Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

J&D Towing, LLC, a towing company, owned only one tow truck that was rendered a total loss when a negligent motorist collided with the truck. J&D filed a claim with American Alternative Insurance Corporation (AAIC) under an underinsured-motorist policy issued by AAIC requesting compensation for the loss of use of the truck. AAIC denied the claim. Thereafter, J&D sued AAIC seeking loss-of-use damages. The trial court entered judgment in favor of J&D. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Texas law allows loss-of-use damages for partial destruction but not for total destruction of personal property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Texas law permits loss-of-use damages in total-destruction cases. View "J&D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Ray Fischer transferred his business assets to CTMI, LLC pursuant to a written asset-purchase agreement. CTMI later filed a second amended petition alleging that portions of the asset-purchase agreement were unenforceable “agreements to agree.” The trial court entered judgment in favor of Fischer. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that the disputed portion of CTMI’s payment obligations was an unenforceable agreement to agree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payment provision at issue was enforceable because its material terms were sufficiently definite to enable a court to determine CTMI’s obligation and provide a remedy for its breach. View "Fischer v. CTMI, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Jason Jenkins was injured while using an acid-addition system at a chemical plant. The acid-addition was added to the plant in 1992 by Occidental Chemical Corporation. Occidental sold the plant to Equistar chemicals, L.P., Jenkins’s employer, in 1998. Jenkins sued Occidental, among other defendants, alleging that Occidental’s negligent design of the acid-addition system caused his injuries. Occidental affirmatively pled two statutes of repose. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment that Jenkins take nothing, concluding that the verdict supported at least one of Occidental’s repose defenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Jenkins’s claim was based on Occidental’s negligent design of the acid-addition system, a theory that survived Occidental’s sale of the property and continued independently of any premises-liability claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a claim against a previous owner for injury allegedly caused by a dangerous condition of real property is a premises-liability claim, regardless of the previous property owner’s role in creating the condition; and (2) because the previous owner sold the property several years before Plaintiff’s accident and did not otherwise owe Plaintiff a duty of care, the court of appeals erred in holding Occidental liable for the dangerous condition and Jenkins’s injury. View "Occidential Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

U.S. Metals, Inc. sold ExxonMobil Corp. approximately 350 flanges for use in constructing diesel refinery processing units. In post-installation testing, several flanges leaked, and ExxonMobil decided it was necessary to replace them to avoid the risk of fire and explosion. ExxonMobil sued U.S. Metals for the cost of replacing the flanges and damages for the lost use of the diesel units during the process. U.S. Metal settled with ExxonMobil and then claimed indemnification from its commercial general liability (CGL) insurer, Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., for the amount paid. Liberty Mutual denied coverage. U.S. Metals sued in federal district court to determine its right to a defense and indemnity under the policy. Four questions were certified to the Supreme Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court concluded that the CGL does not cover most of the damages claimed and answered the circuit court’s questions accordingly. View "U.S. Metals, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident that occurred when a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) trooper ran a red light while pursuing a reckless driver. Plaintiff filed suit against DPS, relying on the Texas Tort Claims Act’s sovereign-immunity waiver. DPS filed a combined motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that it retained immunity from suit based on the trooper’s official immunity and the emergency-response exception to the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver. The trial court denied DPS’s motion and plea. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that DPS failed conclusively to establish the good-faith element of its official-immunity defense, and DPS’s summary judgment was incompetent to establish good faith because it failed to address whether the trooper considered alternative courses of action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied an inaccurate good-faith standard and erred in concluding that DPS failed to adduce evidence addressing alternatives to pursuit. Remanded. View "Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued BNSF Railway Company, his employer, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act to recover damages for a latent occupational injury. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff $1.9 million in costs and damages. BNSF appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was untimely. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because there was conflicting evidence in the record concerning when the injury occurred, the jury was entitled to weigh that evidence and reach its finding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Plaintiff take nothing, holding that no evidence supported the jury’s finding that Plaintiff timely filed his lawsuit. View "BNSF Ry. Co. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Hospital, alleging that she was injured when she slipped on water on the floor. Hospital filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC), and Plaintiff failed to serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. The trial court denied Hospital’s motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because Plaintiff’s claim was based on an alleged departure from accepted standards of safety, it was an HCLC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no substantive nexus was shown to exist between the safety standards Plaintiff alleged Hospital violated the the provision of health care, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim was not a health care liability claim. View "Galvan v. Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract and for wrongfully discharging him in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim in good faith. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim related to Defendant’s failure to remit accrued vacation pay upon his termination. A jury found in Plaintiff’s favor. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him past and future lost earnings, employee benefits, and other damages. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment on the retaliation claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, holding that no evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that claim. View "Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, alleging breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Concerned by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s (Counsel) exposure to certain documents as a result of Counsel working “closely” with Defendant’s former finance manager, Defendant moved to disqualify Counsel from representing Plaintiff. The special master denied the motion to disqualify. The trial court, however, ordered Counsel’s disqualification. The court of appeals subsequently denied Plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the trial court improperly disqualified Counsel under In re American Home Products Corp., as the American Home Products screening requirement does not govern a fact witness with information about his former employer if his position with that employer existed independently of litigation and he did not primarily report to lawyers. Rather, to the extent that a fact witness discloses his past employer’s privileged and confidential information, the factors outlined in In re Meador should guide the trial court’s decision regarding disqualification. View "In re RSR Corp. and Quemetco Metals Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law

Lorene and Harley Walter owned a certificate of deposit account with Bank of America. The account was a survivorship account and a payable-on-death account. After Harley died and while Lorene was still alive, the Bank distributed the funds in the account to Dwight Eisenhauer and Jo Ann Day, the named beneficiaries on the account, in equal sums. The Bank violated its deposit agreement with the Walters in doing so because these payments were made before Harley’s death. Eisenhauer, using his power of attorney, deposited his check into an account in Lorene’s name, making himself beneficiary upon her death. After Lorene died, Eisenhauer, as the independent executor of Lorene’s estate, sued the Bank for breach of the deposit agreement. The jury found that the Bank had failed to comply with the agreement but that the estate suffered no damages. The trial court subsequently granted judgment for Eisenhauer notwithstanding the jury’s verdict and rendered judgment for the amount that had been distributed to Day, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Eisenhauer, as the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the estate suffered no damages. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Eisenhauer" on Justia Law