Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, a shareholder of a closely held parent corporation asserted a derivative lawsuit on behalf of the corporation’s wholly owned subsidiary against one of the subsidiary’s directors and several of the subsidiary’s officers, employees, and managers for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. The trial court concluded that the shareholder did not have standing to bring the derivative lawsuit. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the shareholder had double-derivative standing to sue and that the business judgment rule did not impose a jurisdictional barrier that the shareholder had to overcome to bring the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the enactment of the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA) did not alter the way the business judgment rule applies to the merits of derivative lawsuits alleging that the directors or officers of a closely held corporation breached their duties to the corporation; (2) to achieve standing to assert a derivative proceeding under TBCA, a shareholder plaintiff is not required to plead and prove that the board of directors acted outside the protections of the business judgment rule in deciding not to pursue the corporation’s cause of action; and (3) Texas recognizes the concept of double-derivative standing. View "Sneed v. Webre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a cardiothoracic surgeon who practiced at Memorial Hermann Memorial City Medical Center until 2012. When Plaintiff agreed to practice at Methodist West, Defendants - Memorial Hermann and certain healthcare practitioners - began conducting a “whisper campaign” against Plaintiff to cast doubt on Plaintiff’s heart surgery procedures. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting claims for business disparagement, defamation, tortious interference with prospective business relationship, and improper restraint of trade. When Plaintiff moved to compel the production of certain documents, Memorial Hermann asserted the documents were protected from discovery under the medical committee privilege and the medical peer review committee privilege. The trial court ordered Defendants to produce the documents. After the court of appeals denied Defendants’ petition for writ of mandamus, Defendants sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief as to some of the documents that the Court determined were protected but denied relief as to the remainder of the documents, holding that they were not confidential under either the medical committee privilege or the medical peer review committee privilege. View "In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys." on Justia Law

After Shell Oil Company and Shell International, E&P, Inc. (collectively, Shell) received notice from the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by one of its contractors, Shell performed an internal investigation and reported the results to the DOJ. Shell employee Robert Writt was terminated following the investigation. Writt sued Shell for wrongful termination and defamation. Writt’s defamation claim was based on allegations that, in the report provided to the DOJ, Shell falsely accused him of approving bribery payments and participating in illegal conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Shell, concluding that Shell was absolutely privileged to prove the investigative report to the DOJ. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the report was only conditionally, not absolutely, privileged because the evidence did not conclusively establish that at the time Shell provided its report to the DOJ a criminal judicial proceeding was under serious consideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Shell’s statements were made preliminarily to a proposed judicial proceeding, and thus, the statements in the report were absolutely privileged. View "Shell Oil Co. v. Writt" on Justia Law

Elias Alvarado filed a complaint against the City of McCamey for negligence and negligence per se, claiming that governmental employee Jesus Molina was driving a city vehicle under the influence of alcohol when he struck Alvarado’s vehicle. The City asserted immunity from suit. Alvarado then filed an amended petition naming Molina as an additional defendant. Molina moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA)’s election-of-remedies provision, alleging that Alvarado had previously made an irrevocable election to sue the City and was thus barred from suing him as well. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that material fact questions existed regarding whether Molina was actually driving the City’s vehicle within the scope of his employment or under the influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the TTCA, Alvarado’s choice to sue only the City, not its employee, constituted an irrevocable election and barred any future suit against Molina, an individual employee of the City, regarding the same subject matter. View "Molina v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

To suspend execution of a money judgment on appeal, a judgment debtor must post security as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 52.006 and Tex. R. App. P. 24. The security must cover compensatory damages, interest, and costs, but is subject to caps. In this case, Longview Energy Company obtained a judgment against five defendants for breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants appealed and together posted a $25 million bond as security to supersede enforcement of the judgment. The trial court applied the caps separately to each of four jointly and severally liable defendants, requiring the four defendants to post security equal to the lesser of $25 million or fifty percent of Defendants’ net worth. The court of appeals reversed the security order, concluding that Defendants were together required to post only $25 million in security to supersede the judgment as to them all. All parties petitioned the Supreme Court for relief by mandamus. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) the money judgment award at issue was not for “compensatory damages,” and therefore, the Court need not consider whether the court of appeals correctly applied the caps on security; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering post-judgment discovery. View "In re Longview Energy Co." on Justia Law

