Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The insured in this case (Insured) managed the insurance needs of more than 100 commercial properties. Insured purchased an excess policy from Insurer. The excess insurance policy limited the coverage to “the least” of three alternative amounts. When Hurricane Rita hit the Gulf Coast, the hurricane damaged fifteen of the properties at issue. Insurer calculated “the least” of the three alternative limits separately for each covered item at each damaged property, on an item-by-item basis. Insured filed suit against Insurer to recover the difference between its losses and the amount that Insurer had paid, contending that “the least” of the three limits applied just once in any one occurrence to the total of all losses from all covered items at all of the damaged properties. The trial court agreed with Insurer’s construction of the policy and ordered that Insured pay nothing. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Insured’s construction was correct, and awarded Insured $7.5 million. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both constructions are reasonable, and the policy is therefore ambiguous; and (2) because the Court’s rules require it to construe an insurance policy’s ambiguous coverage limitation in favor of coverage for the insured, the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed. View "RSUI Indemnity Co. v. Lynd Co." on Justia Law

The users of an aerial lift supporting a worker forty feet in the air attempted to move the machine. The worker fell to the ground and died. This action for wrongful death and survivor damages ensued. Petitioner manufactures and sells the aerial lift. Users of the aerial lift are warned that “attempting to move the machine with the platform raised will tip the machine over and cause death or serious injury.” Petitioner has sold more than 100,000 of its lifts worldwide. There are only three reported accidents like the one in issue. Here, the jury found that a design defect in the lift caused the accident. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s design defect finding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was little evidence of a safer alternative design for the aerial lift, and there was no evidence in the record that the lift was unreasonably dangerous. View "Genie Industries, Inc. v. Matak" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a warehouse fire in Pasadena, Texas. Plaintiffs, the company that leased the warehouse and the company that stored materials in the warehouse, sued Defendants, the suppliers of the chlorpyrifos that the lessee used in the warehouse, for manufacturing and marketing defect, breach of contract, negligence, and other causes of action. The jury found that the chlorpyrifos was defective and that Defendants breached the parties’ contract. After the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiffs, Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the testimony of all four of Plaintiffs’ experts was unreliable and constituted no evidence of negligence, manufacturing defect, and causation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that each expert’s individual testimony was reliable, and therefore, the experts’ collective testimony was reliable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the testimony of all four experts was unreliable; and (2) consequently, there was no evidence of an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the main defendant (Defendant) both wanted an interest in a coalbed methane exploration prospect in Bulgaria. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant obtained his interest by tortiously interfering with the owner’s contract to convey an interest to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed damages for the loss of its interest in the project. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded $66.5 million in actual damages. The trial court reduced the damages to $31.16 million. The court of appeals reversed in part and rendered judgment on the verdict, awarding Plaintiff the $66.5 million actual damages found by the jury, as well as exemplary damages. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence of the fair market value of Plaintiff’s lost interest was too speculative to support the jury’s award of damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, under the rule that lost profits cannot be recovered as damages unless proven to a reasonable certainty, Plaintiff was not permitted to recover all of the damages found by the jury. View "Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a visitor to St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, slipped and fell in an area of the lobby where the floor was being cleaned and buffed. Plaintiff sued the Hospital on a premises liability theory. The Hospital asserted that Plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC) under the Texas Medical Liability Act and moved for dismissal of the complaint because Plaintiff failed to serve an expert report. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s suit was not a HCLC because the record demonstrated that Plaintiff’s claim was based on safety standards that had no substantive relationship to the Hospital’s providing of health care; and (2) because Plaintiff’s claim was not an HCLC, Plaintiff was not required to serve an expert report to avoid dismissal of her suit. Remanded. View "Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp." on Justia Law

Following their two-month-old’s death from whooping cough, Plaintiffs sued Kristin Ault, D.O. and her employer, ETMC First Physicians, alleging that Dr. Ault’s negligence caused the infant’s death and that ETMC was vicariously liable for the negligence. After Plaintiffs served Defendants with an amended expert report, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the expert’s opinions as to causation were conclusory because the report failed to link the expert's opinions to the underlying facts. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the lawsuit dismissed in light of conflicting statements in the report, which the court held failed to link the expert’s conclusions to the underlying facts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the report was not conclusory but was a good faith effort to comply with the Texas Medical Liability Act’s requirements. View "Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians" on Justia Law

William Marsh Rice University (Rice University), a private institution of higher education, employed Officer Gary Spears as a commissioned peace officer at its police department. Officer Spears arrested Rasheed Rafaey for driving while intoxicated and other charges. The charges against Rafaey were later dismissed. Thereafter, Rafaey sued Officer Spears and Rice University (collectively, Defendants) alleging that the arrest and detention were unlawful. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Defendants’ interlocutory appeal without determining whether Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Officer Spears was not an “officer or employee of the state” that may invoke a court of appeals’ interlocutory jurisdiction under Tex. Civil. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) to consider the appeals of both Officer Spears and Rice University because the “officer…of the state” language in the statute applies to university peace officers. View "William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Rafael" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a severe adverse reaction to a compounded drug administered by her physician that left her permanently blind in both eyes. Plaintiff sued the compounding pharmacy and several of its licensed-pharmacist employees. Taking the position that Plaintiff had asserted health care liability claims governed by the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act), the defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to serve them with an expert report. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the pharmacist defendants were not health care providers, the claims against them were not health care liability claims, and therefore, the Act did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act applies to Plaintiff’s claims against the pharmacist defendants; (2) under the applicable version of that Act, Plaintiff was required to serve the defendants with an expert report within 120 days of filing suit; and (3) because Plaintiff failed to do so, her claims must be dismissed. Remanded. View "Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was involved in two car accidents three months apart. After the second accident, Plaintiff sued the opposing driver in the first accident, alleging that the first collision caused her injuries. Defendant contended that the second accident caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Because of the lack of expert testimony supporting Defendant’s theory and on Plaintiff’s pretrial request, the trial court excluded all evidence of the second accident on relevance grounds. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of the second accident was relevant to whether Defendant’s negligence caused Plaintiff’s damages, and the trial court committed harmful error in excluding the evidence and in refusing to allow cross-examination of Plaintiff’s expert on the subject. Remanded for a new trial. View "JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza" on Justia Law

Steven Lipsky, concerned that an oil and gas operator close to his property (“Range”), had some responsibility for contaminating his ground water, complained about the gas in his well to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Texas Railroad Commission, and the media. Alisa Rich, an environmental consultant, confirmed the presence of gases in the well. The Railroad Commission concluded that Range’s operations were not the source of the contamination. Lipsky and his wife, Shyla, sued Range, alleging negligence. Range counterclaimed against the Lipskys and filed a third-party claim against Rich, alleging defamation, among other claims. The trial court dismissed the Lipskys’ claims as an improper collateral attack on the Commission’s determination and declined to dismiss Range’s claims against the Lipskys and Rich. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief in part, concluding that the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) required the dismissal of Range’s claims against Shyla and Rich but did not require dismissal of Range’s claims against Lipsky. Both Range and Lipsky sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Court denied relief, holding (1) the trial court properly considered circumstantial evidence when considering Lipskys’ motion to dismiss under the TCPA; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in its disposition of the proceedings below. View "In re Lipsky" on Justia Law