Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Houston City Council adopted an equal rights ordinance, Relators - residents of the City of Houston - organized a petition drive calling for the City Council to repeal the ordinance or put it to popular vote. The City Secretary certified the petition’s sufficiency, but the City Council denied it, claiming that the petition was invalid because it lacked the required number of valid signatures. Relators sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding (1) Relators did not have an adequate remedy by way of appeal for lack of sufficient time for the appeal to be finally resolved; and (2) the City Council did not perform its ministerial duty to immediately reconsider the ordinance after the City Secretary certified the petition’s sufficiency and, if it did not repeal it, to put it on the November 2015 ballot. View "In re Jared Woodfill" on Justia Law

Respondent sued Petitioners and attempted to serve Petitioners by using Petitioners’ registered address on file with the Secretary of State’s office. Petitioners, however, had moved several years earlier and had failed to provide an updated registered address to the Secretary of State. Petitioners did not answer the lawsuit, and Respondent obtained a default judgment. Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 239a, Respondent certified Petitioners’ outdated address as their last known mailing address, even though there was some evidence Respondent had actual notice of Petitioners’ current address. Petitioners failed to receive notice of the default judgment. Petitioners filed a petition for an equitable bill of review, asserting that Respondent had not properly served them with process and not had properly certified their last known mailing address for notice of the default judgment. The trial court granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Petitioners presented some evidence that their failure to receive notice of the default judgment resulted solely from Respondent’s failure to properly certify Petitioners’ last known mailing address, and not from any negligence or fault on Petitioners’ part, Petitioners raised a genuine issue of material fact in their bill-of-review claim. View "Kay Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp." on Justia Law

This case involved a boundary dispute between the City of Ingleside and the City of Corpus Christi over the scope of an ordinance establishing the adjacent bay waters’ “shoreline” as the common border. Each city claimed that several piers, bulkheads, wharves, and artificial structures affixed to Ingleside’s shore and projecting into bay waters fell within its jurisdictional boundaries. Ingleside sued Corpus Christi seeking a declaration that the structures were functionally part of the land and therefore were within the jurisdiction of the land side of the shoreline. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to establish the boundary between the two cities because the issue was a purely political question not subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether natural and artificial conditions are protrusions of the “shoreline” is a justiciable issue materially distinct from a legislative determination about where to establish a municipal boundary line, and therefore, Ingelside’s declaration did not require the court to address a political question beyond the Court’s competence or authority. Remanded. View "City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi" on Justia Law

McGinnes Industrial Waste Corporation dumped pulp and paper mill waste sludge into disposal pits near the San Jacinto River in Pasadena, Texas (the site). After environmental contamination was discovered at the site, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) instituted superfund cleanup proceedings under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). During the period that McGinnes was dumping waste at the Site, it was covered by standard-form commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies issued by Phoenix Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company (together, the Insurers). McGinnes requested a defense in the EPA proceedings from the Insurers. The Insurers refused, determining that the proceedings were not a “suit” under the policy. McGinnes sued the insurers in federal court seeking a declaration that the policies obligated them to defend the EPA’s CERCLA proceedings. The district court granted the Insurers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the duty-to-defend issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question regarding the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that “suit” in the CGL policies at issue must also include CERCLA enforcement proceedings by the EPA. View "McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals held David Dow, a post-trial capital defense attorney, in contempt for violating Court of Criminal Appeals Miscellaneous Rule 11-003 and suspended him from practicing before it for one year. Dow filed this original proceeding seeking mandamus and declaratory relief in the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority in imposing the sanction. The Supreme Court dismissed Dow’s petition, holding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction under the Constitution over Dow’s petition for mandamus relief; and (2) because the Court lacked mandamus jurisdiction, it also lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. View "In re Dow" on Justia Law