At issue in these two separate cases was whether a life settlement agreement or viatical settlement agreement is an investment contract and thus a security under the Texas Securities Act. In one case, Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Life Partners, Inc. violated the Texas Securities Act (Act) by selling unregistered securities and misrepresenting to purchasers that they were not, in fact, securities. In the second case, the State filed suit alleging that Life Partners had committed fraud in connection with the sale of securities. The Both district courts entered judgments for Life Partners. Both courts of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the life settlement agreements were securities under the Texas Securities Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the agreements at issue in these cases were investment contracts, and thus securities, under the Texas Securities Act. View "Life Partners Holdings, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

Cuahutemoc Gonzalez contracted with several companies, including a company owned by Robert Garcia, to transport silage from a farm. Garcia brought to the farm a tandem truck and a new driver, Raymond Ramierz. During the tandem truck’s first trip, Ramirez collided with a car in which a mother and daughter were traveling. The collision killed all three. Samuel Jackson, the daughter’s father and mother’s former husband, filed suit against Gonzalez, seeking to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of Garcia and Ramirez based on Gonzalez’s alleged status as a motor carrier under both the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (Federal Regulations) and their Texas counterparts (Texas Regulations). Ramirez’s family (the Ramirezes) intervened and asserted negligence claims against Gonzalez under common-law theories of retained control over an independent contract and joint enterprise. The trial court granted Gonzalez’s no-evidence motions for summary judgment as to both the Ramirezes’ and Jackson’s claims. The court of appeals reversed as to the no-evidence summary judgment on Jackson’s claim under the Texas Regulations and on the Ramirezes’ negligence claims based on retained control. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Gonzalez cannot be held liable as a motor carrier under either the Federal Regulations or the Texas Regulations; and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to show that the same party retained sufficient control over the transportation in which the truck was engaged to owe Ramirez a common-law duty. View "Gonzalez v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

When Wayne Ventling initiated divorce proceedings seeking to end a common-law marriage to Patricia Johnson the parties entered into an agreement that included contractual alimony payments to Johnson. Thereafter, Ventling argued that he and Johnson had never been married, and therefore, his contractual obligations were invalid. The dispute over the agreed divorce decree spawned eighteen years of litigation and was now on its third appeal. The remaining issues were when postjudgment interest began accruing, whether Johnson was correctly denied both prejudgment and postjudgment interest for a portion of the proceedings, and whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s request for conditional appellate attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals’ judgment, holding (1) June 16, 2009 was the date of the final judgment for purposes of calculating prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the award of damages on Johnson’s underlying claim; (2) March 21, 2012 was the date of final judgment for purposes of calculating postjudgment interest on the severable award of past attorney’s fees; (3) the trial court erred in creating a gap between the accrual of prejudgment and postjudgment interest; and (3) the court erred in denying Johnson’s request for conditional appellate attorney fees. Remanded. View "Ventling v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas sued TCI West End, Inc. for civil penalties under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 54.017, as authorized by section 54.012, asserting that TCI violated a city ordinance by demolishing a building located in a historic overlay district. Following a jury verdict in the City’s favor, the trial court awarded the City $750,000 in civil penalties. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) sections 54.012 and 54.017 apply only to health and safety ordinances, not general zoning ordinances regulating the use of land; and (2) in the alternative, there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that TCI had actual notice of the ordinance provision before demolishing the building. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment concluding that Chapter 54 did not authorize the City’s enforcement action against TCI, holding that the court of appeals’ holding was incompatible with the statute’s plain language. View "City of Dallas v. TCI West End, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Henderson, a pipeline insulation worker who had contracted mesothelioma, alleged that he was exposed to asbestos-containing products while working as an independent contractor at Dow Chemical Company’s facility. Henderson was allegedly exposed to asbestos both directly from his own insulation work and as a bystander to the insulation work of Dow employees. Dow moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 95 applied to Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Chapter 95 relates to limitations on a property owner’s liability for injury, death, or property damage to an independent contractor. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff’s negligence claims based on Dow’s negligent activities would go to a jury but not his claims based on injuries arising out of his own work. The jury found that Dow’s negligence proximately caused Henderson’s injuries. The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Dow, concluding that Chapter 95 applied to all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Dow and that Plaintiffs had failed to establish Dow’s liability under the standards set forth in Chapter 95. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Chapter 95 applies to all independent contractor claims for damages caused by a property owner’s negligence when the requirements of section 95.002(2) are satisfied. View "Abutahoun v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law