Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents, a same-sex couple who were married in Massachusetts, sought a divorce in Texas. The two women settled their differences, and the trial court orally granted an ostensible divorce pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The State filed a petition in intervention seeking to oppose the petition for divorce and to defend the constitutionality of Texas law that limits divorce actions to persons of the opposite sex who are married to one another. The State argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to render a divorce. The trial court ultimately decided not to entertain the State’s petition, concluding that the attempted intervention was untimely. The court of appeals dismissed the State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, also ruling that the intervention was untimely. The State sought the Supreme Court’s review, asking the Court to allow the intervention and to vacate the divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and denied the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the State failed to secure standing by properly presenting its arguments to the trial court and court of appeals, and consequently, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reach those issues. View "State v. Naylor" on Justia Law

At issue in this residential construction dispute was whether the statutory cap on exemplary damages is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense or avoidance. The trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of the statutory cap because Petitioner did not assert the cap until her motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the exemplary damages award, concluding that the statutory cap on exemplary damages did not apply because Petitioner failed to expressly plead the cap as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in relation to the exemplary cap, holding (i) the exemplary damages cap is not a matter ”constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” and need not be affirmatively pleaded because it applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts, and (ii) because Petitioner timely asserted the cap in her motion for new trial, the exemplary damages must be capped at $200,000; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC" on Justia Law

A number of civil disputes arose from the discovery that a probate clerk had looted millions of dollars from the estates of Bexar County residents who had died intestate. The case involved an intestate estate defrauded of more than half a million dollars. More than a decade after the estate’s administration had closed, and more than three years after learning that the rogue clerk had misappropriated funds from the estates, the intestate’s heirs petitioned by equitable bill of review to re-open the estate, alleging that the estate administrator breached fiduciary duties and fraudulently concealed information about the estate’s assets. The probate court granted the equitable bill of review and set aside the orders closing probate. Thereafter, the heirs successfully litigated their claims against the administrator and were awarded damages against the administrator and his surety. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the heirs’ bill of review was untimely because it was filed more than two years after they received information that would cause a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action. View "Valdez v. Bernard" on Justia Law

In a 1996 purchase and sale agreement Torch Energy Advisors Inc. sold its leasehold interests in undeveloped oil and gas fields located under federal waters. Certain interests were excluded from the conveyance. A decade later, a federal court determined that the federal government had repudiated the mineral leases because a statute enacted before the conveyance had been applied in a manner that precluded development of the leasehold interests. Consequently, the purchaser’s successor in interest, Plains Exploration & Production Company, was awarded restitution of the lease-bonus payments that Torch’s predecessor had paid to secure the leases. Torch claimed an ownership interest in approximately half of the judgment based on the terms of the excluded-assets provision in the 1996 agreement. Plains declined to pay. Torch sued, alleging contract and equitable theories of recovery. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in Plains’s favor. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded the equity claim for a trial on the merits, concluding that Torch’s equitable claim hinged on the proper construction of the 1996 agreement’s terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant excluded-assets provisions in the 1996 agreement were unambiguous and, as a matter of law, Torch did not retain ownership of the claimed asset. View "Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors, Inc." on Justia Law

Kachina Pipeline Co., a pipeline operator, and Michael Lillis, a natural-gas producer, entered into a Gas Purchase Agreement. Kachina bought, transported, and resold Lillis’s gas according to the Agreement. Lillis later entered into a separate purchase agreement and constructed his own pipeline to one of Davis Gas Processing’s plants. Thereafter, Lillis sued Kachina, asserting that Kachina breached the Agreement by deducting the costs of compression that occurred after Lillis delivered the gas to Kachina. Lillis also brought a fraud claim, asserting that Kachina represented it would release him from the Agreement. Kachina counterclaimed for breach of the Agreement and seeking declarations that it had the right to deduct compression charges under the Agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Kachina, declaring that the Agreement entitled Kachina to deduct the costs of compression from its payments to Lillis and that the Agreement gave Kachina the option to extend the arrangement for an additional five-year term. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Agreement unambiguously allowed neither the disputed deductions nor a five-year extension. Remanded. View "Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Lillis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were more than 400 residents and homeowners in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in Harris County. From 1998 to 2002, most of Plaintiffs’ homes were inundated in three successive floods. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against several government entities, arguing that Defendants knew that harm was substantially certain to result to Plaintiffs’ homes when Defendants approved private development in the White Oak Bayou watershed without mitigating its consequences. Defendants responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised on the elements of the takings claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a fact question existed as to each element of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, and therefore, the government entities’ plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied. View "Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

A narrow majority of voters in the City of Houston adopted an amendment to their City Charter that was approved in the November 2, 2010 election. The amendment created a “Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund for Drainage and Streets.” After the election, several voters filed an election contest seeking a declaration that the ballot proposition was invalid and a determination that the adoption of the amendment was invalid. The ballot in this case did not make clear that the amendment imposed charges directly on many voters. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the City did not adequately describe the chief features of the charter amendment on the ballot, the proposed amendment was not submitted with such definiteness and certainty that voters would not be misled. Remanded. View "Dacus v. Parker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while mopping a restroom floor at a Kroger store. Plaintiff’s employer, Kroger Texas, LP, had elected not to subscribe to the Texas workers’ compensation system. Plaintiff filed suit against Kroger in state court, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. Kroger removed the case to federal district court. The court granted summary judgment to Kroger. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. At issue in this appeal was Plaintiff’s premises-liability claim. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the nature and scope of an employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe workplace is unclear under Texas law when an employee is aware of the hazard or risk at issue and certified a question of law regarding the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that, under Texas law (1) an employer generally does not have a duty to warn or protect its employees from unreasonably dangerous premises conditions that are open and obvious or known to the employee; and (2) under this rule, the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s waiver of a nonsubscribing employer’s common law defenses does not eliminate an employee’s burden of proving that the employer owed him a duty as an element of a premises liability claim. View "Austin v. Kroger Texas, LP" on Justia Law

Candelario Lopez, who was hired by Interstate Treating to work on the installation of a gas processing plant, was transporting two other Interstate Treating employees to the job site when he died in an automobile accident. Lopez’s wife, Maximina Lopez, sought death benefits from Interstate Treating’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, SeaBright Insurance Co. SeaBright denied coverage, concluding that Lopez was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. A hearing officer, however, determined that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment and ordered SeaBright to pay death benefits. The trial court affirmed the administrative decision. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he died, and Maximina was entitled to benefits. View "Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez" on Justia Law

As a general matter, an overriding royalty on oil and gas production is free of production costs but must bear its share of postproduction costs unless the parties agree otherwise. In this case, the Hyder family leased 948 mineral acres. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC acquired the lessee’s interest. The Hyders and Chesapeake agreed that the overriding royalty was free of production costs under the lease but disputed whether it was also free of postproduction costs. The trial court rendered judgment for the Hyders, awarding them $575,359 in postproduction costs that Chesapeake wrongfully deducted from their overriding royalty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease in this case clearly freed the gas royalty of postproduction costs and did the same for the overriding royalty. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder" on Justia Law