In 2011, Respondents sued Petitioner over two acres of land that Petitioner purchased from Respondents in 2006 through a trust. The deed mistakenly - but unambiguously - failed to reserve mineral rights. When Respondents discovered the error, they demanded that Petitioner issue a correction deed, but Petitioner claimed that the statute of limitations barred Respondents’ claims over the deed. Respondents urged the trial court to declare as a matter of law that the deed did not convey mineral rights and argued that Petitioner breached the sales contract by refusing to execute a correction deed. The trial court ruled that Respondents’ claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the discovery rule delayed the accrual of limitations for a deed-reformation claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plainly obvious and material omission in an unambiguous deed is not a type of injury for which the discovery rule is available because it charges parties with irrefutable notice for limitations purposes; (2) Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 13.002 provides all persons, including the grantor, with notice of the deed’s contents as well; and (3) therefore, a grantor who signs an unambiguous deed is presumed as a matter of law to have immediate knowledge of material omissions. Accordingly, Respondents’ suit was untimely. View "Cosgrove v. Cade" on Justia Law

Francisco Lopez hired Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP (the Firm) to represent him in a divorce suit. The attorney-client employment contract between the parties contained an arbitration provision specifying that Lopez and the Firm will arbitrate any disputes that arise between them with the exception of claims made by the Firm for recovery of its fees and expenses. Once the underlying divorce matter was settled, Lopez sued the Firm, claiming that the Firm induced him to accept an inadequate settlement. The Firm moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the Firm’s motion. The Firm filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the denial and an original proceeding seeking mandamus under common law. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to order arbitration and denied mandamus relief, concluding that the arbitration provision was so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lopez did not prove that either the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable or any other defense to the arbitration provision. View "In re Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were deaf inmates housed in a unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). Petitioners sued TDCJ’s executive director, asserting that he violated the Texas Human Resources Code by failing reasonably to accommodate their impairment. Petitioners relied on the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity as a basis for showing that the trial court had jurisdiction. The trial court granted a temporary injunction ordering TDCJ to make certain accommodations. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, holding that TDCJ prison facilities are not “public facilities” under the Code, and therefore, Defendant could not have acted ultra vires by failing to comply with its provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that TDCJ prisons are not “public facilities” under the Code and that Petitioners failed to show Defendant acted ultra vires. View "Beeman v. Livingston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of attorneys’ immunity from civil liability to non-clients. Philip Byrd and Nancy Simenstad commenced divorce proceedings. Simenstad was represented in the proceedings by Cantey Hanger, LLP. The parties eventually settled. The decree awarded Simenstad three aircraft as her separate property, including a Piper Seminole that had been owned by Lucy Leasing, Co., LLC. Byrd and two of the companies awarded to Byrd in the decree later sued Simenstad and Cantey Hanger alleging that after the decree was entered, Defendants falsified a bill of sale transferring the Piper Seminole from Lucy Leasing to a third party in order to shift tax liability for the aircraft to Byrd in contravention of the divorce decree. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cantey Hanger on attorney-immunity grounds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the firm’s alleged misconduct was unrelated to the divorce litigation and that the firm had not conclusively established its entitlement to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Canter Hanger conclusively established that it is immune from civil liability to Plaintiffs, and therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. View "Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Greater Houston Partnership (GHP) is a nonprofit corporation providing economic development services to the City and other clients pursuant to quid pro quo contracts. A Houston area resident submitted to GHP a request seeking a copy of GHP’s check register. The resident claimed that GHP is an organization that spends or is supported in whole or in part by public funds, and therefore, GHP is subject to the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA) in the same manner as a governmental body. GHP did not disclose the requested information, claiming that it did not qualify as a “governmental body” under the TPIA because the public funds it received were compensation for services provided to the City of Houston pursuant to a contract. The Attorney General concluded that GHP was subject to the TPIA’s disclosure requirements. The trial court agreed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that GHP is not a “governmental body” under the TPIA because it is not wholly or partially sustained by public funds. View "Greater Houston P’ship v. Paxton" on Justia Law