Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Wayne Ventling initiated divorce proceedings seeking to end a common-law marriage to Patricia Johnson the parties entered into an agreement that included contractual alimony payments to Johnson. Thereafter, Ventling argued that he and Johnson had never been married, and therefore, his contractual obligations were invalid. The dispute over the agreed divorce decree spawned eighteen years of litigation and was now on its third appeal. The remaining issues were when postjudgment interest began accruing, whether Johnson was correctly denied both prejudgment and postjudgment interest for a portion of the proceedings, and whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s request for conditional appellate attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals’ judgment, holding (1) June 16, 2009 was the date of the final judgment for purposes of calculating prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the award of damages on Johnson’s underlying claim; (2) March 21, 2012 was the date of final judgment for purposes of calculating postjudgment interest on the severable award of past attorney’s fees; (3) the trial court erred in creating a gap between the accrual of prejudgment and postjudgment interest; and (3) the court erred in denying Johnson’s request for conditional appellate attorney fees. Remanded. View "Ventling v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas sued TCI West End, Inc. for civil penalties under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 54.017, as authorized by section 54.012, asserting that TCI violated a city ordinance by demolishing a building located in a historic overlay district. Following a jury verdict in the City’s favor, the trial court awarded the City $750,000 in civil penalties. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) sections 54.012 and 54.017 apply only to health and safety ordinances, not general zoning ordinances regulating the use of land; and (2) in the alternative, there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that TCI had actual notice of the ordinance provision before demolishing the building. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment concluding that Chapter 54 did not authorize the City’s enforcement action against TCI, holding that the court of appeals’ holding was incompatible with the statute’s plain language. View "City of Dallas v. TCI West End, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Henderson, a pipeline insulation worker who had contracted mesothelioma, alleged that he was exposed to asbestos-containing products while working as an independent contractor at Dow Chemical Company’s facility. Henderson was allegedly exposed to asbestos both directly from his own insulation work and as a bystander to the insulation work of Dow employees. Dow moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 95 applied to Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Chapter 95 relates to limitations on a property owner’s liability for injury, death, or property damage to an independent contractor. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff’s negligence claims based on Dow’s negligent activities would go to a jury but not his claims based on injuries arising out of his own work. The jury found that Dow’s negligence proximately caused Henderson’s injuries. The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Dow, concluding that Chapter 95 applied to all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Dow and that Plaintiffs had failed to establish Dow’s liability under the standards set forth in Chapter 95. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Chapter 95 applies to all independent contractor claims for damages caused by a property owner’s negligence when the requirements of section 95.002(2) are satisfied. View "Abutahoun v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law

The insured in this case (Insured) managed the insurance needs of more than 100 commercial properties. Insured purchased an excess policy from Insurer. The excess insurance policy limited the coverage to “the least” of three alternative amounts. When Hurricane Rita hit the Gulf Coast, the hurricane damaged fifteen of the properties at issue. Insurer calculated “the least” of the three alternative limits separately for each covered item at each damaged property, on an item-by-item basis. Insured filed suit against Insurer to recover the difference between its losses and the amount that Insurer had paid, contending that “the least” of the three limits applied just once in any one occurrence to the total of all losses from all covered items at all of the damaged properties. The trial court agreed with Insurer’s construction of the policy and ordered that Insured pay nothing. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Insured’s construction was correct, and awarded Insured $7.5 million. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both constructions are reasonable, and the policy is therefore ambiguous; and (2) because the Court’s rules require it to construe an insurance policy’s ambiguous coverage limitation in favor of coverage for the insured, the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed. View "RSUI Indemnity Co. v. Lynd Co." on Justia Law

The users of an aerial lift supporting a worker forty feet in the air attempted to move the machine. The worker fell to the ground and died. This action for wrongful death and survivor damages ensued. Petitioner manufactures and sells the aerial lift. Users of the aerial lift are warned that “attempting to move the machine with the platform raised will tip the machine over and cause death or serious injury.” Petitioner has sold more than 100,000 of its lifts worldwide. There are only three reported accidents like the one in issue. Here, the jury found that a design defect in the lift caused the accident. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s design defect finding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was little evidence of a safer alternative design for the aerial lift, and there was no evidence in the record that the lift was unreasonably dangerous. View "Genie Industries, Inc. v. Matak" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a warehouse fire in Pasadena, Texas. Plaintiffs, the company that leased the warehouse and the company that stored materials in the warehouse, sued Defendants, the suppliers of the chlorpyrifos that the lessee used in the warehouse, for manufacturing and marketing defect, breach of contract, negligence, and other causes of action. The jury found that the chlorpyrifos was defective and that Defendants breached the parties’ contract. After the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiffs, Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the testimony of all four of Plaintiffs’ experts was unreliable and constituted no evidence of negligence, manufacturing defect, and causation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that each expert’s individual testimony was reliable, and therefore, the experts’ collective testimony was reliable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the testimony of all four experts was unreliable; and (2) consequently, there was no evidence of an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the main defendant (Defendant) both wanted an interest in a coalbed methane exploration prospect in Bulgaria. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant obtained his interest by tortiously interfering with the owner’s contract to convey an interest to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed damages for the loss of its interest in the project. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded $66.5 million in actual damages. The trial court reduced the damages to $31.16 million. The court of appeals reversed in part and rendered judgment on the verdict, awarding Plaintiff the $66.5 million actual damages found by the jury, as well as exemplary damages. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence of the fair market value of Plaintiff’s lost interest was too speculative to support the jury’s award of damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, under the rule that lost profits cannot be recovered as damages unless proven to a reasonable certainty, Plaintiff was not permitted to recover all of the damages found by the jury. View "Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a visitor to St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, slipped and fell in an area of the lobby where the floor was being cleaned and buffed. Plaintiff sued the Hospital on a premises liability theory. The Hospital asserted that Plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC) under the Texas Medical Liability Act and moved for dismissal of the complaint because Plaintiff failed to serve an expert report. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s suit was not a HCLC because the record demonstrated that Plaintiff’s claim was based on safety standards that had no substantive relationship to the Hospital’s providing of health care; and (2) because Plaintiff’s claim was not an HCLC, Plaintiff was not required to serve an expert report to avoid dismissal of her suit. Remanded. View "Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp." on Justia Law

Following their two-month-old’s death from whooping cough, Plaintiffs sued Kristin Ault, D.O. and her employer, ETMC First Physicians, alleging that Dr. Ault’s negligence caused the infant’s death and that ETMC was vicariously liable for the negligence. After Plaintiffs served Defendants with an amended expert report, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the expert’s opinions as to causation were conclusory because the report failed to link the expert's opinions to the underlying facts. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the lawsuit dismissed in light of conflicting statements in the report, which the court held failed to link the expert’s conclusions to the underlying facts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the report was not conclusory but was a good faith effort to comply with the Texas Medical Liability Act’s requirements. View "Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians" on Justia Law

William Marsh Rice University (Rice University), a private institution of higher education, employed Officer Gary Spears as a commissioned peace officer at its police department. Officer Spears arrested Rasheed Rafaey for driving while intoxicated and other charges. The charges against Rafaey were later dismissed. Thereafter, Rafaey sued Officer Spears and Rice University (collectively, Defendants) alleging that the arrest and detention were unlawful. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Defendants’ interlocutory appeal without determining whether Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Officer Spears was not an “officer or employee of the state” that may invoke a court of appeals’ interlocutory jurisdiction under Tex. Civil. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) to consider the appeals of both Officer Spears and Rice University because the “officer…of the state” language in the statute applies to university peace officers. View "William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Rafael" on Justia Law