston" on Justia Law

Petitioners were six individuals who sued for divorce in Tarrant County between 2008 and 2012. Petitioners filed uncontested affidavits of indigence in lieu of paying costs pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 145, but Petitioners’ final divorce decrees nevertheless allocated costs. In 2012, the District Clerk of Tarrant County sent collection notices to each Petitioner demanding about $300 in court costs and fees and threatening the seizure of Petitioners’ property to satisfy the debt. Petitioners sued for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief in a district court that had not issued any of their divorce decrees. The district court temporarily enjoined the District Clerk from collecting court costs from indigent parties who have filed an affidavit on indigency. The court of appeals vacated the injunction and dismissed the case because the trial court had not rendered the judgments in the cases in which costs were billed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over the petitions; and (2) the temporary injunction was proper. Remanded. View "Campbell v. Wilder" on Justia Law

After a retrial, a jury found that Mother had endangered her daughter and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. The court of appeals affirmed. The attorney in Mother’s second appeal moved to withdraw. The court of appeals granted the motion to withdraw without considering whether new counsel should be appointed. Mother, who was indigent, filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which motion was transferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court abated the case to consider the issue of Mother’s right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and Mother’s motion for appointment of counsel, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by allowing counsel to withdraw; and (2) the right to counsel under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 107.103(a) includes all proceedings in the Court, including the filing of a petition for review, and if a court of appeals allows an attorney to withdraw, it must provide for the appointment of new counsel to pursue a petition for review. View "In re P.M." on Justia Law

The Golf Channel, Inc. entered into an agreement with Stanford International Bank Limited (Stanford) under which Golf Channel received $5.9 million in exchange for media-advertising services. It was later discovered that Stanford used a classic Ponzi-scheme artifice. At issue in this case was whether Golf Channel must return all remuneration paid for services rendered absent proof the transaction benefited Stanford’s creditors. The Fifth Circuit initially ordered Golf Channel to relinquish its compensation, concluding that media-advertising services have “no value” to a Ponzi scheme’s creditors despite the same services being potentially “quite valuable” to the creditors of a legitimate business. On rehearing, the Circuit vacated its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), under which an asset transferred with intent to defraud a creditor may be reclaimed for the benefit of the transferor’s creditors unless the transferee took the asset in good faith and for “reasonably equivalent value.” The Supreme Court held that TUFTA does not contain separate standards for assessing “value” and “reasonably equivalent value” based on whether the debtor was operating a Ponzi scheme and that value must be determined objectively at the time of the transfer and in relation to the individual exchange at hand. View "Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc." on Justia Law

N.C., a state-prison inmate, filed a petition to expunge criminal records. The trial court denied the petition. N.C. appealed but failed to include two filings required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14. The court of appeals dismissed the action without giving N.C. an opportunity to cure the Chapter 14 filing defects. N.C. filed a timely notice of rehearing. Thereafter, N.C. complied with the court’s instructions and corrected both Chapter 14 filing defects. The court of appeals, however, denied N.C.’s motion for rehearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in accordance with McLean v. Livingston, the court of appeals must give an inmate an opportunity to cure a Chapter 14 filing defect in an appellate proceeding, through an amended filing, before the court can dismiss the appeal. View "Ex Parte N.C." on Justia Law